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AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " 16(b) " ORDINARY CASE ANALYSIS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VOID FOR VAGUENESS
Linus Chan, in The ordinary cases demise in criminal sentencing & its implications for immigration law, at Crimmigration.com, summarized the impact of Johnson v. United States as follows: After the Supreme Court announced the ordinary case method in James, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and a couple of federal circuit courts began to adopt it in immigration cases when deciding whether someone has committed a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b). Section 16(b)s language is not an exact match to ACCAs residual clause, but isnt far off. Section 16(b) defines a crime of violence as a felony which, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. Like the ACCAs residual clause, 16(b) requires an examination of risk, and also looks at whether force is used in the course of committing the offense. Two circuit courts called the phrases virtually identical. See Roberts v. Holder, 745 F.3d 928, 930 (8th Cir. 2014); Lopez-Cardona v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2011). Moreover, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits applied the ordinary case from James to 16(b) cases. Rodriguez-Castellon v. Holder, 733 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2013); Perez-Munoz v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 357, 363 (5th Cir. 2007). The BIA had begun applying the ordinary case method to 16(b) cases in 2011, see Matter of Ramon Martinez, 25 I&N Dec. 571 (BIA 2011), and just a few weeks before Johnson reiterated its support for the ordinary case method in Matter of Francisco-Alonzo, 26 I&N Dec 594 (BIA 2015) (analyzed on this blog here). In Francisco-Alonzo, the BIA relied heavily on the fact that James had not been overruled, and it saw no reason to question the rule when examining risk based definitions. The James ordinary method, it seemed, had become embedded in immigration law. The reliance on James as good precedent proved to be ill timed. On June 26, 2015, just three weeks after Francisco-Alonzo the United States Supreme Court not only overruled James in Johnson but also found that the residual clause of the ACCA and the ordinary case method unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court specifically criticized the ordinary case rule. It ties the judicial assessment of the risk to a judicially imagined ordinary case of a crime, not to real-world facts for statutory elements, the Court concluded. Johnson, No. 13-7120, slip op at 5. The Court wrote that such an exercise was too speculative and too unreliable to give guidance to either defendants or judges. The Court explained that other risk-assessment statutes did their work by gauging the riskiness of conduct in which an individual defendant engages on a particular occasion. As a general matter, we do not doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for an application of a qualitative standard such as substantive risk to real-word conduct Id. at 12. Ultimately the residual clause was vague because it requires application of the serious potential risk standard to an idealized ordinary case of the crime. Because the elements necessary to determine the imaginary ideal are uncertain both in nature and degree of effect, the Court concluded, this abstract inquiry offers significantly less predictability than one [t]hat deals with the actual, not with an imaginary condition other than the facts. Id. (quoting International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216, 223 (1914)).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " AIDING AND ABETTING
Rosemond v. United States, ___ U.S. ___ (2014) (discussion of elements of aiding and abetting). The court stated: When an accomplice knows beforehand of a confederates design to carry a gun, he can attempt to alter that plan or, if unsuccessful, withdraw from the enterprise; it is deciding instead to go ahead with his role in the venture that shows his intent to aid an armed offense. But when an accomplice knows nothing of a gun until it appears at the scene, he may already have completed his acts of assistance; or even if not, he may at that late point have no realistic opportunity to quit the crime. And when that is so, the defendant has not shown the requisite intent to assist a crime involving a gun. As even the Government concedes, an unarmed accomplice cannot aid and abet a 924(c) violation unless he has foreknowledge that his confederate will commit the offense with a firearm. Brief for United States 38; see also infra, at 15"17. For the reasons just given, we think that means knowledge at a time the accomplice can do something with it"most notably, opt to walk away. Id. at ___.

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " 18 USC 16(b) -- POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS
United States v. Fish, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 715785 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (Massachusetts conviction for possession of burglarious tools, under M.G.L. ch. 266, 49, does not categorically constitute a crime of violence as defined at 18 U.S.C. 16, because it included neither an element of force under (a) nor the substantial risk that violent force would be used under (b)).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " BURGLARY
Descamps v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___ (Jun. 20, 2013) (California conviction of burglary, in violation of Penal Code 459 (entry without requiring unlawful entry with intent to commit theft or any felony), is overbroad with respect to the generic federal definition of burglary, for purposes of federal sentence enhancement under the ACCA for a prior burglary conviction, because generic unlawful entry is never an element of 459, a conviction under that statute is never for generic burglary.).

BIA

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM
Matter of Chairez, 26 I&N Dec. 349 (BIA 2014) (Utah conviction for violation of 76-10-508.1(1)(a), discharge of a firearm, is not categorically an aggravated felony crime of violence, since the offense may be committed recklessly).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM
Matter of Chairez, 26 I&N Dec. 349 (BIA 2014) (Utah conviction for violation of 76-10-508.1(1)(b) and (c), discharge of a firearm in the direction of a building, person, or vehicle, is categorically an aggravated felony crime of violence).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " THEFT " RECEIPT OF STOLEN PROPERTY
Matter of Sierra, 26 I&N Dec. 288 (BIA 2014) (Nevada conviction for violation of NRS 193.330, 205.273, possession of a stolen vehicle, is not a categorical aggravated felony theft offense under INA 101(a)(43)(G), for immigration purposes, since the statute only requires reason to believe that the property received was stolen, but the generic definition of receipt of stolen property applicable to the aggravated felony definition requires knowledge).

CONVICTION " NATURE OF OFFENSE " ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE " SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT " MILITARY CONVICTION
Matter of Chavez-Alvarez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 274 (BIA Mar. 14, 2014) (an sentencing enhancement element listed in a specification in the Manual for Courts-Martial, that must be pled and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, is the functional equivalent of an element of a criminal offense for immigration purposes).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " RECEIPT OF STOLEN PROPERTY
Matter of Sierra, 26 I & N Dec. 288, 292 (BIA 2014) (Nevada conviction of attempted possession of a stolen vehicle, in violation of Nevada Revised Statute 193.330 and 205.273, was not categorically an aggravated felony as an attempted theft offense, because Nevada law does not require actual knowledge that the property had been stolen, but only reason to believe; aggravated felony theft ground requires intent to deprive, which can be inferred from actual knowledge, but not from reason to believe); citing Matter of Garcia-Madruga, 24 I & N Dec. 436 (BIA 2008). NOTE: For any theft offense in which the mental state can be either knowledge or reason to know or believe, if the record shows that the defendant pled to the latter element, the defendant may be protected against the conviction being considered an aggravated felony. E.g., Massachusetts offense receiving a stolen motor vehicle, under M.G.L. ch. 266 28, only requires a reason to believe mental state.

