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Aggravated Felonies





 


 

§ B.9 3. Assault and Battery

 





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                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " DOMESTIC VIOLENCE " CORPORAL INJURY TO SPOUSE

                      Banuelos-Ayon v.  Holder, 611 F.3d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir. 2010) (California conviction of corporal injury of a spouse constitutes a crime of violence, and thus is a crime of domestic violence, INA  237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C.  237(a)(2)(E)(i), for immigration purposes).
                    


                  
BIA


                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " 18 USC  16(b) -- ASSAULT WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON 

                      United States v. Fish, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 715785 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (Massachusetts conviction for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, under M.G.L. ch. 265,  15A, did not categorically constitute a crime of violence, under 18 U.S.C.  16(b), because the minimum conduct punishable under this statute did not create a substantial risk that the defendant would intentionally use physical force against person or property, since the minimum conduct included reckless conduct), applying Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO COMMIT A LISTED FELONY

                      
Matter of Ramon Martinez, 25 I&N Dec. 571 (BIA 2011) (California conviction of assault with intent to commit a felony, in violation of Penal Code  220, is categorically an aggravated felony crime of violence, even though the record of conviction did not specify which felony he intended to commit, because all the enumerated felonies listed in that statute constitute crimes of violence).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - 18 U.S.C.  16(a)

                      Matter of Perez Ramirez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 203 (BIA Mar. 17, 2010) (California conviction for misdemeanor willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse, in violation of Penal Code  273.5(a), qualifies categorically as a conviction for a "crime of violence" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.  16(a)).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONIES " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ASSAULT AND BATTERY AGAINST A FAMILY OR HOUSEHOLD MEMBER

                      Matter of Velasquez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 278 (BIA 2010) (In light of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010), that because the Virginia statute reaches conduct that cannot be classified as violent force, the respondents offense is not categorically a crime of violence and thus cannot be classified as a categorical crime of domestic violence for purposes of section 237(a)(2)(E) of the Act.).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSAULT - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      Matter of Martin, 23 I. & N. Dec. 
                    491 (BIA Sept. 26, 2002) (Connecticut conviction of third-degree 
                    assault, in violation of section 53a-61(a)(1) of the Connecticut 
                    General Statutes, which involves the intentional infliction 
                    of physical injury upon another, is a crime of violence under 
                    18 U.S.C. § 16(a), for deportation purposes).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED BATTERY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      Matter of B, 20 I. & N. Dec. 
                    427 (BIA Nov. 19, 1991) (conviction of aggravated battery 
                    by injuring a person with a shot from a firearm constitutes 
                    a crime of violence and is therefore an aggravated felony 
                    since a sentence of five years was imposed).
                    


                  
First Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

                      United States v. Whindleton, 797 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. Aug. 10, 2015) (Massachusetts conviction for conviction for assault with a deadly weapon under Massachusetts General Laws ch. 265,  15B(b) [[w]hoever, by means of a dangerous weapon, commits an assault upon another.], constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA); following United States v. Am, 564 F.3d 25, 33 & n. 9 (1st Cir. 2009) (an ADW conviction under under Massachusetts General Laws ch. 265,  15B(b) clearly satisfies the ACCA's Force Clause). 

Note: At issue in this case is whether the Massachusetts offense of assault with a dangerous weapon (ADW), Mass. Gen. L. ch. 265,  15B(b), has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force as defined in the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). This question is relevant under immigration law, because the aggravated felony definition of crime of violence includes identical language. 18 U.S.C.  16(a). Whindleton, supra, at 112.

Immigration attorneys should note that the First Circuit may have left open an argument regarding the degree of intent necessary for an ADW conviction and whether that intent is sufficient for a violent felony or a crime of violence. See Whindleton at n.9 & n.12.

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ASSAULT " INTENT

                      Villanueva v. Holder, 784 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. Apr. 24, 2015) (Connecticut conviction for assault in the third degree, under Conn. Gen.Stat.  53a"61, did not constitute a crime of violence aggravated felony, under INA  101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.  1101(a)(43)(F), where the record of conviction did not indicate the subdivision under which the noncitizen was convicted, since two of the three sections involved only recklessness or negligence which are insufficient intent to constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.  16).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ASSAULT AND BATTERY

                      United States v. Martinez, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15173 (1st Cir. Aug. 6, 2014) (Massachusetts convictions for assault and battery and simple assault, under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 265,  13A, did not categorically constitute crimes of violence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G.  4B1.2(a), even though the defendant admitted having struck his girlfriend, because the term struck covers conduct that is neither intentional nor involves violent force).

Note: The defendant did not raise a claim that the assault and battery statute was not divisible, so no resort to the record of conviction was proper; therefore, the court did not reach that issue. Immigration attorneys should argue that under Martinez, Massachusetts simple assault can never be an aggravated felony as a crime of violence or a crime of domestic violence under INA  237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C.  1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Similarly, immigration counsel should argue that Massachusetts assault and battery is not a crime of violence " both because the record of conviction does not clearly and necessarily establish a conviction for harmful battery and because (most importantly) assault and battery is not a divisible offense and therefore should never be considered a crime of violence. 

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " 18 USC  16(a) -- ASSAULT WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON 

                      United States v. Fish, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 715785 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (Massachusetts conviction for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, under M.G.L. ch. 265,  15A, did not categorically constitute a crime of violence, under 18 U.S.C.  16(a), because the minimum conduct punishable under this statute does not have as an element the use of violent force, but instead covers even the slightest touching with a dangerous weapon).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ATTEMPTED RECKLESS ASSAULT

                      Dale v. Holder, 610 F.3d 294 (5th Cir. Jun. 25, 2010) (New York conviction for first degree assault, in violation of New York Penal Code  120.10, is not necessarily an aggravated felony crime of violence since the statute is divisible and includes reckless assault; BIA erred in finding that defendants in New York cannot be convicted of "attempted" reckless assault - although attempted reckless assault does not necessarily appear logical from a criminal standpoint, New York case law indicates that the offense is an acceptable plea), citing People v. Guishard, 15 A.D.3d 731, 789 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (N.Y.App.Div.2005) (affirming plea conviction to attempted assault in the first degree although the crime was a "legal impossibility").

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT

                      Lopes v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. Oct. 26, 2007) (Rhode Island conviction for assault and battery, in violation of Gen.Laws 1956,  11-5-3, is an aggravated felony for immigration purposes, since the statue requires "use of force" as an element; although the statute does not define "assault," the Rhode Island Supreme Court has defined assault as an attempt to do a bodily harm to another person with "force or violence"; "because section 11-5-3 does not provide a definition of assault, the BIA appropriately looked to Rhode Island case law to determine how the state defines the crime.").

