Both parts of the aggravated felony crime of violence definition require “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another . . . .”[409]  This would seem to exclude offenses committed against one’s own property.  For example, if a person ripped his own telephone from the wall, that offense was committed against his own property, and would thus not be included within this crime of violence aggravated felony definition.  Similarly, attempted suicide represents a use of force against the person of oneself, and thus cannot be considered a crime of violence under these definitions.  Therefore, a conviction of attempted suicide does not constitute an aggravated felony, even if a sentence of one year or more is imposed.  A statute that is not limited to physical injury against person or property of another does not fall within this definition.[410]

[409] 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (emphasis supplied).

[410] United States v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508, 519-520 (9th Cir. 2000) (California conviction of stalking, under Penal Code § 646.9(a) — “any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, is guilty” of stalking — did not constitute a crime of violence because on its face the statute was not limited to physical injury, and therefore was not a crime of violence).

Third Circuit

CRIME OF VIOLENCE - INTENT REQUIREMENT - RECKLESSNESS INSUFFICIENT
Recent federal circuit decisions conclude that mere recklessness is an insufficient intent to constitute a crime of violence, under the reasoning of Leocal. E.g., Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 2005 WL 3579002 (3d Cir. Jan. 3, 2006); Tran v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 464, 2005 WL 1620320 (3d Cir. Jul. 12, 2005); Oyebanji v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. Aug. 11, 2005); Bejarano-Urrutia v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 444 (4th Cir. Jul. 5, 2005); United States v. Perez-Vargas, 414 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2005); Popal v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 249, 2005 WL 1791198 (3d Cir. Jul. 29, 2005); see also Lara-Cazares v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. May 23, 2005) (gross negligence insufficient); Garcia v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2061819 (4th Cir. Jul. 26, 2006).

Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ARSON
Jordison v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2007) (California conviction of arson, in violation of Penal Code 452(c) ("recklessly set[ting] fire to . . . a structure or forest land"), was not a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. section 16(b) for purposes of triggering deportation as an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), since offense may be committed by setting fire to ones own property).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ARSON - SAFE HAVEN - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - OFFENSE MUST BE AGAINST PERSON OR PROPERTY OF ANOTHER
Jordison v. Keisler, 501 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2007, amended Oct. 30, 2007) (California conviction for "recklessly set[ting] fire to ... a structure or forest land" in violation of Penal Code 452(c) is not categorically an aggravated felony "crime of violence" for purposes of removal since the offense may be committed by burning the defendant's own land or structure whereas a crime of violence is one that involves violence or potential violence against the person or property of others).

Eleventh Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ASSAULT ON AN OFFICER
United States v. Palomino-Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. May 21, 2010) (Arizona conviction for violation of Ariz. Stat. 13-1204(A)(7), aggravated assault against a police officer, defined as any simple assault against a law enforcement agent, is not necessarily a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes since the identity of the victim as a police officer does not affect the level of force required to constitute a crime of violence).