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " 18 USC 16(b) -- ASSAULT WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON
United States v. Fish, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 715785 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (Massachusetts conviction for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, under M.G.L. ch. 265, 15A, did not categorically constitute a crime of violence, under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), because the minimum conduct punishable under this statute did not create a substantial risk that the defendant would intentionally use physical force against person or property, since the minimum conduct included reckless conduct), applying Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " DRUG TRAFFICKING OFFENSE " DISTRIBUTION OF SMALL AMOUNT OF MARIJUANA
Matter of Castro-Rodriguez, 25 I&N Dec. 698 (BIA 2012) (remanding case to IJ to allow respondent to present factual evidence that Virginia conviction of possession with the intent to give or distribute less than one-half ounce of marijuana, in violation of Va. Rev. Stat. 18.2-248.1(a)(1), involved only gratuitous distribution of a small amount of marijuana); following Matter of Aruna, 24 I&N Dec. 452 (BIA 2008) (the federal felony conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance offense, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D), allows for the consideration of evidence outside the record of conviction for the purpose of reducing the felony offense to a misdemeanor); citing United States v. Hamlin, 319 F.3d 666, 670-71 (4th Cir. 2003). NOTE: The BIA relied upon Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009), to find the circumstance-specific approach is appropriate to determine whether a conviction of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute involved a small amount of marijuana and no remuneration. The BIA stated that the less than 30 grams of marijuana exception, may, in general, serve as a useful guidepost in determining whether an amount is small. Matter of Castro Rodriguez, 25 I&N Dec. at 703.

AGGRAVATED FELONY " DRUG TRAFFICKING " DELIVERY OF SIMULATED CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
Matter of Sanchez-Cornejo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 273 (BIA 2010) (Texas conviction of delivery of a simulated controlled substance, as defined by 482.001(4) of the Texas Health and Safety Code, is not an aggravated felony drug trafficking offense because federal law does not punish distribution of a non-controlled substance in place of a real controlled substance; the violation is, however, a controlled substances offense for purposes of triggering removability under INA 237(a)(2)(B)).

First Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ASSAULT " INTENT
Villanueva v. Holder, 784 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. Apr. 24, 2015) (Connecticut conviction for assault in the third degree, under Conn. Gen.Stat. 53a"61, did not constitute a crime of violence aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), where the record of conviction did not indicate the subdivision under which the noncitizen was convicted, since two of the three sections involved only recklessness or negligence which are insufficient intent to constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ASSAULT AND BATTERY
United States v. Martinez, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15173 (1st Cir. Aug. 6, 2014) (Massachusetts convictions for assault and battery and simple assault, under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 265, 13A, did not categorically constitute crimes of violence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a), even though the defendant admitted having struck his girlfriend, because the term struck covers conduct that is neither intentional nor involves violent force). Note: The defendant did not raise a claim that the assault and battery statute was not divisible, so no resort to the record of conviction was proper; therefore, the court did not reach that issue. Immigration attorneys should argue that under Martinez, Massachusetts simple assault can never be an aggravated felony as a crime of violence or a crime of domestic violence under INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Similarly, immigration counsel should argue that Massachusetts assault and battery is not a crime of violence " both because the record of conviction does not clearly and necessarily establish a conviction for harmful battery and because (most importantly) assault and battery is not a divisible offense and therefore should never be considered a crime of violence.

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " 18 USC 16(b) -- BREAKING AND ENTERING
United States v. Fish, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 715785 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (Massachusetts conviction for breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, M.G.L. ch. 266, 16, 18, did not categorically constitute a crime of violence, under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), because the minimum conduct punishable did not create a substantial risk that the defendant would use physical force against person or property, since the minimum conduct included nonviolent entries of rarely-occupied structures through unlocked doors or windows,; rejecting the governments argument that the court should look only to the typical case charged under the statute). NOTE: A conviction for breaking and entering a building with a sentence of imprisonment of one year or more, suspended or imposed, remains an aggravated felony under a different provision of the aggravated felony statute. 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) (theft offense or burglary offense with sentence of one year or more is aggravated felony); see Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990) (burglary defined as unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " 18 USC 16(a) -- ASSAULT WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON
United States v. Fish, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 715785 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (Massachusetts conviction for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, under M.G.L. ch. 265, 15A, did not categorically constitute a crime of violence, under 18 U.S.C. 16(a), because the minimum conduct punishable under this statute does not have as an element the use of violent force, but instead covers even the slightest touching with a dangerous weapon).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " 18 USC 16(a) -- POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS
United States v. Fish, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 715785 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (Massachusetts conviction for possession of burglarious tools, under M.G.L. ch. 266, 49, does not categorically constitute a crime of violence as defined at 18 U.S.C. 16, because it included neither an element of force under (a) nor the substantial risk that violent force would be used under (b)).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " 18 USC 16(b) -- POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS
United States v. Fish, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 715785 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (Massachusetts conviction for possession of burglarious tools, under M.G.L. ch. 266, 49, does not categorically constitute a crime of violence as defined at 18 U.S.C. 16, because it included neither an element of force under (a) nor the substantial risk that violent force would be used under (b)).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " LARCENY
Patel v. Holder, 707 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. Feb. 1, 2013) (Connecticut conviction of fourth degree larceny under Conn. Gen.Stat. 53a"125, is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude because the offense may be committed without intent to permanently deprive).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR " CHILD ENDANGERMENT
Campbell v. Holder, 698 F.3d 29, *31 (1st Cir. Oct. 19, 2012) (Connecticut conviction of risk of injury to a minor under of the Connecticut General Statutes 53"21(a)(1) (penalizing [a]ny person who ... wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such child is endangered, the health of such child is likely to be injured or the morals of such child are likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair the health or morals of any such child...], does not categorically constitute aggravated felony sexual abuse of a minor, under INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), since the statute includes non-sexual acts such as providing alcohol to a minor).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " DRUG TRAFFICKING OFFENSES " SOLICITATION
James v. Holder, 698 F.3d 24, *27 (1st Cir. Oct. 19, 2012) (The more difficult issue is whether James' conviction under section 21a"277(b) was for an offense that would also comprise trafficking"which is true of some but not necessarily all of the subordinate offenses listed in the Connecticut statute. The INA (through a series of cross-references) defines illicit trafficking to include the manufacture, distribution and dispensing of a controlled substance, as well as possession with intent to do any of these; INA 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B), cf.18 U.S.C. 924(c)(2); 21 U.S.C. 841(a); but this definition does not appear to encompass offers and gifts, which are criminalized under the Connecticut statute.); citing United States v. Savage, 542 F.3d 959, 965 (2d Cir.2008) (Conn.Gen.Stat. 21a"277(b) plainly criminalizes, inter alia, a mere offer to sell a controlled substance, which might be made absent possession); Mendieta"Robles v. Gonzales, 226 Fed. App'x 564, 568"69 (6th Cir.2007) (conviction under state statute that criminalizes gift of drugs is not necessarily an illicit trafficking offense under INA); see also Matter of Davis, 20 I. & N. Dec. 536, 541 (B.I.A. 1992) (business or merchant nature is [e]ssential to the term trafficking under INA).).