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT - VEHICULAR

                      United States v. Earle, 488 F.3d 537 (1st Cir. Jun. 6, 2007) (Massachusetts conviction of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, a motor vehicle, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265,  15A(b), constituted a crime of violence, for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since the elements of the statute require the use of force against the person of another).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSAULT - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States v. Cordoza-Estrada, 385 
                    F.3d 56 (1st Cir. Sept. 29, 2004) (New Hampshire conviction 
                    of simple assault for punching a man in the face and breaking 
                    his nose, with a sentence to twelve months of imprisonment 
                    with ten months suspended, constituted an aggravated felony 
                    crime of violence conviction, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 
                    U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), triggering an eight-level enhancement 
                    of sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) for illegal re-entry, 
                    even though the conviction was a misdemeanor).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSAULT - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 20 
                    (1st Cir. Oct. 19, 2001) (Maine conviction for assault, under 
                    17-A M.R.S.A. § 207 qualifies as a "crime of violence" 
                    for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (felon with a firearm), 
                    since the minimum conduct of "offensive physical contact," 
                    "invariably emanate[s] from the application of some quantum 
                    of physical force" which is sufficient to constitute 
                    the use of physical force for purposes of defining the offense 
                    as a crime of violence).
                    


                  
Lower Courts of First Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSAULT ON OFFICER - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      Rowe v. INS, 45 F.Supp.2d 144 
                    (D.Mass. Apr. 30, 1999) (conviction for assault and battery 
                    of a police officer is an aggravated felony as defined by 
                    INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.  1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes 
                    of deportation).
                    


                  
Second Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " SECOND-DEGREE ASSAULT

                      Morris v. Holder, 676 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 2012) (New York conviction for second-degree assault under New York Penal Law  120.05(2) categorically constitutes a crime of violence for the purposes of 18 U.S.C.  16(b), and is therefore an aggravated felony under INA  101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.  1101 (a)(43)(F), finding argument that the offense is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.  16(a) because the crime does not require "physical force" to be inopposite because  16(b) does not require use of physical force).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - 18 U.S.C.  16(a) -- MASSACHUSETTS CONVICTION OF ASSAULT ON OFFICER UNDER INTENTIONAL THEORY CONSTITUTED CRIME OF VIOLENCE SINCE HAS ELEMENT OF USE OF FORCE

                      Blake v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2007 WL 914865 (2d Cir. March 28, 2007) (Massachusetts statute defining offense of assault on police officer and other categories of public official, Massachusetts General Laws chapter 265, section 13D, under intentional theory of assault, constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.  16(a), since it has an element of use of force).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - 18 U.S.C.  16(b) -- MASSACHUSETTS CONVICTION OF ASSAULT ON OFFICER UNDER WANTON OR RECKLESS THEORY CONSTITUTED CRIME OF VIOLENCE UNDER 16(b) SINCE IT HAS A SUBSTANTIAL RISK THE DEFENDANT WILL USE FORCE TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE

                      Blake v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2007 WL 914865 (2d Cir. March 28, 2007) (Massachusetts statute defining offense of assault on police officer and other categories of public official, Massachusetts General Laws chapter 265, section 13D, under the wanton or reckless theory of assault, constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.  16(b), since it offers a substantial risk the defendant will use force to commit the offense; the court found that Massachusetts law required physical or bodily injury to convict).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      THIRD DEGREE ASSAULT - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft, 
                    327 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2003) (Connecticut conviction 
                    of third-degree assault in violation of section 53a-61(a)(1) 
                    of the Connecticut General Statutes, which involves the intentional 
                    infliction of physical injury upon another, is not a crime 
                    of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) and is therefore not an 
                    aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.  1101(a)(43)(F) 
                    because use of force is not an element of the offense).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSAULT - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148 
                    (2d Cir. Aug. 29, 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 904, 121 S.Ct. 
                    2246 (2001) (Rhode Island misdemeanor simple assault conviction, 
                    for which suspended sentence of one year was imposed, constituted 
                    an aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 
                    § 1101(a)(43)(F), warranting 16-level enhancement of illegal 
                    re-entry sentence for violation of INA § 276(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
                    § 1326(a)(1) under U.S.S.G.  2L1.2(b)(1)(A)).
                    


                  
Lower Courts of Second Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSAULT - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      Milbin v. Ashcroft, 293 F.Supp.2d 158 
                    (D.Conn. Dec. 2, 2003) (Connecticut conviction under any subdivision 
                    of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-61, which prohibits various ways 
                    of causing injury to a person, did not constitute a crime 
                    of violence within the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 
                    § 1101(a)(43)(F), 18 U.S.C.  16(a), because it does not have 
                    use of force as an element, and could be violated by guile, 
                    deception, or even deliberate omission), following Chrzanoski 
                    v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2003).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RISK OF INJURY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      Santapaola v. Ashcroft, 249 
                    F.Supp.2d 181 (D.Conn. Mar. 13, 2003) (Connecticut conviction 
                    for risk of injury, in violation of Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53-21(1), 
                    constituted an aggravated felony conviction for a "crime 
                    of violence," under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.  1101(a)(43)(F), 
                    for deportation purposes).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSAULT WITH INJURY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      Persaud v. McElroy, 225 F. 
                    Supp. 2d 420 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2002) (New York conviction 
                    of assault with injury under N.Y. Penal Law § 120.05(6) was 
                    not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) because it 
                    did not require, as an element of the offense, that the defendant 
                    use physical force to inflict the injury, and the conviction 
                    was therefore not an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 
                    8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)).
                    


                  
Third Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - SIMPLE ASSAULT

                      United States v. Otero, __ F.3d __ 2007 WL 2610412 (3d Cir. Sept. 12, 2007) (Pennsylvania conviction of simple assault, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann.  2701(a) (2003), is not necessarily a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes since the offense does not necessarily require proof of the use of force when causing "bodily injury."), applying reasoning of Popal v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2005) (same statute is not necessarily an aggravated felony crime of violence) to the sentencing context.


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      SIMPLE ASSAULT - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533 
                    (3d Cir. Jan. 3, 2006) (Pennsylvania misdemeanor conviction 
                    of simple assault, under 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 2701(a)(3) 
                    ("A person is guilty of assault if he . . . attempts 
                    by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious 
                    bodily injury."), constituted a crime of violence, under 
                    18 U.S.C. § 16(a), and therefore an aggravated felony under 
                    INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.  1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes 
                    of triggering deportation).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      RECKLESS SIMPLE ASSAULT - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      Popal v. Gonzalez, 416 
                    F.3d 249 (3d Cir. July 29, 2005) (Pennsylvania conviction 
                    of simple assault (reckless), in violation of Pennsylvania 
                    Penal Code § 18 Pa.C.S.A.  2701, is not an aggravated felony 
                    crime of violence for immigration purposes, since a mens rea 
                    of recklessness is insufficient to qualify as a crime of violence 
                    under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.  1101(a)(43)(F)).
                    


