An intent to deprive the owner of property only temporarily is insufficient to constitute a crime of moral turpitude.[996]  The BIA has held that a conviction can constitute a “theft” conviction, and therefore an aggravated felony, even though the offense does not have an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property as an essential element.[997]  The BIA, however, was specific in stating that this did not mean such a lower-intent offense now constituted a crime involving moral turpitude: “An offense involving the taking of property need not be a crime involving moral turpitude in order to be considered a ‘theft’ offense [as an aggravated felony].”[998] 

[996] Matter of Grazley, 14 I. & N. Dec. 330, 333 (BIA 1973) (“Ordinarily, a conviction for theft is considered to involve moral turpitude only when a permanent taking is intended”).

[997] Matter of VZS, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1338 (BIA 2000) (a taking of property constitutes a “theft offense” within the  definition of an aggravated felony, whenever there is criminal intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent, and a California conviction for violating Vehicle Code § 10851 constitutes an aggravated felony). 

[998] Id. at n.12 (“We distinguish the present case from our decision in Matter of D, 1 I. & N. Dec. 143 (BIA 1941), where we held that a conviction under a predecessor statute to section 10851 was not a crime involving moral turpitude because the statute in question could include a mere temporary taking, as well as a permanent deprivation of the vehicle. Id. at 145. An offense involving the taking of property need not be a crime involving moral turpitude in order to be considered a “theft” offense. More pertinent to this case, however, is our finding in Matter of Grazley, 14 I. & N. Dec. 330 (BIA 1973), that a taking could constitute “theft” even if it did not include the turpitudinous element of intent to permanently deprive the owner of his or her property.  In Grazley, we reviewed section 283 of the Criminal Code of Canada, which provided for a theft conviction whether the taking was permanent or temporary. Ordinarily, a conviction for theft is considered to involve moral turpitude only when a permanent taking is intended.”).

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - THEFT - FARE EVASION
Santos-Gonzales v. Reno, 93 F.Supp. 2d 286, 288 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (New York conviction of fare evasion, a.k.a. turnstile jumping, when punished under New York Penal Law 165.15(03) (With intent obtains or attempts to obtain [taxi or public transportation] service or avoids or attempts to avoid payment therefor by force, intimidation, stealth, deception or mechanical tampering, or by unjustifiable failure or refusal to pay) is a crime of moral turpitude).

First Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " LARCENY
Patel v. Holder, 707 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. Feb. 1, 2013) (Connecticut conviction of fourth degree larceny under Conn. Gen.Stat. 53a"125, is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude because the offense may be committed without intent to permanently deprive).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " THEFT " THEFT OFFENSES INVOLVE MORAL TURPITUDE ONLY IF THEY REQUIRE AN ELEMENT OF INTENT TO PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY
Patel v. Holder, 707 F.3d 77, ___ (1st Cir. Feb. 1, 2013) (It is common ground among the parties that theft offenses can meet this definition, and that not all theft offenses do so. As noted above, the BIA generally distinguishes between turpitudinous thefts and their less depraved counterparts by asking whether the defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner of the purloined property.); citing In re Grazley, 14 I. & N. Dec. 330, 333 (BIA 1973).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " LARCENY
Patel v. Holder, 707 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. Feb. 1, 2013) (Connecticut conviction of fourth degree larceny under Conn. Gen.Stat. 53a"125, is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude because the offense may be committed without intent to permanently deprive).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " THEFT " THEFT OFFENSES INVOLVE MORAL TURPITUDE ONLY IF THEY REQUIRE AN ELEMENT OF INTENT TO PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY
Patel v. Holder, 707 F.3d 77, ___ (1st Cir. Feb. 1, 2013) (It is common ground among the parties that theft offenses can meet this definition, and that not all theft offenses do so. As noted above, the BIA generally distinguishes between turpitudinous thefts and their less depraved counterparts by asking whether the defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner of the purloined property.); citing In re Grazley, 14 I. & N. Dec. 330, 333 (BIA 1973).