Second Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " FRAUD OFFENSE " PLEA DID NOT ESTABLISH OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED WITH SPECIFIC INTENT TO DEFRAUD
Akinsade v. Holder, 678 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. May 1, 2012) (federal conviction for embezzlement by a bank employee under 18 U.S.C. 656, did not categorically constitute a fraud aggravated felony, for purposes of deportation, where none of the facts to which the petitioner actually and necessarily pleaded to establish whether that offense was committed with a specific intent to defraud).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " THIRD-DEGREE BURGLARY
United States v. Folkes, 622 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. Sept. 29, 2010) (per curiam) (New York conviction of third degree burglary, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 140.20 [knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein.], did not categorically constitute crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since the statute does not necessarily involve use of force against another).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " POSSESSION OF A FIREARM
United States v. Folkes, 622 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. Sept. 29, 2010) (per curiam) (New York conviction of third-degree criminal possession of a loaded firearm, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 265.02(4), did not categorically constitute crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since the crime of violence definition requires some affirmative conduct beyond mere possession of a gun); following United States v. Gamez, 577 F.3d 394, 398 (2d Cir. 2009).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR " SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
Ganzhi v. Holder, 624 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. Sept. 7, 2010) (per curiam) (New York conviction of sexual misconduct, in violation of New York Penal Law 130.20(1), is a divisible statute, since it provides in different subsections different definitions of lack of consent, and includes offenses involving minors one day shy of 17 years of age).

Third Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " FIREARMS AND DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES " ARSON " FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT
Bautista v. Atty Gen. of the U.S., 744 F.3d 54 (3d Cir. Feb. 28, 2014) (New York conviction of attempted arson in the third degree, in violation of Penal Law 110 and 150.10, did not categorically constitute a match for the elements of 18 U.S.C. 844(i), and is therefore not an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(E)(i), because the New York arson statute does not require the federal jurisdictional element that the object of the arson be used in interstate commerce, which the Supreme Court has found to be a critical and substantive element of that arson offense). The court reasoned as follows: We must assume that Congress was aware of the limits imposed by the Commerce Clause on the reach of the statutes it passes and that it restricted the breadth of 101(a)(43)(E) with the substantive constraints of the included jurisdictional elements in mind. See United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 279"80, 95 S.Ct. 2150, 45 L.Ed.2d 177 (1975) (comparing Congress's use of in commerce versus affected commerce to show that Congress is aware of its Commerce Clause power and the extent to which it asserts that power in drafting statutes). We cannot undermine the categorical approach and Congress's deliberate choice to include 844(i), rather than generic arson, in 101(a)(43)(E)(i). Further, were we to ignore the jurisdictional element in our categorical approach to 844(i), as the BIA has here, we would be characterizing a state conviction for arson of the intrastate house in Jones as an aggravated felony described in 844(i), when the Supreme Court clearly excised the arson of such intrastate objects from the scope of that federal statute. Id. at 64-66.

AGGRAVATED FELONY " DRUG TRAFFICKING " FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT VIOLATIONS
Borrome v. Attorney General of the United States, 687 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. Jul. 18, 2012) (federal conviction for unauthorized wholesale distribution in interstate commerce of prescription drugs, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 331(t), 353(e), is not a drug trafficking aggravated felony).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " FRAUD OR DECEIT " LOSS TO THE VICTIM
Singh v. Att'y General, 677 F.3d 503 (3d Cir. Apr. 16, 2012) (federal conviction of knowingly making a false statement under penalty of perjury in a bankruptcy proceeding in violation of 18 U.S.C. 152(3), did not trigger removal-deportation as an aggravated felony fraud conviction, because government failed to show that actual loss to the victim exceeded $10,000.00). NOTE: This case agrees with Pierre v. Holder 588 F.3d 767 (2d Cir. 2009), in finding that to be a fraud or deceit aggravated felony, there must be a actual loss, rather than merely an intended or attempted a loss, in excess of $10,000. The court suggests, however, that the government should have charged the respondent under INA 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U), to capture intended loss.

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER
Totimeh v. Attorney General, 666 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. Jan. 12, 2012) (Minnesota conviction of failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of Minn. Stat. 243.166.5, defined the offense as knowingly violat[ing] any of [the statutes] provisions or intentionally provid[ing] false information, is not a crime of moral turpitude, since it is a regulatory offense designed to assist law enforcement, and does not regulate a crime that of itself is inherently vile or intentionally malicious.); following Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2011) (Colorado conviction of failure to register as a sex offender, is not a CIMT).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " DRUG TRAFFICKING " SALE OF MARIJUANA
Thomas v. Attorney General of U.S., 625 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. Oct. 26, 2010) (New York misdemeanor conviction for fourth-degree criminal sale of marijuana, in violation of Penal Law 221.40, is a divisible statute [to sell, exchange, give or dispose of to another], only sale of which categorically falls within the hypothetical federal felony test of drug trafficking crimes that qualify as aggravated felonies INA 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B); record of conviction did not establish that sale with consideration was involved; police reports were not part of the record of conviction, even where defendant waived information).

Fourth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " THEFT OFFENSE " RECEIVING STOLEN OR EMBEZZLED PROPERTY
This file summarizes developments occurring from Apr. 1-30, 2016. Mena v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 1660166 (4th Cir. Apr. 27, 2016) (federal conviction of violating 18 U.S.C. 659, second paragraph (purchase, receipt, or possession of property that has moved in interstate or foreign commerce knowing the same to have been embezzled or stolen), was not categorically an aggravated felony theft offense, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), for immigration purposes, because the crime of embezzlement necessarily involves a taking of property with the owner's consent, and a taking of property without consent is an essential element of aggravated felony theft); see Soliman v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276, 282 (4th Cir. 2005) ([w]hen a theft offense has occurred, property has been obtained from its owner without consent; but in a fraud scheme, the owner has voluntarily surrendered his property, because of an intentional perversion of truth, or otherwise act [ed] upon a false representation to his injury. . . . [The] key and controlling distinction between these two crimes is ... the consent element"theft occurs without consent, while fraud occurs with consent that has been unlawfully obtained.); accord, Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2014).

CONVICTION -- NATURE OF CONVICTION " CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS " CIRCUMSTANCE-SPECIFIC FACTOR " DOMESTIC RELATIONSHIP DOMESTIC VIOLENCE " DOMESTIC RELATIONSHP " CIRCUMSTANCE-SPECIFIC FACTOR
Hernandez-Zavala v. Lynch, (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 2015) (North Carolina conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-33(c)(1), is a crime of domestic violence, even though domestic relationship is not necessary to convict; applying circumstance specific analysis to domestic relationship element of 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i)).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " THEFT OFFENSES " UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE " DEFINITION OF THEFT
Castillo v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 161952 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2015) (Virginia conviction of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, in violation of Virginia Code 18.2"102 [take, drive or use any ... vehicle ... not his own, without the consent of the owner [ ] and in the absence of the owner, and with intent temporarily to deprive the owner [ ] of his possession [ ], without intent to steal the same, shall be guilty], did not categorically qualify as an aggravated felony theft offense, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), because the full range of conduct covered by the Virginia crime of unauthorized use can and do arise based on circumstances in which the defendant's use of property deviates only slightly from the specific scope of consensual use, resulting in an insignificant effect on ownership interests. [Footnote omitted] These circumstances stand in stark contrast to crimes involving the intentional, nonconsensual takings that typically involve significant impairment of ownership rights and damage to the property as described by the BIA in its elaboration of the term theft offense. See VZS, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1349.); quoting Overstreet v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 234, 435 S.E.2d 906, 908 (Va.Ct.App.1993).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPIUTDE " SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
Mohamed v. Holder, 769 F.3d 885 (4th Cir. Oct. 17, 2014) (Virgina conviction for violation of VaCodeAnn. 18.2-472.1, failure to register as a sex offender, is not a crime involving moral turpitude for immigration purposes, since it is merely a regulatory offense), disagreeing with Matter of Tobar-Lobo, 24 I&N Dec. 143 (BIA 2007).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " RESISTING ARREST
United States v. Aparicio-Soria, 740 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2014) (en banc) (Maryland conviction of resisting arrest, in violation of Md. Code, Crim. Law 9"408(b)(1) [[a] person may not intentionally ... resist a lawful arrest.], does not qualify categorically as a "crime of violence" within the meaning of the residual force clause of U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), because it does not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " SECOND-DEGREE ASSAULT
United States v. Royal, 731 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. Oct. 1, 2013) (Maryland conviction for second-degree assault, in violation of Md. Code, Crim. Law 3"203(a), did not constitute a predicate violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act, because the Maryland offense was a facially indivisible statute, i.e., one that does not set out elements of the offense in the alternative, but which may nevertheless broadly criminalize qualitatively different categories of conduct; Maryland courts do not require unanimity on whether the offense was committed by offensive physical contact or infliction of physical harm.).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " CHILD ABUSE
United States v. Gomez, 690 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. Aug. 10, 2012) (Maryland conviction of child abuse, in violation of Maryland Code 1957, Article 27, 35C, was not a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes because the offense could be committed without use of force).