                  
Fourth Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " SECOND-DEGREE ASSAULT

                      United States v. Royal, 731 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. Oct. 1, 2013) (Maryland conviction for second-degree assault, in violation of Md. Code, Crim. Law  3"203(a), did not constitute a predicate violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act, because the Maryland offense was a facially indivisible statute, i.e., one that does not set out elements of the offense in the alternative, but which may nevertheless broadly criminalize qualitatively different categories of conduct; Maryland courts do not require unanimity on whether the offense was committed by offensive physical contact or infliction of physical harm.).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSAULT - 18 USC 16(a) - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      Garcia v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d 
                    ___, 2006 WL 2061819 (4th Cir. Jul. 26, 2006) (New York conviction 
                    of second-degree assault, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 
                    120.05 ["recklessly causes serious physical injury to 
                    another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous 
                    instrument"], does not constitute an aggravated felony 
                    "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), 
                    since its definition does not contain an element that there 
                    be the intentional employment of physical force against a 
                    person or thing).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSALUT - 18 USC 16(b) - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      Garcia v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 
                    2006 WL 2061819 (4th Cir. Jul. 26, 2006) (New York conviction 
                    of second-degree assault, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 
                    120.05 ["recklessly causes serious physical injury to 
                    another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous 
                    instrument"], does not constitute a "crime of violence" 
                    under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and thus is not an aggravated 
                    felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), 
                    since recklessness, like negligence, is not enough to support 
                    a determination that a crime is a "crime of violence"), 
                    following Bejarano-Urrutia v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 444, 447 
                    (4th Cir. 2005) (such a violation did not qualify as a "crime 
                    of violence" because "[a]lthough the crime of violating 
                    Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-36 intrinsically involves a substantial 
                    risk that the defendant's actions will cause physical harm, 
                    it does not intrinsically involve a substantial risk that 
                    force will be applied 'as a means to an end.'").


                    


                  
Lower Courts of Fourth Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSAULT WITH DANGEROUS WEAPON - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States v. 
                    Gebele, 117 F.Supp.2d 540, 544 (W.D.Va. Oct. 13, 2000) (Massachusetts 
                    conviction of Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous 
                    Weapon, with a sentence of five years and one day, was a "crime 
                    of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and therefore constituted 
                    an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.  
                    1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of enhancing an illegal re-entry 
                    sentence).
                    


                  
Fifth Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIMES OF VIOLENCE " ASSAULT WITH DEADLY WEAPON

                      United States v. Carrasco-Tercero, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 983180 (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 2014) (New Mexico conviction of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, under N.M. Stat.  30"3"2, was a crime of violence for illegal reentry sentencing purposes, notwithstanding that assault N.M. Stat.  30-3-1 includes the use of insulting language toward another impugning his honor, delicacy or reputation.; that New Mexico did not have approved jury instructions for an aggravated assault crime predicated on insulting language, combined with the fact that Carrasco"Tercero has presented no instance where a defendant has been charged with such an offense or where a New Mexico court has mentioned it as a possibility, leads this court to conclude that New Mexico does not in fact recognize this theory of aggravated assault.); disagreeing with United States v. Rede"Mendez, 680 F.3d 552, 557-560 (6th Cir.2012) (New Mexico conviction of aggravated assault, under N.M. Stat.  30"3"2, was not a crime of violence, because assault under N.M. Stat.  30-3-1 included the use of insulting language toward another impugning his honor, delicacy or reputation.).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " AGGRAVATED ASSAULT

                      United States v. Esparza-Perez, 681 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. May 14, 2012) (Arkansas conviction of aggravated assault [[e]ngag[ing] in conduct that creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person.] is not a crime of violence under the residual clause of USSG    2L1.2, because the statute does not require any contact or injury or attempt or threat of offensive contact or injury, thus did not have as an element "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " AGGRAVATED ASSAULT

                      United States v. Esparza-Perez, 681 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. May 14, 2012) (Arkansas conviction of aggravated assault, in violation of Ark. Code  5-13-204(a)(1), is not a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, under U.S.S.G.  2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii), because it does not require proof of an assault as that crime is generally defined"i.e., as an offense that involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of offensive contact against another person).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY"CRIME OF VIOLENCE"DOMESTIC ASSAULT AND BATTERY

                      United States v. Miranda-Ortegon, 670 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. Feb. 10, 2012) (Oklahoma conviction for domestic assault and battery, in violation of Okla. Stat. tit. 21,  644C [[a]ny person who commits an assault and battery against a current or former spouse ... [or] a child ... shall be guilty of domestic abuse.], did not constitute an aggravated felony crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes because the elements of the offense require only the slightest touching is necessary to constitute the force or violence element of battery.); quoting Steele v. State, 778 P.2d 929, 931 (Okla.Crim.App.1989); see United States v. Smith, 652 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir.2011) (Oklahoma assault-and-battery offense did not fall within the first prong of the Armed Career Criminal Act [has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, 18 U.S.C.  924(e)(2)(B)(i)]); see Johnson v. United States, """ U.S. """", 130 S.Ct. 1265, 1269"71, 176 L.Ed.2d 1, (2010) (holding that Florida felony battery conviction was not a violent felony under 18 U.S.C.  924(e)(1)(2)(B)(i), because the offense's elements are satisfied by any physical contact, no matter how slight (quotation marks and internal citation omitted)).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " CORPORAL INJURY OF A SPOUSE

                      
United States v. Cruz-Rodriguez, 625 F.3d 274, 276 (5th Cir. Nov. 2, 2010) (per curiam) (California conviction of willful infliction of corporal injury, in violation of Penal Code  273.5(a), constituted a crime of violence under U.S.S.G.  2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), for purposes of imposing a 16-level enhancement to the offense level for illegal reentry sentence: With respect to the willful infliction of corporal injury offense, we previously rejected this argument in an unpublished opinion, holding that California Penal Code  237.5(a) penalizes the intentional use of force that results in a traumatic condition. United States v. Gutierrez, 371 Fed.Appx. 550, 551 (5th Cir.2010) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We find this reasoning persuasive. Moreover, our previous decision is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's analysis of  237.5(a). United States v. Laurico-Yeno, 590 F.3d 818, 820 (9th Cir.2010), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 216, 2010 WL 2551985 (2010) (Because the use of physical force against the person of another is an element of the statute, we hold that California Penal Code  273.5 is a categorical crime of violence under U.S.S.G.  2L1.2.). Accordingly, we hold that the offense of willful infliction of corporal injury is a crime of violence for the purpose of sentence adjustments under U.S.S.G.  2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " SOLICITATION TO COMMITT ASSAULT 

