(A)  Exercise of Right to Trial.  The court may not sentence a defendant more harshly who demands a trial than one who pleads guilty.[283]

[283] United States v. Barris, 46 F.3d 33 (8th Cir. 1995) (court may not disqualify defendant from acceptance of responsibility reduction on ground defendant elected trial on an insanity defense); Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941, 944 (5th Cir. 1966) (persistence in claim of innocence despite court’s request he make a clean breast of it and judge would take that into account in sentencing, although new trial, appeal, petition for certiorari, and collateral attack were still open to the defendant); ABA Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 14-4 1.8 (1980) (“The court should not impose upon a defendant any sentence in excess of that which would be justified by any of the protective, deterrent, or other purposes of the criminal law because the defendant has chosen to require the prosecution to prove guilt at trial rather than to enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.”).

Other

POST CON - GROUNDS - CONVICTION - SENTENCE
The sentencing court may not sentence the defendant more harshly for exercising the constitutional right to jury trial, or threaten the defendant with harsher punishment to coerce a plea. In re Lewallen, 23 Cal.3d 274, 278-281 (1979) (court commits judicial misconduct and violates due process by threatening the defendant with a sentence in excess of the plea bargain sentence if he goes to trial, or by sentencing him more harshly for exercising constitutional right to trial by jury); Ryan v. Comn on Judicial Performance, 45 Cal. 3d 518, 534 (1988) (judge removed from the bench in part for using harsh sentencing as a punishment for going to trial). See also Schaffner v. Greco, 458 F.Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (trial judges bias during trial and repeatedly trying to coerce defendant to plead guilty invalidated the guilty plea).