Fifth Circuit

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES " DEPORTATION " EXCEPTION FOR FIRST OFFENSE POSSESSION OF SMALL AMOUNT OF MARIJUANA " BIA CANNOT ADD CONDITIONS
Flores v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 2015) (conviction for possession of marijuana in a school zone meets the personal use exception to deportability for a controlled substances offense; BIA erred in adding to the personal use exception a requirement that the offense be no more than the least serious offense). NOTE: This reasoning should also invalidate the possession in jail disqualification from the marijuana exception to the controlled substance ground of deportation. The Court specifically cited, and disagreed with, Matter of Moncada"Servellon, 24 I. & N. Dec. 62 (BIA 2007). The Court also found that Moncada-Servellon was not due Chevron deference, as it was contrary to the INA.

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " MANSLAUGHTER
United States v. Garcia-Perez, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 753759 (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 2015) (Florida conviction of manslaughter, in violation of Florida Statute 782.07, did not qualify as a crime of violence under United States Sentencing Guideline 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), because Florida manslaughter conviction does not require proof of force, and my be committed with negligent intent).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " DRUG TRAFFICKING " DELIVERY OF COCAINE
Sarmientos v. Holder, 742 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 2014) (Florida conviction of delivery of cocaine, in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(1)(a)(1)(sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance), is not a categorical aggravated felony drug trafficking offense, since Florida statute does not require knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance, while federal offense requires knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance); see State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 415"16 (Fla. 2012) (explaining that knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance is no longer an element of the Florida crime that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
United States v. Esparza-Perez, 681 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. May 14, 2012) (Arkansas conviction of aggravated assault [[e]ngag[ing] in conduct that creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person.] is not a crime of violence under the residual clause of USSG 2L1.2, because the statute does not require any contact or injury or attempt or threat of offensive contact or injury, thus did not have as an element "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
United States v. Esparza-Perez, 681 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. May 14, 2012) (Arkansas conviction of aggravated assault, in violation of Ark. Code 5-13-204(a)(1), is not a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii), because it does not require proof of an assault as that crime is generally defined"i.e., as an offense that involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of offensive contact against another person).

Sixth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. Aug 4, 2011) (Tennessee conviction of aggravated assault, in violation of Tenn.Code Ann. 39"13"102 (1991), was not a violent felony under the ACCAs use of physical force clause, or under its residual clause, for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act, where the offense could be committed recklessly).

Seventh Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " FIREARMS OFFENSES " POSSESSION OF A WEAPON
(Illinois conviction for being in possession of a weapon in violation of 720 ILCS 5/24"1.1(a) did not qualify as an aggravated felony, because Illinoiss definition of a firearm is broader than its federal counterpart because it includes pneumatic weapons). NOTE: Compressed air is not an explosive, which means that pneumatic weapons are not firearms under federal law. See, e.g., United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 853 F.3d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc); United States v. Crooker, 608 F.3d 94, 96 (1st Cir. 2010). Rodriguez-Contreras v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 579, 580 (Cir. 2017).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIMES OF VIOLENCE " COMMITTING FELONY WHILE ARMED
Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, *644 (No. 11-1695) (7th Cir. Aug. 20, 2012) (armed violence, defined as "committing any felony defined by Illinois Law while armed," did not qualify as a Violent Felony when the underlying felony consisted of simple possession of drugs; while there is evidence of a connection between Congresss attempt to keep firearms away from habitual drug users and its goal of reducing violent crime, United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2010), it has not been shown that the mere possession of a gun by a drug user . . . can be described as purposeful, violent, or aggressive conduct within the meaning of Begay.).

POST CON RELIEF " GROUNDS " INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
United States v. Griffin, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (7th Cir., Jul. 5, 2012) (reversing federal conviction for felon in possession of firearms where there was no evidence defendant intended to exercise any control over his father's firearms in his parents' home where he went to live after being released from prison: a defendant's strong connection to the residence alone does not suffice to establish the nexus required to prove his constructive possession of a gun found in the residence.").

Eighth Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " ASSAULT " GENERAL CRIMINAL INTENT
Alonzo v. Lynch,___ F.3d ___, ___, 2016 WL 1612772 (8th Cir. Apr. 22, 2016) ([T]he BIA and various courts have declined to classify [simple assault] as a [CIMT]. Simple assault typically is a general intent crime, and it is thus different in character from those offenses that involve a vicious motive, corrupt mind, or evil intent. Chanmouny v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 810, 814"15 (8th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (quoting Matter of O, 3 I. & N. Dec. 193, 194"95 (BIA 1948)); see also [Matter of] Solon, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 241 (same).).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE " OBSTRUCTION OF LEGAL PROCESS
Ortiz v. Lynch, __ F.3d __ (8th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015) (Minnesota conviction for violation of Minn.Stat. 609.50, subd. 2(2), obstruction of legal process, is not an aggravated felony crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), INA 101(a)(43)(F), since the minimum amount of force required to sustain a conviction under the obstruction of legal process is not violent force as required by 18 U.S.C. 16).

AGGRAVATED FELONIES " ATTEMPT " MERE PREPARATORY CONDUCT HELD INSUFFICIENT
United States v Warnell Reid, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 5314563 (8th Cir. Oct 20, 2014) (Missouri conviction for attempted burglary is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2), because Missouris statute can be violated by mere preparatory conduct; commentary to the Missouri attempt statute says that "reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission of the offense" or "possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the offense, which are specially designed for such unlawful use" can be a substantial step sufficient for conviction of attempted burglary); see James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (Florida state courts stated attempt required "an overt act directed toward the entry of a structure" to qualify as attempted burglary, so the court here found it unnecessary to address whether "more attenuated conduct" -- such as the "casing" of a building or neighborhood -- would suffice, but suggested that a statute requiring only "preparatory conduct" might well not qualify).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIMES OF VIOLENCE " SECOND-DEGREE BATTERY
United States v. Dawn, 685 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. Jun. 28, 2012) (Arkansas conviction of second-degree battery, in violation of Ark. Code Ann. 5"13"202(a) (2006), is not categorically a crime of violence for purposes of the Armed Career Criminals Act, because it includes recklessly causing serious physical injury, including reckless driving).

Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ROBBERY
United States v. Jones, 877 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. Dec. 15, 2017) (Arizona conviction for armed robbery, under A.R.S. 13-1904, is not a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA, because Arizona's armed robbery does not require the use of force), following United States v. Molinar, 876 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2017).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ROBBERY United States v. Jones, 877 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. Dec. 15, 2017) (Arizona conviction for armed robbery, under A.R.S. 13-1904, is not a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA, because Arizona's armed robbery does not require the use of force), following United States v. Molinar, 876 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2017).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ROBBERY
United States vs. Sanchez Molinar, 876 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. Nov. 29, 2017) (Arizona conviction for robbery, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-1904(A), which includes merely possessing a fake gun during the commission of a robbery without mentioning or brandishing it, is not a crime of violence for purposes of the ACCA because the minimum conduct necessary to commit the offense is not sufficiently violent for to qualify as a crime of violence under Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010)).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " HIT AND RUN
Conejo Bravo v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. Nov.17, 2017) (California conviction of hit and run, under Vehicle Code 20001(a), is under a divisible statute; the record established that noncitizen failed to render aid, which is a crime of moral turpitude); see Garcia-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 284, 290 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that Texas hit and run law qualifies as a CIMT, as "the failure to stop and render aid after being involved in an automobile accident is the type of base behavior that reflects moral turpitude").

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CHILD PORNOGRAPHY " POSSESSION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Chavez-Solis v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2015) (California conviction of possession of child pornography, Penal Code 311.11(a), is broader than the relevant federal aggravated felony statutory definition, and there is a realistic probability that overbroad conduct would be prosecuted in California, and this conviction therefore is not considered to be an aggravated felony for purposes of INA 101(a)(43)(I), 237(a)(2)(A)(iii): No provision of the federal statute's definition of sexually explicit conduct can be read to encompass any touching on any part of a child's body with the intent of arousing sexual desires. California's child pornography statute thus sweeps in depictions of a broader range of sexual conduct than the federal child pornography statute encompasses. On this basis, Penal Code 311.11(a) is categorically overinclusive.).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
Quijada-Aguilar v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 5103038 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 2015) (California conviction for voluntary manslaughter, under Penal Code 192(a), did not qualify as a particularly serious crime that would render noncitizen ineligible for withholding of removal, since it did not constitute an aggravated felony crime of violence, because it encompassed reckless conduct).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " THEFT OFFENSE
Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2015) (California theft conviction, including any offense for which the underlying substantive offense charged was a violation of Penal Code 484, is not aggravated felony theft, since because the California definition of theft includes theft of labor, false credit reporting, and theft by false pretenses, which do not fall within the definition of aggravated felony theft).

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES " PARAPHERNALIA " UNLISTED SUBSTANCE
Madrigal-Barcenas v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 4716767 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2015) (Nevada drug paraphernalia conviction, under NRSA 453.566, constitutes a controlled substance conviction, for purposes of inadmissibility, only if the conviction involved a substance criminalized by federal drug laws); following Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2828 (2015); holding Luu-Le v. INS, 224 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2000) and its progeny are no longer good law.

AGGRAVATED FELONY " SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR " CHILD MOLESTATION
United States v. Martinez, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 3406178 (9th Cir. May 28, 2015) (Washington conviction of third-degree child molestation, in violation of Wash. Rev.Code 9A.44.089, is categorically not an aggravated felony sexual abuse of a minor offense, under INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), since the offense is not divisible and includes touching over clothing; sexual abuse of a minor requires skin on skin contact); see State v. Soonalole, 992 P.2d 541, 544 & n.13 (Wash.Ct.App.2000) (holding that the fondling and thigh rubbing over the victim's clothes constituted a separate act of third-degree child molestation under state criminal law for double jeopardy purposes); see also United States v. Castro, 607 F.3d 566, 570 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended (holding that a California statute prohibiting lewd and lascivious acts on a child, under Penal Code 288(a), was categorically broader than the generic definition for sexual abuse of a minor because [l]ewd touching [under the state statute] can occur through a victim's clothing and can involve any part of the victim's body).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " THEFT OFFENSE " THEFT
Garcia v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 2385402 (9th Cir. May 20, 2015) (California conviction of theft, under Penal Code 487(a), is not categorically a theft aggravated felony because the California offense includes theft of labor, and because the California statute may be violated even if the victim consented to transfer his property by false pretenses), citing Carrillo"Jaime v. Holder, 572 F.3d 747, 751"53 (9th Cir. 2009).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " UNAUTHORIZED DRIVING A VEHICLE
Almanza-Arenas v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 2014) (California conviction of violating Vehicle Code 10851(a), a statute that criminalizes both conduct that would constitute a crime of moral turpitude " taking a vehicle with intent permanently to deprive the owner, and conduct that does not amount to a crime of moral turpitude " taking with intent temporarily to deprive the owner " was not categorically a crime of moral turpitude and does not render respondent ineligible for non-LPR cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b) in the context of removal proceedings for inadmissibility); see Castillo-Cruz v. Holder, 581 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2009) (a theft offense is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude if the statute of conviction is broad enough to criminalize a taking with intent to deprive the owner of his property only temporarily.).

AGGRAVATED FELONIES " DRUG TRAFFICKING OFFENSES " POSSESSION FOR SALE CONVICTION " NATURE OF CONVICTION " CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS " DIVISIBLE STATUTE " CALIFORNIA POSSESSION FOR SALE
Padilla-Martinez v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___, n.3, 2014 WL 5421219 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 2014) (California conviction of possession for sale of a controlled substance, in violation of Health and Safety Code 11378, qualified as an aggravated felony for deportation purposes, since state law required jury to identify specific controlled substance as an element of the offense, and thus the modified categorical analysis was properly used to consult the record of conviction, which identified federally listed substance). The court stated: California Health & Safety Code 11378 is divisible for several reasons. First, it is written in the disjunctive by listing five alternative categories of controlled substances. See Quijada Coronado v. Holder, 747 F.3d 662, 668"69 (9th Cir.2014) (concluding that California Health & Safety Code 11377(a), a statute substantially similar to 11378, is divisible). Also, California state law treats the type of controlled substance as a separate element in prosecuting relevant drug offenses. See, e.g., 2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Crim. Law (4th ed.2012) 102 (a specified controlled substance is an element common to all state drug crimes requiring proof of possession); CALCRIM 2302 (Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instruction for conviction under 11378 requires the jury to fill in the blank where the controlled substance is to be identified); People v. Montero, 155 Cal.App.4th 1170, 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 668, 671 (Cal.Ct.App.2007) (adopting the CALCRIM jury instruction); see also People v. Gerber, 196 Cal.App.4th 368, 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 688, 704 (Cal.Ct.App.2011) (finding instructional error where jury instructions for conviction of a California drug crime did not require the jury to identify the type of controlled substance). Id. at ___, n.3.