                      
United States v. Mendez-Casarez, 624 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. Oct. 15, 2010) (North Carolina conviction of solicitation to commit assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, in violation of the common-law definition of North Carolina law, see State v. Richardson, 100 N.C.App. 240, 395 S.E.2d 143, 147-48 (1990), constituted a crime of violence for illegal reentry sentencing purposes, because the list of predicate crimes of violence was not exhaustive; solicitation is sufficiently similar to conspiracy, which is one of the enumerated offenses in the list; the list was not subject to rule of lenity; the non-exhaustive interpretation did not render Guideline vague); United States v. Cornelio-Pena, 435 F.3d 1279, 1288 (10th Cir. 2006) (Arizona conviction for solicitation to commit burglary of a dwelling constituted a crime of violence for the purposes of U.S.S.G.  2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)); United States v. Shumate, 329 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.2003) (Oregon conviction for solicitation of delivery of cocaine constituted a controlled substance offense for the purposes of U.S.S.G.  4B1.1(a), which includes aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such an offense, U.S.S.G.  4B1.2 cmt. n. 1); United States v. Dolt, 27 F.3d 235, 240 (6th Cir.1994) (Florida conviction for solicitation to traffic in cocaine did not constitute a controlled substance offense for the purposes of U.S.S.G.  4B1.1(a)); see United States v. Liranzo, 944 F.2d 73, 79 (2d Cir.1991) (New York conviction for criminal facilitation of the sale of cocaine did not constitute a controlled substance offense for the purposes of U.S.S.G.  4B1.1(a)).



                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - INJURY OF CHILD

                      United States v. Andino-Ortega, 608 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. Jun. 8, 2010) (Texas conviction for injury to child, in violation of Texas Penal Code  22.04(a), did not constitute a crime of violence, for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since it does not require use of force; Texas Penal Code  22.04(a) can be committed, for example, "by intentional act without the use of physical force by putting poison or another harmful substance in a child's food or drink.").

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - UNLAWFUL WOUNDING

                      Singh v. Holder, 568 F.3d 525 (5th Cir. May 14, 2009) (Virginia conviction of unlawful wounding, under Virginia Code  18.2-51 ["maliciously shoot, stab, cut, or wound any person or by any means cause him bodily injury, with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill"] is an aggravated felony crime of violence under INA  101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.  1101(a)(43)(F) for purposes of barring naturalization under INA  101(f)(8), 8 U.S.C.  1101(f)(8)).



NOTE: the Fifth Circuit here found the conviction was a "crime of violence" because the petitioner did not suggest any ways in which the offense would not be a crime of violence, failing to meet the requirements of Duenas and James. 



                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO COMMIT A FELONY

                      United States v. Rojas-Gutierrez, 510 F.3d 545 (5th Cir. Dec. 13, 2007) (California conviction of assault with intent to commit certain enumerated felonies, including mayhem, rape, sodomy and oral copulation, in violation of Penal Code  220(a), constituted a "crime of violence" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of aggravated assault includes "assault with intent to commit a felony.").
 

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - INJURY TO CHILD

                      Perez-Munoz v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. Nov. 6, 2007) (Texas conviction for injury of a child, in violation of Texas Penal Code  22.04(a)(3), is an aggravated felony crime of violence, under INA  101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.  1101(a)(43)(F), for immigration purposes).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT

                      United States v. Neri-Hernandes, 504 F.3d 587 (5th Cir. Oct. 12, 2007) (New York conviction for attempted assault, in violation of N.Y. McKinney's Penal Law  120.05, is categorically a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT

                      United States v. Neri-Hernandes, 504 F.3d 587 (5th Cir. Oct. 12, 2007) (New York conviction for attempted assault, in violation of N.Y. McKinney's Penal Law  120.05, is categorically a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT WITH DEADLY WEAPON

                      United States v. Dominguez, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 441885 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 2007) (Florida conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of Florida Statutes  784.045(1)(a), is a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes; although under that statute, an aggravated battery could be committed by merely touching someone with a deadly weapon without the use of force, such touching created a sufficient threat of force to qualify as a crime of violence).

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT

                      United States v. Garcia, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir. Nov. 22, 2006) (Colorado conviction for third-degree assault, in violation of Colo. Rev. Stat.  18-3-204, is not a crime of violence as defined under U.S.S.G. section 4B1.2(a)(1), for purposes of career offender sentence enhancement purposes, because the statute of conviction does not require use of physical force; mere touching is sufficient). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/5th/0541030cr0p.pdf
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT

                      United States v. Villegas-Hernandez, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 3072558 (5th Cir. Oct. 31, 2006) (Texas conviction for violation of Penal Code  22.01(a), assault, is not an aggravated felony crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes since the statute may be violated without the perpetrator using force against the victim). 
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/5th/0540988cr0p.pdf

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSAULT ON POLICE OFFICER - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States v. Fierro-Reyna, 
                    __ F.3d __ (5th Cir. Sept. 28, 2006) (Texas conviction from 
                    1979 for aggravated assault on a police officer, in violation 
                    of Penal Code § 22.02(a)(2) (1974) [punishing simple 
                    assault on a police officer] is not a "crime of violence" 
                    for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since simple assault 
                    does not necessarily require use of force; state classification 
                    of assault as 'aggravated' because it is committed against 
                    a police officer is irrelevant).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED BATTERY WITH DEADLY WEAPON - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States v. Velasco, 
                    ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2729670 (5th Cir. Sept. 27, 2006) (Illinois 
                    conviction for aggravated battery, under 720 IL. COMP. STAT. 
                    5/12-4(a), (b)(1) (1995) ["aggravated battery" in 
                    this case, according to the indictment, occurred when "[a] 
                    person who, in committing a battery, intentionally or knowingly 
                    causes great bodily harm, or permanent disability or disfigurement" 
                    by use of a deadly weapon other than by the discharge of a 
                    firearm], was a "crime of violence" warranting 16-level 
                    enhancement of defendant's sentence for illegal reentry, under 
                    USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), since "use" of a deadly 
                    weapon to cause bodily harm is sufficient to require use of 
                    force against the person of another, and the indictment was 
                    included in the record of conviction).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED BATTERY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      Larin-Ulloa v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __, 2006 
                    WL 2441387 (5th Cir. Aug. 24, 2006) (Kansas conviction of 
                    aggravated battery under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3414(a)(1)(C), 
                    defined as intentional physical contact with a deadly weapon 
                    in a rude, insulting or angry manner defines a crime which 
                    is categorically a "crime of violence," under 18 
                    U.S.C. § 16(b) and thus an aggravated felony for removal 
                    purposes).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      
                    Andrade v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir. Aug. 1, 2006) (Massachusetts 
                    conviction of battery, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 
                    265, § 13A, although divisible, is found in this case 
                    to be an aggravated felony crime of violence under INA § 
                    101(a)(43)(F), as falling under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), where 
                    the conviction "also concerned a violation of a domestic 
                    abuse protective order.")
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      SECOND-DEGREE ASSAULT - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States v. Torres-Diaz, 
                    438 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. Jan. 30, 2006) (Connecticut conviction 
                    of second-degree assault under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-60(a)(2) 
                    ("with intent to cause physical injury to another person, 
                    he causes such injury to such person or to a third person 
                    by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument other 
                    than by means of the discharge of a firearm"), with a 
                    five-year suspended sentence, constituted a conviction of 
                    "aggravated assault" as used in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 
                    n.1(B)(iii), and is thus a "crime of violence" under 
                    U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), for purposes of imposing a 
                    16-level enhancement of sentence for illegal re-entry, because 
                    the offense of conviction tracks the Model Penal Code definition 
                    of "aggravated assault" almost exactly).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED BATTERY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States v. Gonzalez-Chavez, 
                    432 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2005) (Florida conviction 
                    of aggravated battery under § 784.045 of the Florida Statutes 
                    is divisible, as the statute may be violated by any assault 
                    on a pregnant woman, including spitting, which does not involve 
                    the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force, and therefore 
                    may not be an aggravated felony crime of violence for sentencing 
                    purposes).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSAULT - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      Gonzalez-Garcia v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 
                    234 (5th Cir. Nov. 16, 2005) (Texas conviction of assault, 
                    in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(3) ("intentionally 
                    or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the 
                    person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will 
                    regard the contact as offensive or provocative"), did 
                    not constitute a crime of violence aggravated felony under 
                    INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.  1101(a)(43)(F), since "offensive 
                    or provocative contact" does not necessarily involve 
                    the use of physical force).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSAULT WITH BODILY INJURY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States v. Urias-Escobar, 
                    281 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. Jan. 23, 2002), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 
                    2377 (2002) (Texas conviction for misdemeanor assault with 
                    bodily injury, with one year suspended sentence imposed, was 
                    an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.  
                    1101(a)(43)(F) that warranted an enhanced sentence under U.S.S.G. 
                    § 2L1.2 for illegal re-entry).
                    


