Post-Conviction Relief for Immigrants



 
 

§ 7.95 4. Vindictive Sentencing

 
Skip to § 7.

For more text, click "Next Page>"

Judicial vindictiveness may not play a part in the sentence.  A defendant must be free to exercise constitutional and statutory rights without fear of retaliation.[281]  The court is prohibited from imposing punishment on a defendant merely because s/he exercises a constitutional right.[282]


[281] North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (court imposed harsher penalty in retaliation for defendant's exercise of right); see Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (vindictiveness prohibition applied to prosecution).

[282] United States v. Long, 823 F.2d 1209, 1211 (7th Cir. 1987); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978).

Updates

 

Other

POST CON - GROUNDS - CONVICTION - SENTENCE
The sentencing court may not sentence the defendant more harshly for exercising the constitutional right to jury trial, or threaten the defendant with harsher punishment to coerce a plea. In re Lewallen, 23 Cal.3d 274, 278-281 (1979) (court commits judicial misconduct and violates due process by threatening the defendant with a sentence in excess of the plea bargain sentence if he goes to trial, or by sentencing him more harshly for exercising constitutional right to trial by jury); Ryan v. Comn on Judicial Performance, 45 Cal. 3d 518, 534 (1988) (judge removed from the bench in part for using harsh sentencing as a punishment for going to trial). See also Schaffner v. Greco, 458 F.Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (trial judges bias during trial and repeatedly trying to coerce defendant to plead guilty invalidated the guilty plea).

 

TRANSLATE