AGGRAVATED FELONY " FIREARMS OFFENSES " ANTIQUE FIREARMS DEFENSE
United States v. Hernandez, 769 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 2014) (per curiam) (California conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm under California Penal Code 12021(a)(1), did not categorically qualify as a listed firearms aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(E), 8 U.S.C. 101(a)(43)(E), since the state did not have an exception for antique firearms, as federal law did, and the state in fact prosecuted defendants under this statute for being in possession of antique firearms, and the state statutory definition of firearm is not divisible, so resort to the modified categorical analysis or record of conviction is prohibited).

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES " UNIDENTIFIED SUBSTANCE AGGRAVATED FELONY " DRUG TRAFFICKING " UNIDENTIFIED SUBSTANCE
Medina-Lara v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 2014) (California conviction of possession for sale of a controlled substance, in violation of Health & Safety Code 11351, is neither an aggravated felony drug trafficking conviction, under INA 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B), nor a controlled substances conviction, under INA 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), under the modified categorical analysis, because the amended complaint and the abstract of judgment did not provide clear and convincing evidence regarding what specific substance the petitioner pleaded guilty to), withdrawing prior opinion at ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 4654481 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2014); distinguishing Cabantac v. Holder, 736 F.3d 787, 793-94 (9th Cir.2012) (per curiam); Ramirez-Villalpando v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. July 1, 2011). Cross-References: Cal Crim Def Immig 8.21 (unidentified drug). Cross-References: Cal Crim Def Immig 14.20 (record failed to prove identity of drug).

SAFE HAVEN " CARRYING A CONCEALED FIREARM CRIM DEF " FIREARMS OFFENSES " DEFINITION OF FIREARM
A plea to carrying a concealed firearm on the person, in violation of Pen C 25400(a)(2), should not be considered a crime of moral turpitude, a firearms conviction, or an aggravated felony, as a ground of deportation, inadmissibility, or even for relief purposes such as cancellation of removal. United States v. Aguilera"Rios, 754 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2014); Matter of Chairez, 26 I&N Dec. 349, 35558 (BIA 2014).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " BURGLARY
Rendon v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2014 WL 4115930 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2014) (California conviction of burglary, in violation of Penal Code 459 [entry with intent to commit larceny or any felony], did not constitute a divisible statute, under Descamps; the presence of an or between grand or petit larceny and any felony does not render the statute divisible, because the intended offense, under this statute, is not an element of the offense, but a means of commission, since California law does not require jury unanimity on this point; BIA's use of the modified categorical approach was impermissible); citing People v. Failla, 414 P.2d 39, 44-45 (1966); distinguishing Ngaeth v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 796, 802 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (decided prior to Descamps); Hernandez"Cruz v. Holder, 651 F.3d 1094, 1104"05 (9th Cir. 2011) (same). NOTE: The court states: To be clear, it is black-letter law that a statute is divisible only if it contains multiple alternative elements, as opposed to multiple alternative means. Id. at 2285. Thus, when a court encounters a statute that is written in the disjunctive (that is, with an or), that fact alone cannot end the divisibility inquiry. Only when state law requires that in order to convict the defendant the jury must unanimously agree that he committed a particular substantive offense contained within the disjunctively worded statute are we able to conclude that the statute contains alternative elements and not alternative means.

CAL CRIM DEF " CONSPIRACY " OBJECT OF A CONSPIRACY IS NOT AN ELEMENT AGGRAVATED FELONY " CONSPIRACY
People v. Vargas, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210, 247 (2001) (the object of a conspiracy is not an element of a California conspiracy offense: [T]he specific crimes that constitute the object of the conspiracy are not elements of the conspiracy. Rather, they are the means by which the purpose of the conspiracy was to be achieved.); id. at 245 (So long as there is unanimity that crime was the object of the agreement, conspiracy is established regardless of whether some jurors believe that crime to be murder and others believe that crime to be something else.). Note: As long as Rendon v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2014 WL 4115930 (9th Cir. August 22, 2014), remains the law of the Ninth Circuit, the target offense of the conspiracy does not constitute part of the elements of the offense of conviction. Under the same reasoning, a conspiracy offense is not divisible in terms of the elements, so the immigration authorities cannot use the modified categorical analysis to consult the record of conviction documents to determine the nature of the conviction for immigration purposes. Thanks to Dan Kesselbrenner.

AGGRAVATED FELONIES " FIREARMS OFFENSES " ANTIQUE FIREARMS
United States v. Aguilera-Rios, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 2723766 (9th Cir. Jun. 17, 2014) (California Penal Code 12021(c)(1), current Penal Code 29800, is not a categorical aggravated felony firearms offense, since the statute lacks an antique firearms exception); explicitly partially overruling Gil v. Holder, 651 F.3d 1000, 1005"06 (9th Cir. 2011), and implicitly partially overruling Matter of Mendez-Orellana, 25 I&N Dec. 254 (BIA 2010).

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES " ATTEMPTED PROMOTING DANGEROUS DRUG NOT REMOVABLE " PAULUS DEFENSE " UNLISTED DRUG
Ragasa v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2014 WL 1661491 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 2014) (Hawaii conviction for promotion of a dangerous drug, in violation of HRS 705"500(1)(b), 712"1241(1)(b)(ii), is not categorically a controlled substances offense; Ragasa is not categorically removable under Section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the INA because his statute of conviction criminalizes at least two substances that are not similarly proscribed by the CSA: benzylfentanyl and thenylfentanyl. Compare Haw.Rev.Stat. 329"14(b)(56) & (57) (2003); Haw.Rev.Stat. 712"1240 (2004); Haw.Rev.Stat. 712"1241(1)(b)(ii) (2006), with 21 U.S.C. 812; 21 C.F.R. 1308.11"15.).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " SEXUAL CONDUCT WITH A MINOR
United States v. Gomez, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 1623725 (9th Cir. Apr. 24, 2014) (Arizona conviction for violation of ARS 13-405, sexual conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen, is not necessarily a crime of violence, as sexual abuse of a minor, for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, under current law), applying tests of Estrada"Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ASSAULT ON OFFICER
United States v. Dominguez-Maroyoqui, 748 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 2014) (federal conviction for assaulting a federal officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 111(a), is not categorically a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since the offense does not require, as an element, proof that defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use physical force).