                  
Sixth Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " AGGRAVATED ASSAULT

                      
United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. Aug 4, 2011) (Tennessee conviction of aggravated assault, in violation of Tenn.Code Ann.  39"13"102 (1991), was not a violent felony under the ACCAs use of physical force clause, or under its residual clause, for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act, where the offense could be committed recklessly).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO COMMIT SEXUAL BATTERY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United 
                    States v. Arnold, 58 F.3d 1117, 1122 n. 4 (6th Cir. July 13, 
                    1995) (Tennessee conviction for assault with intent to commit 
                    sexual battery is not categorically a "crime of violence" 
                    for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon with a firearm) 
                    because the minimum conduct of the offense can be committed 
                    through force or coercion).
                    


                  
Seventh Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR " AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ABUSE

                      
United States v. Sandoval Ramirez, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2864417 (7th Cir. Jul. 20, 2011) (Illinois conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/12"16(d), qualified as sexual abuse of a minor, within the enumerated offenses of the crime of violence definition, for purposes of imposing a 16"level illegal reentry sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G.  2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), since all of the different offenses within that statute constitute intentional acts of a sexual nature against a minor).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " AGGRAVATED BATTERY

                      
United States v. Aviles-Solarzano, 623 F.3d 470, 472-473 (7th Cir. Oct. 13, 2010) (Illinois conviction of aggravated battery, under 720 ILCS 5/12-4(b), is not categorically a crime of violence, within the meaning of U.S.S.G.  2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), since Illinois aggravated battery may include non-violent offenses, such as spitting on another person while standing on a sidewalk).


                    


                  
Eighth Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " THIRD-DEGREE ASSAULT

                      Roberts v. Holder, 745 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 2014) (Minnesota conviction for third-degree assault, under Minn.Stat.  609.223 subd. 1, 609.02 subd. 10. [assault of another, (2) that inflicts substantial bodily harm. Minn.Stat. 609.223 subd. 1. Assault is defined as (1) an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death; or (2) the intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily harm upon another.],  constituted a crime of violence aggravated felony, because the ordinary case of third-degree assault involve[s] the intentional use of physical force against another, so it has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force); quoting United States v. Salean, 583 F.3d 1059, 1060 (8th Cir.2009) (Minnesota conviction of fourth-degree assault constituted violent felony within the ACCA based on a virtually identical definition). 
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIMES OF VIOLENCE " SECOND-DEGREE BATTERY

                      United States v. Dawn, 685 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. Jun. 28, 2012) (Arkansas conviction of second-degree battery, in violation of Ark. Code Ann.  5"13"202(a) (2006), is not categorically a crime of violence for purposes of the Armed Career Criminals Act, because it includes recklessly causing serious physical injury, including reckless driving).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIMES OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT ON POLICE OFFICER

                      United States v. Reyes-Solano, F.3d 543 F.3d 474 (8th Cir. Sept. 26, 2008) (Mississippi convictions for domestic assault and assault on a police officer were not categorically "crimes of violence" (defined as including twelve enumerated offenses (none at issue in this case), "or any other federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another."), so as to justify a four-level sentence enhancement under USSG   2L1.2(b)(1)(E) for illegal reentry after deportation, because "Absent state court records identifying the offense of conviction, from which the elements of that offense may be determined, the testimony of Reyes-Solano at sentencing is not sufficient proof that actual, attempted, or threatened use of force was an element of the offense and not merely conduct incidental to an offense whose essential elements did not include the use of force. Accordingly, on this record the four-level increase under  2L1.2(b)(1)(E) was improperly imposed.")

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSAULT - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617 (8th 
                    Cir. Mar. 24, 1999) (Iowa conviction of misdemeanor assault, 
                    under Iowa Code § 708.1(1), which may be committed by "[a]ny 
                    act which is . . . intended to result in physical contact 
                    which will be insulting or offensive to another," by 
                    necessity, requires physical force to complete, and is thus 
                    sufficient physical force to constitute a crime of violence 
                    for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (felon with a firearm)). 

                    


                  
Ninth Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

                      United States v. Jimenez-Arzate, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 2015) (amending and superseding opinion denying rehearing en banc) (California conviction for violation of Penal Code  245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence for federal sentencing purposes, since United States v. Grajeda, which held that a conviction under section 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence, is still good law even in light of People v. Aznavoleh, 210 Cal.App.4th 1181 (2012), and People v. Wyatt, 48 Cal.4th 776 (2010), which do not hold that assault with a deadly weapon may be committed with reckless intent;  a defendant guilty of assault must be aware of the facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that a battery would directly, naturally and probably result from his conduct. He may not be convicted based on facts he did not know but should have known. Wyatt, at 159 (quoting People v. Williams, 26 Cal.4th 779 (2001)). 
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

                      United States v. Jimenez-Arzate, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 149802 (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 2015) (per curiam) (California conviction for assault with deadly weapon, in violation of Penal Code  245(a)(1), was categorically a crime of violence, for federal sentencing purposes, rejecting the argument that the California courts have weakened the intent requirement to recklessness, which involves insufficient intent to qualify, so United States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2009), is no longer good law in light of People v. Aznavoleh, 210 Cal.App.4th 1181, 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 901, 904 (2012), and People v. Wyatt, 48 Cal.4th 776, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 259, 229 P.3d 156, 157 (2010)).

