The nature of the intent element sufficient to constitute a crime of violence under § 16(b) is very similar, according to the Supreme Court, to that required under 16(a).  See § 7.49, supra.

 

SAFE HAVEN - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE OF FIREARM SUFFICIENT FOR CONVICTION UNDER 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) SO IT CANNOT CONSTITUTE AN AGGRAVATED FELONY CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Dean v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1849 (Apr. 29, 2009) (unintentional or accidental discharge of firearm during violent or drug-trafficking offense is sufficient to warrant 10-year mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(iii)).

Therefore, this enhancement does not convert the substantive offense into an aggravated felony crime of violence because the intent required for this sentence enhancement is insufficient under Leocal to constitute a crime of violence.

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE -- INTENT REQUIREMENT
Leocal v. Ashcroft, ___ U.S. ___, 160 L. Ed. 2d 271, 125 S. Ct. 377 (2004) (state statute of conviction must require at least the same level of scienter as the relevant federal statute in order for the state conviction to constitute an aggravated felony).

BIA

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " INTENT
Matter of Singh, 25 I. & N. Dec. 670 (BIA 2012) (an offense that may be committed recklessly may still be considered an aggravated felony crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b)).

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE " VIOLATION OF PROTECTION ORDER
Matter of Strydom, 25 I. & N. Dec. 507 (BIA May 24, 2011) (Kansas conviction for attempting to make a phone call to his wifes home in violation of the no-contact provision of a temporary protection order, in violation of Kan. Stats. 21-3843(a)(1), triggers deportation under INA 237(a)(2)(E)(ii)), following Szalai v. Holder, 572 F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 2009) (petitioners violation of the 100 yard stay away provision in Oregon Family Abuse Prevention Act restraining order triggers deportation under INA 237(a)(2)(E)(ii)); Alanis-Alvarado v. Holder, 558 F.3d 833, 839-40 (9th Cir. 2009) (injunction against telephoning a domestic partner in the context of a domestic violence protective order involves protection against violence, threats, or harassment, even if it is possible that the [offenders] violative conduct did not independently constitute violence, threats, or harassment[,] since INA 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) only requires a violation of the portion of a protection order that involves protection against credible threats of such conduct.) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Third Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " 18 U.S.C. 16(b) " RECKLESS MENS REA DOES NOT NECESSARILY BAR CRIME OF VIOLENCE UNDER 18 U.S.C. 16(b)
Aguilar v. Attorney General of the U.S., ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 5925141 (3d Cir. Nov. 29, 2011) (Pennsylvania conviction of sexual assault, under 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. 3124.1, constituted a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), and was therefore an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), even though the offense has a minimum mens rea of recklessness; because sexual assault raises a substantial risk that the perpetrator will intentionally use force in furtherance of the offense, we agree with the BIA that it constitutes a crime of violence under 16(b).).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - VEHICULAR HOMICIDE
Oyebanji v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 260 (3rd Cir. Aug. 11, 2005) (vehicular homicide under New Jersey Statutes 2C:11-5, is not a crime of violence as defined by 18 U.S.C. 16, since the statue requires only a reckless intent)
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/3rd/034143p.pdf