BIA

SEXUAL ABUSE OF MINOR - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Matter of Small, 23 I. & N. Dec. 448 (BIA June 4, 2002) (en banc) (New York misdemeanor conviction of sexual abuse of a minor, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 130.60(2), with a sentence of one year in custody, constitutes a crime of violence aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).

SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
Matter of Small, 23 I. & N. Dec. 448 (BIA June 4, 2002) (en banc) (New York misdemeanor conviction sexual abuse in the second degree, in violation of New York Penal Law § 130.60(2), constitutes "sexual abuse of a minor" and is therefore an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A)).

INDECENT EXPOSURE - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991 (BIA Sept. 16, 1999) (en banc) (Texas conviction of indecency with a child by exposure of private parts, pursuant to section 21.11(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code, constitutes sexual abuse of a minor and is therefore an aggravated felony within the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)).

First Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR " CHILD ENDANGERMENT
Campbell v. Holder, 698 F.3d 29, *31 (1st Cir. Oct. 19, 2012) (Connecticut conviction of risk of injury to a minor under of the Connecticut General Statutes 53"21(a)(1) (penalizing [a]ny person who ... wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such child is endangered, the health of such child is likely to be injured or the morals of such child are likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair the health or morals of any such child...], does not categorically constitute aggravated felony sexual abuse of a minor, under INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), since the statute includes non-sexual acts such as providing alcohol to a minor).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - INDECENT ASSAULT AND BATTERY ON MINOR AGED 14
Ramirez v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. Mar. 14, 2008) (Massachusetts conviction of indecent assault on person aged 14, in violation of M.G.L.A. c. 265, 13H, is an aggravated felony crime of violence; although the statute may be violated by a merely offensive touching, the statute requires a showing of lack of consent, and therefore commission of the crime involves a substantial risk that violence will be used).

LEWD ASSAULT ON CHILD - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
United States v. Londono-Quintero, 289 F.3d 147 (1st Cir. May 6, 2002) (Florida conviction of lewd and lascivious assault on child, in violation of F.S.A. § 800.04, was sexual abuse of a minor and therefore an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A) warranting enhancement of sentence for illegal re-entry under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)).

INDECENT ASSAULT ON A CHILD - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
Emile v. INS, 244 F.3d 183 (1st Cir. Mar. 30, 2001) (Massachusetts conviction for indecent assault and battery on a child under 14, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265 § 13B, qualified as an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), since state statute included conduct that, with an appropriate federal nexus, would violate federal sexual abuse statutes).

Lower Courts of First Circuit

RAPE OF A CHILD - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
Sango-Dema v. District Director, INS, 122 F.Supp.2d 213 (D.Mass. Nov. 20, 2000) (Massachusetts conviction for rape of a child, under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 265, § 23, with sentence of two and a half years in custody, constitutes "sexual abuse of a minor," an aggravated felony under INA § 101(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(43)(A), for removal purposes).

INDECENT ASSAULT ON MINOR - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Sango-Dema v. District Director, INS, 122 F.Supp.2d 213 (D.Mass. Nov. 20, 2000) (Massachusetts conviction for indecent assault and battery on a person over fourteen years old, in violation of Mass. Gen. L. ch. 265, § 13H, with sentence of three to five years suspended sentence, constitutes a "crime of violence," an aggravated felony under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and INA 101(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(43)(F), for removal purposes, since "any violation of Mass. Gen. L. ch. 256, § 13H, by its nature, presents a substantial risk that force may be used in order to overcome the victims lack of consent and accomplish the indecent touching. Sutherland v. Reno, 228 F.3d 171, 176 (2d Cir. 2000).").

Second Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR " FIRST DEGREE SEXUAL ABUSE
Flores v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 795212 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 2015) (New York conviction of first-degree sexual abuse under N.Y. Penal Law 130.65, which contains four different offenses, each with different elements, is a divisible statute, permitting consideration of the record of conviction under the modified categorical analysis to determine which offense was the offense of conviction).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR " SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
Ganzhi v. Holder, 624 F.3d 23, 2010 WL 3465604 (2d Cir. Sept. 7, 2010) (per curiam) (New York conviction of sexual misconduct, in violation of New York Penal Law 130.20(1)[engages in sexual intercourse with another person without such person's consent], does not qualify as a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony under the categorical analysis, since the statute has no element involving the age of the victim).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR " SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
Ganzhi v. Holder, 624 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. Sept. 7, 2010) (per curiam) (New York conviction of sexual misconduct, in violation of New York Penal Law 130.20(1), is a divisible statute, since it provides in different subsections different definitions of lack of consent, and includes offenses involving minors one day shy of 17 years of age).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
Costa v. Holder, 611 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. Jul. 2, 2010) (Connecticut conviction for violation of C.G.S. 53a-71, second-degree sexual assault, is an aggravated felony crime of violence for immigration purposes, since when the victim cannot consent-the statute inherently involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used in the course of committing the offense.), following Chery v. Ashcroft, 347 F.3d 404 (2d Cir. 2003). Note: The court rejected the argument that the statute was divisible because some portions of the statute could be committed against a minor just shy of 18 years old.