	The court reasoned:

We disagree. Aznavoleh involved a defendant who intentionally ran a red light while racing another car down the street even though he saw a car entering the intersection on the green. The defendant made no effort to stop despite a passenger warning him that he needed to stop. The California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's finding that the defendant met the willfulness element of assault under California Penal Code  245(a)(1), which the California Court of Appeal defined as intentionality. 

Wyatt involved a father who, while play wrestling with his infant son, struck the boy with such force that he killed him. [Citation omitted.]  The Wyatt court upheld the father's conviction for involuntary manslaughter and assault on a child causing death because substantial evidence established that defendant knew he was striking his young son with his fist, forearm, knee, and elbow, and that he used an amount of force a reasonable person would realize was likely to result in great bodily injury. Id. As did the California Court of Appeal in Aznavoleh, the California Supreme Court in Wyatt explained that a defendant guilty of assault must be aware of the facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that a battery would directly, naturally and probably result from his conduct. He may not be convicted based on facts he did not know but should have known. Id. at 159 (quoting People v. Williams, 26 Cal.4th 779, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197, 203 (2001)).

Contrary to Jimenez"Arzate's argument, Aznavoleh did not hold that an automobile accident stemming from merely reckless driving may result in a conviction under  245(a)(1). The defendant in Aznavoleh engaged in street racing, heedlessly disregarding a perceived likelihood of death or grave injury to others. Likewise, in Wyatt, a reasonable person would have recognized the dangers of striking a child with the deadly force used, even if the defendant was not subjectively aware of the risks of his play wrestling with the child in that manner.

(Id. at ___.)

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " FIRST DEGREE ASSAULT

                      United States v. Castillo-Marin, 684 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. Jul. 3, 2012) (New York conviction of assault in the first degree, under New York Penal Law  120.10, was not categorically a crime of violence, for illegal re-entry purposes, because it includes reckless endangerment and causing injury during flight, which do not prohibit only conduct that involves an intent to injure, and may be committed with mere recklessness).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED ASSAULT

                      United States v. Gomez-Hernandez, 680 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. May 31, 2012) (Arizona attempted aggravated assault conviction, for attempting to "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly" cause a physical injury with a deadly weapon is categorically a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes because one cannot "attempt" to commit a reckless act, and therefore the conviction must have involved intent, rather than recklessness).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " CORPORAL INJURY OF A SPOUSE

                      
United States v. Ayala-Nicanor, 659 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2011) (California conviction of corporal injury of a spouse, under Penal Code  273.5(a), is a categorical crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

                      Camacho-Cruz v. Holder, 621 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 2010) (Nevada conviction of assault with a deadly weapon, under N.R.S. 200.471, which may be violated by putting another in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm, is categorically an aggravated felony crime of violence for immigration purposes).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONIES " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " CORPORAL INJURY OF A SPOUSE

                      Banuelos-Ayon v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir. Jul. 14, 2010) (California conviction for violation of Penal Code  273.5(a) was categorically a crime of domestic violence, since it requires that the defendant willfully inflict ... corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition and thus requires the use of force).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States v. Jennen, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 625041 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 2010) (Washington conviction of second degree assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of Wash. Rev.Code  9A.36.021(1), was categorically a crime of violence under USSG  4B1.2(a) ("any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." because each of the three ways the Washington offense could be committed meets the Guidelines definition).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - CORPORAL INJURY OF A SPOUSE

                      United States v. Laurico-Yeno, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 6393 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2010) (California conviction of corporal injury on a spouse, in violation of Penal Code  273.5(a), constituted a "crime of violence" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, because the intentional use of physical force against the person of another is an element of the statute, and the defendant failed to show there was a realistic probability that the statute would be applied to conduct outside the "crime of violence" definition).



NOTE: The petitioner pointed to published California cases that indicated that prosecution under Penal Code  273.5 included simple assaults resulting in a traumatic condition.  People v. Gutierrez, 171 Cal.App.3d 944, 217 Cal.Rptr. 616, 620-21 (1985).  Although the court cited Leocal for the proposition that the force must be violent, the ultimate decision seemed to rest on the failure of the petitioner to meet the Duenas "realistic probability" test.  Counsel may be able to challenge this decision, either by locating a decision that shows application of Penal Code  273.5 in a simple battery context.  Counsel may also be able to argue this decision should be reconsidered in light of Johnson v. United States, __ U.S. __ (Mar. 2, 2010) (the use of force must be "violent" in order to constitute a "crime of violence" for purpose of the Armed Career Criminal Act).

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

                      United States v. Estrada-Eliverio, 583 F.3d 669 (9th Cir. Oct. 5, 2009) (California conviction of assault with a deadly weapon or by means likely to produce great bodily injury, under Penal Code  245(a)(1), constituted a "crime of violence" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes), following United States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. Sept. 21, 2009).

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON - REQUIREMENT OF SUFFICIENT FORCE

                      United States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. Sept. 21, 2009) (California conviction of assault with a deadly weapon or by means likely to produce great bodily injury, under Penal Code  245(a)(1), categorically constituted a "crime of violence" for purposes of application of a sixteen-level enhancement to the base offense level under the "element" prong of U.S.S.G.  2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), to a sentence for illegal reentry after deportation, since the offense requires sufficient violence because "even the least touching with a deadly weapon or instrument is violent in nature"); accord, United States v. Treto-Martinez, 421 F.3d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that a person who touches another with a deadly weapon in a rude, insulting, or angry manner has threatened use of physical force for purposes of the sentencing enhancement); United States v. Dominguez, 479 F.3d 345, 348-49 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that the touching of an individual with a deadly weapon creates a sufficient threat of force to qualify as a COV). 

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States v. Juvenile Female. 566 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. May 27, 2009) (federal felony conviction of assault on a federal officer [with a deadly weapon, or resulting in bodily injury], in violation of 18 U.S.C.  111, is a "crime of violence" as defined by 18 U.S.C.  16(a), for purposes of the Juvenile Delinquency Act).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - AGGRAVATED ASSAULT

                      United States v. Esparza-Herrera, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 455512 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 2009) (per curiam) (Arizona conviction for aggravated assault under Arizona Revised Statutes  13-1204(A)(11) ("[i]ntentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing any physical injury to another person") was not a conviction for a "crime of violence" under USSG  2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), as an "offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another," under U.S.S.G.  2L1.2 n. 1(b)(iii), because "Under the categorical approach, aggravated assault requires a mens rea of at least recklessness "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." Esparza-Herrera's statute of conviction, A.R.S.  13-1204(A)(11), encompassed ordinary recklessness, and therefore his conviction was not a conviction for generic aggravated assault or a crime of violence.").


