In 1990, the Immigration Act of 1990, effective November 29, 1990,[123] added a provision to the aggravated felony definition, including within it foreign convictions of listed offenses for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the past 15 years.  The aggravated felony definition applies to all offenses defined in the statute “in violation of the law of a foreign country for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years.”[124]  There is no provision stopping the clock on this provision.[125]  Therefore, this period continues to run, and at the point the date on which the noncitizen was released from custody on the foreign conviction passes the 15-year mark, the conviction instantly ceases to be an aggravated felony. 

            If no custody was imposed as a result of the conviction, logic dictates that the date of imposition of sentence would be considered the release date for this purpose.  Decisions construing the concept of “release from custody” for purposes of the mandatory detention provision may be analogous.[126]  This mandatory detention provision applies upon release from physical custody,[127] and so would seem to be the same definition as release from “imprisonment” in the aggravated felony foreign conviction definition.

[123] Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978  (November 29, 1990).

[124] INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (second to last sentence).

[125] Compare INA § 240A(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (stopping the clock on seven-year presence requirement for cancellation for LPRs upon service of a notice to appear or commission of a listed criminal offense).

[126] INA § 236(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1226(c)(1) (“The Attorney General shall take into custody any [specified] alien . . . when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation . . . .”).

[127] Matter of West, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1405 (BIA 2000).  See generally I. Kurzban, Kurzban’s Immigration Law Sourcebook 110 (9th ed. 2004).

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE - DOMESTIC RELATIONSHIP ELEMENT OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL FIREARMS POSSESSION OFFENSE NEED NOT BE IN THE ELEMENTS OF THE PREDICATE OFFENSE OF CONVICTION, BUT CAN BE PROVEN BY OTHER EVIDENCE
United States v. Hayes, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1079 (Feb. 24, 2009) (West Virginia conviction of misdemeanor battery, in violation of W. Va. Code Ann. 61-2-9(c) ("[A]ny person [who] unlawfully and intentionally makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with the person of another or unlawfully and intentionally causes physical harm to another person, ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."), constituted a conviction of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(A), for purposes of a conviction of illegal possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9), where evidence outside the elements of the predicate offense established the required domestic relationship.)

First Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONIES " FOREIGN CONVICTIONS " FEDERAL AND STATE CONVICTIONS " 15-YEAR EXCLUSION APPLIES ONLY TO FOREIGN CONVICTIONS
Levesque v. Lynch, 802 F.3d 152, 154 (1st Cir. Sept. 18, 2015) (only foreign convictions for which the term of imprisonment was completed after the previous 15 years are excluded from the aggravated felony definition; the exclusion does not apply to federal and state convictions).

Third Circuit

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE - CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS - THE DOMESTIC RELATIONSHIP MUST BE AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE FALLING WITHIN THE RECORD OF CONVICTION OR THE CONVICTION CANNOT TRIGGER DEPORTATION UNDER THIS GROUND
The Supreme Court has affirmed the use of the ordinary meaning of the language of a statute defining a ground of deportation. The domestic violence deportation ground requires that the noncitizen must have been "convicted of a crime of domestic violence," INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)(emphasis supplied), before this ground of deportation is triggered. This language requires that the conviction itself must be a crime of (a) domestic and (b) violence, since it requires that the respondent be "convicted" of a crime of "domestic violence." Therefore, the statute requires that both the domestic element (the specified relationship) and the crime of violence (under 18 U.S.C. 16) must be part of the conviction itself. The cases that suggest to the contrary ignore this plain statutory language, and their discussions are mostly dictum. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2004); Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2003); Emile v. INS, 244 F.3d 183 (1st Cir. 2001); Sutherland v. Reno, 228 F.3d 171, 176-78 (2d Cir. 2000). The correct rule, firmly grounded on the language of the statute, is that the domestic relationship must be contained in the essential elements of the statute of conviction, as framed by the state legislature or Congress, before a conviction under that statute can constitute a "crime of domestic violence" so as to trigger this ground of deportation. Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613, 622-23 (9th Cir. 2004). Thanks to Lory Rosenberg for this point.

Seventh Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - FOREIGN CONVICTIONS
Canto v. Holder, 593 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. Jan. 28, 2010) (rejecting equal protection argument that the differing treatment of foreign and domestic aggravated felony convictions violates equal protection).

Eleventh Circuit

FOREIGN CONVICTIONS - AGGRAVATED FELONY - SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT - ONLY FOREIGN CONVICTIONS, NOT DOMESTIC CONVICTIONS, CEASE TO BE AGGRAVATED FELONIES AFTER 15 YEARS FROM RELEASE FROM CONFINEMENT
United States v. Maturin, 499 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. Sept. 11, 2007) (federal conviction and sentence based on guilty plea to illegally reentering the U.S. after having previously been deported is affirmed over claim that defendant is not subject to a 17-month sentence enhancement as the term of imprisonment for his offense ended more than 15 years before his reentry, as that aggravated felony requirement applies only to foreign convictions).