Second Circuit

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - BURGLARY - ENTRY WITH INTENT TO COMMIT LARCENY REQUIRED FOR BURGLARY CMT
Wala v. Mukasey, ___ F.3d ___ (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 2007) (Connecticut conviction for third-degree burglary, in violation of Conn. Gen.Stat. section 53a-103, did not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of IONA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for immigration purposes; although the IJ and BIA properly concluded that Wala pled to a burglary with the intent to commit larceny, it was improper for the BIA to have inferred from the plea colloquy that petitioner intended to commit a larceny offense involving a permanent, rather than a temporary, taking of property).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE - LARCENY - ONLY LARCENY REQUIRING INTENT TO PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE CONSTITUTES CMT
Wala v. Mukasey, ___ F.3d ___ (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 2007) (larceny constitutes a crime of moral turpitude only if it requires the intent permanently to deprive: "Under BIA precedent, however, not all larcenies are CIMTs. The BIA has held that "[o]rdinarily, a conviction for theft is considered to involve moral turpitude only when a permanent taking is intended."), quoting Matter of Grazley, 14 I. & N. Dec. 330, 333 (BIA 1973); see also In re R, 2 I. & N. Dec. 819, 828 (BIA 1947) ("It is settled law that the offense of taking property temporarily does not involve moral turpitude.").

Fifth Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " ASSAULT " GENERIC DEFINITION OF CMT ASSAULT
Esparza-Rodriguez v. Holder, 699 F.3d 821, *823, 2012 WL 4937384 (5th Cir. Oct. 18, 2012) (To rise to the level of a CIMT, the BIA has held that an assault statute must have at least two characteristics. First, the scienter element must require specific intent, or, put another way, the actus reus must be accompanied by the evil intent, depraved or vicious motive, or corrupt mind associated with moral turpitude. Id. at 241. Second, the assault statute must require a meaningful level of harm, which must be more than mere offensive touching. Id. at 241"42. Several courts, but not all, and the BIA, but not always, require also an aggravating element indicative of the inherent vileness of the prohibited conduct.). In footnote 6, the court cited additional authority: See Nguyen v. Reno, 211 F.3d 692, 695 (1st Cir.2000) (explaining that an assault may or may not be a crime of moral turpitude, noting that the dividing line is the aggravating element); Uppal v. Holder, 605 F.3d 712, 717 (9th Cir.2010) ([T]o rise to the level of moral turpitude, an assault crime must involve a particular type of aggravating factor, one that says something about the turpitude or blameworthiness inherent in the action.). Contra Mustafaj v. Holder, 369 Fed.Appx. 163, 168"69 (2d Cir.2010) (unpublished) (holding that a New York assault statute qualified as a CIMT even though it lacked an aggravating factor). The BIA's decision-making on this point also has been uneven. Compare Matter of Ahortalejo"Guzman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 465, 465 (BIA 2011) (explaining that simple assault is not a CIMT unless it necessarily involves some aggravating factor that indicates the perpetrator's moral depravity), with In re Solon, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 242"46 (explaining that although the presence of an aggravating factor can be important in determining whether a particular assault amounts to a crime involving moral turpitude ... the need for, and the nature of, any aggravating factor is affected by the mental state required for the conviction). (Id. at ___ n.6.)

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " ASSAULT
Esparza-Rodriguez v. Holder, 699 F.3d 821, 825 (5th Cir. Oct. 18, 2012) (Texas conviction of assault, in violation of Penal Code 22.01(a)(1), properly held a crime involving moral turpitude: we cannot say that it was unreasonable for the BIA, upon careful consideration, to conclude that an intentional assault that is intended to and does cause more than a de minimis level of physical harm, is contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.); quoting Mustafaj v. Holder, 369 Fed.Appx. 163, 168"69 (2d Cir.2010) (unpublished) (holding that a New York assault statute qualified as a CIMT even though it lacked an aggravating factor).

Ninth Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " UNAUTHORIZED DRIVING A VEHICLE
Almanza-Arenas v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 2014) (California conviction of violating Vehicle Code 10851(a), a statute that criminalizes both conduct that would constitute a crime of moral turpitude " taking a vehicle with intent permanently to deprive the owner, and conduct that does not amount to a crime of moral turpitude " taking with intent temporarily to deprive the owner " was not categorically a crime of moral turpitude and does not render respondent ineligible for non-LPR cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b) in the context of removal proceedings for inadmissibility); see Castillo-Cruz v. Holder, 581 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2009) (a theft offense is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude if the statute of conviction is broad enough to criminalize a taking with intent to deprive the owner of his property only temporarily.).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " SIMPLE KIDNAPPING
Castrijon-Garcia v. Holder, 704 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2013) (California conviction of simple kidnapping, under Penal Code 207(a), is categorically not a crime involving moral turpitude making a noncitizen statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal, because it does not require an intent to injure, actual injury, or a special class of victims).