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - AIDING AND ABETTING ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

                      Ortiz-Magana v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. Sept. 09, 2008) (California conviction of aiding and abetting assault with a deadly weapon, under Penal Code  245(a)(1), constitutes a crime of violence aggravated felony for removal purposes).

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT

                      Suazo Perez v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. Jan. 22, 2008) (Washington conviction for fourth degree assault, in violation of RCW 9A.36.041 is not categorically an aggravated felony crime of violence, since it may be committed by any offensive touching). 


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO COMMIT RAPE

                      United States v. Bolanos-Hernandez, 492 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2007) (California conviction of assault with intent to commit rape, in violation of Penal Code  220, 261(a)(2), is crime of violence under the federal sentencing guidelines). 


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT

                      United States v. Carson, 486 F.3d 618 (9th Cir. May 15, 2007) (Washington conviction of second-degree assault, in violation of RCW  9A.36.021(1)(f) [ "[k]nowing[ ] inflict[ion of] bodily harm which by design causes such pain or agony as to be the equivalent of that produced by torture."] is a "crime of violence" for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines career offender enhancement provision, U.S.S.G.  4B1.1). 

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT IN THIRD DEGREE

                      United States v. Rendon-Duarte, 482 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. March 21, 2007) (Alaska conviction of Assault in the Third Degree, in violation of Alaska Statute  11.41.220(a)(1) ("recklessly (A) places another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument."), constituted a crime of violence under U.S.S.G.  4B1.2(a)(2)(2005) ("any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . (2) ... involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another."), for purposes of enhancing sentence for a federal conviction for being a felon in possession of firearms, in violation of in violation of 18 U.S.C.  922(g)(1) & 924(a)(2): "Whether the conduct was reckless or not has no bearing on the applicability of subsection (2) of the Guidelines.").


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT

                      Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2006) (Arizona conviction of domestic violence assault, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stats.  13-1203(A)(1) ["[i]ntentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing any physical injury to another"], did not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.  16(a), and is therefore not a domestic violence conviction, within the meaning of INA  237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C.  1227(a)(2)(E)(i), for immigration purposes, because the relevant Arizona statute permits conviction when a defendant recklessly but unintentionally causes physical injury to another, and because the petitioner's documents of conviction do not prove he intentionally used force against another).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - RECKLESS BUT UNINTENTIONAL MENS REA INSUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ARIZONA ASSAULT

                      Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. October 26, 2006)(en banc) (Arizona conviction of domestic violence assault, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stats.  13-1203(A)(1), 13-601 ["[i]ntentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing any physical injury to another"], did not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.  16(a), and is therefore not a domestic violence conviction, within the meaning of INA  237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C.  1227(a)(2)(E)(i), for immigration purposes, because the relevant Arizona statute permits conviction when a defendant recklessly [i.e., with awareness and conscious disregard of a risk], but unintentionally causes physical injury to another, and because the petitioner's documents of conviction do not prove he intentionally used force against another), following Lara-Cazares v. Gonzales, 308 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (gross negligence insufficient to constitute crime of violence), and overruling United States v. Ceron-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2000); Park v. INS, 252 F.3d 1018, 1024-1025 (9th Cir. 2001).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSAULT - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States v. Sandoval, 390 F.3d 1077 
                    (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 2004) (Washington Assault in the Third 
                    Degree is not a crime of violence for sentencing purposes 
                    since the statute may be violated through an unlawful touching 
                    that does not involve substantial physical force or seriously 
                    risk physical injury).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      MAYHEM - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      Ruiz-Morales v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1219 
                    (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004) (California conviction of mayhem, 
                    under California Penal Code § 203, punishing unlawful and 
                    malicious disfigurement or dismemberment, is an aggravated 
                    felony crime of violence for immigration purposes).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      BATTERY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 672 
                    (9th Cir. Nov. 26, 2003) (Indiana conviction of battery, under 
                    Indiana Code § 35-42-2-1, is not categorically a crime of 
                    violence for purposes of INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i) (domestic violence), 
                    because the offense can be committed by a mere offensive touching).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      BATTERY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063 
                    (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2003) (Wyoming battery conviction: domestic 
                    relationship not a required element in order for Wyoming battery 
                    conviction to serve as a predicate offense under the 18 U.S.C. 
                    § 921(a)(33)(A) firearm statutes definition of a crime of 
                    domestic violence; however, as the battery statute encompasses 
                    less violent behavior than the requisite use or attempted 
                    use of physical force, the statute does not qualify as a predicate 
                    offense for that purpose).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSAULT IN VIOLATION OF COURT ORDER - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States 
                    v. Pimental-Flores, 339 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2003) 
                    (Washington conviction of third degree assault in violation 
                    of court order, under Rev. Code of Washington § 26.50.110(4), 
                    may fail to trigger a 16-level illegal re-entry sentence enhancement, 
                    as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 (2001), because 
                    the statute proscribes merely negligent assault).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      BATTERY CAUSING SERIOUS BODILY INJURY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States 
                    v. Gonzalez-Tamariz, 310 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2002) 
                    (Nevada conviction of battery causing substantial bodily harm, 
                    in violation of Nev.Rev.St. § 200.481, constituted aggravated 
                    felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), 
                    as a crime of violence with one-year sentence imposed, regardless 
                    of its state law label as a misdemeanor with one-year maximum 
                    possible sentence, for purposes of enhancing federal sentence 
                    for illegal re-entry under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)); accord, 
                    United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 149 (2d Cir. Aug. 
                    29, 2000); United States v. Marin-Navarette, 244 F.3d 1284, 
                    1286-87 (11th Cir. Mar. 23, 2001); United States v. Saenz-Mendoza, 
                    287 F.3d 1011, 1014 (10th Cir. Apr. 26, 2002), quoting United 
                    States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 792 (3d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999); 
                    United States v. Urias-Escobar, 281 F.3d 165, 168 (5th Cir. 
                    Jan. 23, 2002), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 2377 (2002).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSAULT WITH DEADLY WEAPON - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      Ocampo-Duran v. Ashcroft, 
                    254 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. June 28, 2001) (California conviction 
                    in 1995 of violating California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) by 
                    committing an assault with a deadly weapon, with a sentence 
                    to one year in prison, constituted a crime of violence and 
                    therefore an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 
                    8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) for immigration purposes).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      ATTEMPTED ASSAULT WITH DEADLY WEAPON - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States 
                    v. Ceron-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. July 26, 2000) (Arizona 
                    conviction for attempted aggravated assault with a deadly 
                    weapon or deadly instrument, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
                    § 13-1001 and 13-1204(A)(2) and (B), constitutes an aggravated 
                    felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.  1101(a)(43)(F), 
                    for purposes of illegal re-entry sentence enhancement under 
                    U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)).
                    