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES " UNLISTED SUBSTANCES AGGRAVATED FELONIES " DRUG TRAFFICKING OFFENSES
Coronado v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 983621 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2014) (Health & S C 11377(a) is not categorically a conviction relating to a federally-listed controlled substance, for purposes of inadmissibility, because it includes at least one substance that is not on the federal list). NOTE: The court found that Health & Safety Code punishes offenses involving "khat (Catha Edulis) and Chorionic gonadotropin (HGC), which are not listed in the federal schedules. See 21 C.F.R. 1308.13 (Schedule III of the CSA).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " FELONY FALSE IMPRISONMENT
Turijan v. Holder, 744 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2014) (California conviction of felony false imprisonment, in violation of Penal Code 236, 237 [deprivation of liberty of another by violence or menace], was not a categorical crime of moral turpitude, because it does not require the intent to injure, actual injury, or a protected class of victim, and California courts have applied the statute to conduct that is not morally turpitudinous); following Castrijon"Garcia v. Holder, 704 F.3d 1205, 1218 (9th Cir. 2013) (California conviction of simple kidnapping under Penal Code 207(a) is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CONSPIRACY " DEFINITION
United States v. Garcia-Santana, 743 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 2014) (Nevada conviction of conspiracy to commit the crime of burglary in violation of Nev.Rev.Stat. 199.480, 205.060(1), does not constitute an aggravated felony conspiracy, where Nevada law does not require as an element of conspiracy the commission of an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy, Nev.Rev.Stat. 199.490; aggravated felony conspiracy, INA 101(a)(43) (U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U), require commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, so the state offense is overbroad); distinguishing United States v. Chandler, 743 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 2014) (Nevada conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery is a violent felony within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), which employs a different definition of conspiracy than that used for the aggravated felony definition under INA 101(a)(43) (U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U)).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " ATTEMPT " DEFINITION
United States v. Gonzalez-Monterroso, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 575952 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2014) (Delaware definition of Attempt, Del.Code tit. 11, 531(2), 532, is not a categorical match with attempt as defined under the U.S.S.G., because Delaware's statutory definition of "substantial step" is materially different from and encompasses more conduct than the federal generic definition).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " FRAUD OFFENSES " LOSS AMOUNT " MEDICARE PRESUMPTIVE LOSS AMOUNT
United States v. Popov, 742 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 2014) (in federal health care fraud prosecutions, the amount billed to an insurer constitutes sufficient evidence to establish the intended loss by a preponderance of the evidence, if not rebutted).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " RACKETEERING
Murillo-Prado v. Holder, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2013) (Arizona conviction for illegally conducting an enterprise is not categorically an aggravated felony RICO conviction, but the record of conviction established respondent was convicted of aggravated felony racketeering). Note: This holding may be inconsistent with Bautista v. Atty Gen. of the U.S., ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir. Feb. 21, 2014)(New York conviction of attempted arson in the third degree, in violation of Penal Law 110 and 150.10, did not categorically constitute a match for the elements of 18 U.S.C. 844(i), and is therefore not an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(E)(i), because the New York arson statute does not require the federal jurisdictional element that the object of the arson be used in interstate commerce, as the corresponding federal statute does, which the Supreme Court has found to be a critical and substantive element of that arson offense, so it did not disqualify him from eligibility for cancellation of removal under INA 240A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(3)).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " RACKETEERING "ARIZONA RICO
Murillo-Prado v. Holder, 735 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2013) (Arizona conviction for racketeering, in violation of Ariz.Rev.Stat. 13"2301, is not categorically a RICO aggravated felony offense, because Arizona's definition of racketeering includes two offenses not explicitly listed in its federal counterpart: (1) [i]ntentional or reckless false statements or publications concerning land for sale or lease or sale of subdivided lands or sale and mortgaging of unsubdivided lands, and (2) making [o]bscene or indecent telephone communications to minors for commercial purposes,).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " SIMPLE KIDNAPPING
Castrijon-Garcia v. Holder, 704 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2013) (California conviction of simple kidnapping, under Penal Code 207(a), is categorically not a crime involving moral turpitude making a noncitizen statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal, because it does not require an intent to injure, actual injury, or a special class of victims).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR " SEXUAL BATTERY
Sanchez-Avalos v. Holder, 693 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2012) (California conviction of sexual battery, in violation of Penal Code 243.4(a), did not categorically constitute a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony, because the elements do not require that the victim be a minor, and the evidence admissible under the modified categorical analysis did not establish that the victim was a minor).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " RESISTING OFFICER
Flores-Lopez v. Holder, 685 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. Jul. 9, 2012) (California conviction of resisting an executive officer in violation of Penal Code 69 is not a categorical crime of violence aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), because it requires only use of de minimis force; the idea that resisting executive officer would inevitably lead to use of violent, physical force was speculative).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " THEFT OFFENSES " REQUIREMENT OF INTENT TO PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE THE OWNER AS DISTINGUISHED FROM DEFINITION OF AGGRAVATED FELONY THEFT OFFENSE
Hernandez-Cruz v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___n.20 (9th Cir. Jul. 7, 2011) (A generic attempted theft offense for CIMT purposes is defined slightly differently than in the aggravated felony context. Whereas the latter, as we noted earlier, requires the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent, Carrillo-Jaime, 572 F.3d at 750 (citation and quotation marks omitted), a permanent taking [must be] intended for a conviction to qualify as a CIMT.); quoting Castillo-Cruz v. Holder, 581 F.3d 1154, 1160 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " FALSE IMPRISONMENT
Saavedra-Figueroa v. Holder, 625 F.3d 621 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2010) (California misdemeanor conviction of false imprisonment, in violation of Penal Code 236, was not a categorical crime of moral turpitude, because crime did not require noncitizen to have the intent to harm necessary for the crime to be base, vile or depraved).

Lower Courts of Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ASSAULT
United States v. Sahagun-Gallegos, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 1591446 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2015) (Arizona conviction of assault, under A.R.S. 13"1204(A), is overbroad with respect to 18 U.S.C. 16, because the definition of assault in subsection (1) of the Arizona statute includes simple recklessness, whereas a crime of violence requires a mens rea of at least heightened recklessness, see United States v. Gomez"Hernandez, 680 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2012), and is divisible); see United States v. Cabrera"Perez, 751 F.3d 1000, 1004"05 (9th Cir. 2014).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY
United States v. Simmons, 782 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 2015) (Hawaii conviction of second-degree escape from custody, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes 710"1021, did not categorically constitute a crime of violence, under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (Sentencing Guidelines or U.S.S.G.) 4B1.1(a), because it includes both active and passive forms of escape); see Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 126"27, 129 S.Ct. 687, 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " ORAL COPULATION WITH A MINOR
People v. Zuniga, 225 Cal.App.4th 1178, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 811 (Cal.App. 4 Dist., Apr. 28, 2014) (California conviction of violating Penal Code 288a(b)(1), oral copulation with a minor, is not a crime of moral turpitude since there is no scienter requirement or age gap required and minor could be any person under 18).

CAL CRIM DEF " SAFE HAVENS " MALICIOUS WITNESS DISSUASION " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " REALISTIC PROBABILITY OF PROSECUTION
People v. Wahidi, 222 Cal.App.4th 802, 807, 166 Cal.Rptr.3d 416 (2d Dist. Dec. 30, 2013) (defendants request that victim and defendant settle their dispute by Islamic mediation, rather than a criminal case, was held to be both knowing and malicious, within the meaning of the malicious witness dissuasion statute, Penal Code 136.1(a)(2), even though the defendant did not demand the victim drop the charges or threaten any violence: There is no substantial evidence that Wahidi intended to vex, annoy, harm, or injure Khan when Wahidi approached Khan in the mosque. But the evidence does show that Wahidi intended to thwart or interfere in any manner with the orderly administration of justice by convincing Khan not to testify at the preliminary hearing the next day. Under the definition of malice in section 136, Wahidi maliciously attempted to dissuade Khan from testifying.") (emphasis added). Note. Under this decision, California law now defines Penal Code 136.1(a)(2) as including conduct such as a civilized request to resolve an issue according to religious belief and conscience that in no sense of the word involves an element of violence (18 U.S.C. 16(a) or by its nature creates a substantial risk of violence (18 U.S.C. 16(b)). This offense therefore does not constitute an aggravated felony crime of violence. In addition, the conduct here is not depraved, and does not involve an intent to vex, annoy, harm, or injure another. It should therefore not be considered a crime of moral turpitude. It includes conduct motivated solely by religious belief and conscience. This sufficiently establishes a realistic probability of prosecution under this statute for non-removable conduct to prevent a conviction for violating this statute from constituting an aggravated felony crime of violence or crime involving moral turpitude. Thanks to Daniel G. DeGriselles.

