(B)  Exercise of Right to Remain Silent.  The court may not sentence a defendant more harshly who, after trial, refuses to repent and admit guilt, on the ground this constitutes compulsory self-incrimination and a violation of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.[284]

 

The court may, however, impose a harsher sentence based on an assessment of the defendant’s character.[285]  The court may also reward those who save the state the time and expense of a trial.[286]

[284] LeBlanc v. United States, 391 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1961); United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960); People v. Jones, 118 Ill. App. 2d 189, 254 N.E.2d 843 (1969).

[285] United States v. Johnson, 903 F.2d 1084, 1089-90 (7th Cir. 1990) (no error in recognizing at sentencing that the defendant had no obligation to confess, but finding lack of mitigation because the defendant gave no indication of remorse; the court acknowledged the difficulty in discriminating between punishment for exercise of right to remain silent and for failure to show remorse); United States v. Bangert, 645 F.2d 1297, 1309 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.860 (1981).

[286] Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (“[W]e cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State and who demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary.”); United States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 874 (1990) (defendant’s acknowledgment of guilt may be considered in selection of appropriate sentence to foster rehabilitation); United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 826 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1112 (1989) (no violation of the right to trial by jury to impose harsher sentence on defendant who shows lack of contrition); United States v. Thompson, 476 F.2d 1196, 1201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 918 (1973); United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989).

Other

POST CON - GROUNDS - CONVICTION - SENTENCE
The sentencing court may not sentence the defendant more harshly for exercising the constitutional right to jury trial, or threaten the defendant with harsher punishment to coerce a plea. In re Lewallen, 23 Cal.3d 274, 278-281 (1979) (court commits judicial misconduct and violates due process by threatening the defendant with a sentence in excess of the plea bargain sentence if he goes to trial, or by sentencing him more harshly for exercising constitutional right to trial by jury); Ryan v. Comn on Judicial Performance, 45 Cal. 3d 518, 534 (1988) (judge removed from the bench in part for using harsh sentencing as a punishment for going to trial). See also Schaffner v. Greco, 458 F.Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (trial judges bias during trial and repeatedly trying to coerce defendant to plead guilty invalidated the guilty plea).