                  
Lower Courts of Ninth Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ASSAULT

                      United States v. Sahagun-Gallegos, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 1591446 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2015) (Arizona conviction of assault, under A.R.S.  13"1204(A), is overbroad with respect to 18 U.S.C.  16, because the definition of assault in subsection (1) of the Arizona statute includes simple recklessness, whereas a crime of violence requires a mens rea of at least heightened recklessness, see United States v. Gomez"Hernandez, 680 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2012), and is divisible); see United States v. Cabrera"Perez, 751 F.3d 1000, 1004"05 (9th Cir. 2014).
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ASSAULT

                      United States v. Sahagun-Gallegos, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 1591446 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2015) (Arizona conviction of assault, under A.R.S.  13"1203(A)(2) is categorically a crime of violence, under 18 U.S.C.  16, and INA  101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), because it is an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.); following United States v. Cabrera"Perez, 751 F.3d 1000, 1004"05 (9th Cir.2014).
                    


                  
Tenth Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT - PREGNANT WOMAN

                      United States v. Barraza-Ramos, 550 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. Dec. 30, 2008) (Florida conviction for aggravated battery, under Fla. Stat.  784.045(1)(b) (intentionally touching a pregnant woman against her will, striking her against her will, or causing her bodily harm), is not categorically a crime of violence, under USSG  2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) ("crime of violence" includes listed offenses plus "any other offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another."), supporting a 16-level enhancement of sentence for illegal reentry after deportation, because the intentional touching offense does not have sufficient violence as an element), following United States v. Hays, 526 F.3d 674, 679 (10th Cir. 2008) (Wyoming conviction of battery [unlawfully touching another in a rude, insolent, or angry manner] does not contain an element of the use or attempted use of physical force, and is therefore not categorically a crime of violence to support a conviction for possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under 18 U.S.C.  922(g)(9) and  924(a)(2), since physical force in a crime of violence must entail more than mere contact)."). 

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT

                      United States v. Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d 1110 (10th Cir. Jun. 2, 2008) (Texas conviction for assault, in violation of Texas Penal Code  22.01(a)(1), is not categorically a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes because the statute includes reckless conduct).

                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States v. Rodriguez-Enriquez, 518 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. Mar. 10, 2008) (Colorado conviction for assault two (drugging a victim), in violation of Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann.  18-3-203(1)(e) (2001), is not a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since drugging by surreptitious means does not involve the use of physical force).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED BATTERY AGAINST OFFICER - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States 
                    v. Treto-Martinez, 421 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. Sept. 7, 2005) 
                    (Kansas conviction of aggravated battery against a law enforcement 
                    officer, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(1)(C), is a crime 
                    of violence for sentencing purposes; "[a]lthough not 
                    all physical contact performed in a rude, insulting or angry 
                    manner would rise to the level of physical force, we conclude 
                    that all intentional physical contact with a deadly weapon 
                    done in a rude, insulting or angry manner does constitute 
                    physical force under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)").
                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSAULT - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States v. Perez-Vargas, 414 F.3d 
                    1282 (10th Cir. July 15, 2005) (Colorado conviction for third-degree 
                    assault, "knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury 
                    to another person or with criminal negligence he causes bodily 
                    injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon," 
                    in violation of C.R.S. § 18-3-204, where judicial decisions 
                    did not require use of force, did not constitute a "crime 
                    of violence," as defined by U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, for purposes 
                    of enhancement of a sentence for illegal re-entry, since the 
                    criminal statute has as an element causation of injury, rather 
                    than use of force: "In other words, Colorados statute 
                    looks to the consequences of the conduct, however applied, 
                    whereas the Guidelines look to the type of conduct that causes 
                    the injury.").
                    


                  
Lower Courts of Tenth Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      ASSAULT - CRIME OF VIOLENCE

                      United States v. Holguin-Enriquez, 120 
                    F.Supp.2d 969 (D.Kan. Oct. 12, 2000) (Washington conviction 
                    for criminal assault, with one-year suspended sentence, constituted 
                    an aggravated felony as crime of violence under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 
                    8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) for purpose of imposing 16-level 
                    enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) to defendants 
                    base offense level for illegal re-entry).
                    


                  
Eleventh Circuit


                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " ASSAULT ON AN OFFICER 

                      United States v. Palomino-Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. May 21, 2010) (Arizona conviction for violation of Ariz. Stat.  13-1204(A)(7), aggravated assault against a police officer, defined as any simple assault against a law enforcement agent, is not necessarily a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes since the identity of the victim as a police officer does not affect the level of force required to constitute a crime of violence).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT

                      Hernandez v. U.S. Atty Gen., __ F.3d __, 2008 WL 160265 (11th Cir. Jan. 18, 2008) (Georgia conviction for simple battery, in violation of Ga. Code Ann. 16-5-23(a)(2), requiring a touching that goes beyond insult to the infliction of pain or physical injury, is an aggravated felony crime of violence for immigration purposes.)  NOTE: the court suggests, in dicta, that even a simple touching would be enough to constitute a aggravated felony crime of violence.


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - BATTERY - PREGNANT WOMAN

                      United States v. Llanos-Agostadero, 486 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. May 15, 2007) (per curiam) (Florida conviction of aggravated battery on a pregnant woman, in violation of Fla. Stat.  784.045(1)(b) ["[a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes another person" against the latter's will, or "[i]ntentionally causes bodily harm to another person." Small v. State, 889 So.2d 862, 863 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004) (construing Fla. Stat.  784.03(1)(a), 784.045(1)(b))], constitutes a "crime of violence" under USSG  2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii); rejecting the argument that the use of physical force was not a necessary element of the state offense), following United States v. Griffith, 455 F.3d 1339, 1340-1345 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 747, 749 (11th Cir. 2005).


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT - SIMPLE BATTERY  CONSTITUTES A CRIME OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UNDER FEDERAL CRIMINAL FIREARMS STATUTE

                      United States v. Griffith, 455 F.3d 1339, 1340-1345 (11th Cir. 2006) (Georgia conviction of simple battery, under Ga.Code Ann.  16-5-23(a)(1) (which occurs when a person "[i]ntentionally makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with the person of another"), constitutes a "crime of domestic violence" under 18 U.S.C.  921(a)(33)(A)(ii), 922(g)(9), which defines a "crime of domestic violence" to include, inter alia, any offense that "has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force.").


                    



                    
                    
                    
 
                      AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT -  SIMPLE BATTERY ON POLICE OFFICER CONSTITUTES CRIME OF VIOLENCE UNDER GUIDELINES

                      United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 747, 749 (11th Cir. 2005) (Florida conviction of simple battery on a law enforcement officer, in violation of Fla. Stat.  784.03 and 784.07, is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G.  4B1.2(a)(1) [inter alia, any offense that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another."]).


                    


                    









 

	

	 

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