Eleventh Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " THROWING A DEADLY MISSLE AT AN OCCUPIED VEHICLE
United States v. Estrada, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 479969 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2015) (per curiam) (Florida conviction for throwing a deadly missile, a violation of Florida Statute 790.19, was not categorically a conviction for a crime of violence, for illegal reentry sentencing purposes, because We concluded that Estrella could be deemed to have been convicted of a crime of violence if his conviction was for wanton conduct, because Florida law defines wanton to mean that one has acted intentionally or with reckless indifference to the consequences and with knowledge that damage is likely to be done to some person. Id. at 1253. But if instead Estrella had been convicted of only malicious conduct, the latter was satisfied by knowledge that injury or damage would be done to a person or to property and, in that case, Estrella would not be deemed to have been convicted of a crime of violence.), following United States v. Estrella, 758 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2014).

Other

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES " COUNTERFEIT DRUG OFFENSES IN LIEU OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
Practice Advisory, Su Yon Yi and Katherine Brady, Immigrant Legal Resource Center, Burn Statutes and Counterfeit Drug Offenses (2015), see ILRC.org (discussing Matter of Sanchez-Cornejo, 25 I&N Dec. 273 (BIA 2010) (the offense of delivery of a simulated controlled substance in violation of Texas law is not an aggravated felony, as defined by INA 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006), but it is a violation of a law relating to a controlled substance under former INA 241(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 125l(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994))

RESOURCES " DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & CRIME OF VIOLENCE
NIP-NLG and Immigrant Defense Project have written an advisory on the Supreme Courts recent decision in U.S v. Castleman. The advisory explains why this decision should have no negative impact on immigration law and how it may even support arguments to narrow the domestic violence and aggravated felony removal grounds. The advisory is located at: http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/publications.htm

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES " UNIDENTIFIED DRUG " PAULUS DEFENSE
Richard Collins, Esq., thinks Chorionic Gonadatropin is not a federally controlled anabolic steroid, although prohibited in California and New York. Convictions under California Health & Safety Code 11377 and 11378 are not categorically offenses relating to a controlled substance because California regulates "numerous substances that are not similarly regulated by the CSA. Ruiz-Vidal v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1072, 1078"79 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Mielewczyk v. Holder, 575 F.3d 992, 995 (9th Cir. 2009).

CD4:15.34;AF:6.30;CMT3:10.31;PCN:10.15; CPCN:2.10; 11.21
While the Board of Immigration Appeals has previously held that a nonimmigrant would have to affirmatively show that the firearm in the particular case actually was an antique (Matter of Mendez-Orellana (BIA 2010) 25 I&N Dec 254, 255), it would appear that the Supreme Court overruled that finding in Moncrieffe v Holder (2013) 133 SCt 1698, 1673. In Moncrieffe, the Court both reaffirmed that a statute defining an offense of conviction must be evaluated solely on the minimum conduct sufficient to commit it, and specifically discussed the antique firearm exception. The Court stated that as long as there is a realistic probability that antique firearms actually are prosecuted under the state statute at issue, a conviction should not be held a deportable firearm offense. Despite Moncrieffe, however, there is real uncertainty as to how the antique firearm defense will be treated in immigration court, and defense counsel should not count on it to save a defendant from deportation " unless the weapon involved in the offense really was a qualifying antique firearm. Otherwise, if the general antique firearm defense is the only alternative, the plea should be restricted to California offenses in which antique firearms actually have been prosecuted. See former Cal. P.C. 12022 (armed with antique weapon while committing felony) and former P.C. 12021 (possession by felon), and their current equivalent statutes, and see, e.g., People v. Gossman, 2003 WL 22866712 (2003); People v. McGraw, 2004 WL 928379 (2004). The California Penal Code, unlike 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3), makes it a crime to possess an antique firearm. Penal Code 25400(a); see Gil v. Holder, 651 F.3d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that conviction under predecessor California statute met federal gun definition even though former statute included conviction for an antique firearm, because antique firearm was an affirmative defense, rather than an element of the offense). Despite the fact that convictions under the California statute would seem necessarily to fail the categorical inquiry, a noncitizen convicted under this provision still must show a realistic probability that California would prosecute a defendant for having an antique weapon. See Moncrieffe v Holder, ___ US ___, 133 SCt 1678, 1693 (2013). See also People v. Robinson (2011) 199 CA4th 707, 131 CR3d 177 (affirming that California firearms definition, applicable to the state felon in possession offense, Penal Code 12021, criminalizes possession of antique or inoperable firearms); People v. Wolfe (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483 (California prosecution for possession of a firearm, after having suffered a conviction for a felony or qualifying misdemeanor, in violation of Penal Code 12021(c)(1), based on possession of a Winchester 16"gauge shotgun and a bolt-action Sharps shotgun, which appeared to be antique firearms); People v. Claseman (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 229 Cal.Rptr. 453 (documenting prosecution for violation of Penal Code 12025(a), carrying a firearm concealed in a vehicle, on the basis of an antique firearm; conviction reversed since firearm was inoperable, not because it was an antique).

IMMIGRATION OFFENSES " FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTS STATE IDENTITY FRAUD PROSECUTIONS RELATED TO FEDERAL I-9 FORMS
State v. Reynua, State of Minnesota, Mower County District Court (Jul. 23, 2012) (File No. 50-CR-09-1811) (unpublished) (admission of an I-9 form in a state forgery prosecution was reversible error); on remand after State v. Reynua, 807 N.W.2d 473 (Minn. App. 2011), review granted, revd in part and remanded (Minn. Feb. 28, 2012) (8 U.S.C. 1324a(b)(5) means what it says -- that other than specified federal prosecutions, the I-9 form and appended documents may not be used to establish a state crime).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " RESISTING EXECUTIVE OFFICER
People v. Nishi, 207 Cal.App.4th 954, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 882 (1st Dist. Jul. 13, 2012) (California Penal Code 69, attempting to deter or resist an executive officer in the performance of duty, is affirmed where the prosecution established the elements of the offense by substantial evidence; the central requirement of an offense under 69 is an attempt to deter an executive officer from performing his or her duties imposed by law; unlawful violence, or a threat of unlawful violence, is merely the means by which the attempt is made; such threat is limited to a threat of unlawful violence used in an attempt to deter the officer).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " RECKLESSNESS " ATTEMPTED RECKLESSNESS
New York permits defendants to plead guilty to legally impossible crimes, including attempted reckless first-degree assault. See People v. Guishard, 15 A.D.3d 731, 789 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (2005) (affirming plea conviction to attempted assault in the first degree although the crime was a legal impossibility); Dale v. Holder, 610 F.3d 294, 302 (5th Cir. 2010). Compare, United States v. Gomez"Hernandez, 680 F.3d 1171, 1175"78 & n. 4 (9th Cir. 2012) (defendant's conviction for attempted aggravated assault qualified as a crime of violence because, under Arizona law, it is not possible to be convicted of attempt without specific intent).