CRIME OF VIOLENCE - SEXUAL CONTACT WITH CHILD UNDER
16 Dos Santos v. Gonzalez, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 521583 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2006) (Connecticut conviction of violating Connecticut General Statute, § 53-21(a)(2) [punishing "contact with the intimate parts, as defined by section 53a-65, of a child under the age of sixteen years or subjects a child under sixteen years of age to contact with the intimate parts of such person, in a sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the health or morals of such child."], is an aggravated felony crime of violence for immigration purposes as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)).

Lower Courts of Second Circuit

RISK OF INJURY - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
Santapaola v. Ashcroft, 249 F.Supp.2d 181 (D.Conn. Mar. 13, 2003) (Connecticut conviction for risk of injury, in violation of Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53-21(1), constituted an aggravated felony conviction for "sexual abuse of a minor" within meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), as a ground of deportation).

Third Circuit

UNLAWFUL SEXUAL CONTACT - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 2004) (Delaware conviction of unlawful sexual contact in the third degree under Del. C. § 767, penalizing "sexual contact with another person [with knowledge] that the contact is either offensive to the victim or occurs without the victims consent," does not constitute sexual abuse of a minor under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), for purposes of triggering deportability).

SEXUAL ASSAULT ON MINOR - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Reve, 241 F.Supp.2d 470 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2003) (New Jersey conviction of sexual assault, defined as committing an act of sexual penetration with a victim who is at least thirteen but less than sixteen years old and the actor is at least four years older than the victim, in violation of former N.J.S.A. § 2C:14-2(c)(5) (1995), recodified, N.J.S.A. § 2C:14-2(c)(4) (Supp. 2002), did not constitute an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of revocation of naturalization, because the offense did not have as an element using, attempting to use, or threatening to use force against the victim, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), and government did not argue substantial risk under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)).

Fifth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. Mar. 15, 2013) (Texas conviction for sexual assault of a child, under Texas Penal Code 22.011(a)(2), constitutes sexual abuse of a minor for purposes of illegal re-entry sentencing; minor in this instance is defined as commonly defined, e.g., a person under 18 years old). Note: The noncitizen in this case did not challenge whether the statute was sexual or necessarily abusive.

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR - SEXUAL ASSAULT OF A CHILD
United States v. Castro-Guevarra, 575 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. Jul. 13, 2009) (Texas conviction for sexual assault of a child younger than 17 years of age, in violation of Penal Code 22.011(a)(2)(A), (c)(1), constituted a conviction for sexual abuse of a minor, and thus a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes); accord, United States v. Martinez-Vega, 471 F.3d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 2006) (Tex. Penal Code 22.011(a)(2) falls within the U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) enhancement as the enumerated offense of sexual abuse of a minor); United States v. Ayala, 542 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2008) (Texas conviction of indecency with a "child" in which a "child" is under 17 years old constitutes sexual abuse of a minor under U.S.S.G 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii)); United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Najera-Najera, 519 F.3d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 2008).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
United States v. Munoz-Ortenza, __ F.3d __, 2009 WL 693146 (5th Cir. Mar. 18, 2009) (California conviction for oral copulation of a minor, in violation of Penal Code 288a(b)(1), was not necessarily "sexual abuse of a minor," and thus not a "crime of violence" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since the offense may be committed against a person under 18, while the minor must be under 16 to qualify as "sexual abuse of a minor."), following United States v. Lopez-DeLeon, 513 F.3d 472 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. 2916, 171 L.Ed.2d 851 (2008) (California conviction for unlawful sex with a minor, in violation of Penal Code 261.5(c), is not necessarily "sexual abuse of a minor" as the statute punishes sex with a person 18 years and under).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR - INDECENCY WITH A CHILD
United States v. Najera-Najera, 519 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. Mar. 7, 2008) (Texas conviction for indecency with a child, in violation of Texas Penal Code 21.11(a)(1), constitutes a "crime of violence" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - CHILD MOLESTATION
United States v. Beliew, 492 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. Jul. 5, 2007) (Louisiana conviction for child molestation, in violation of L.S.A.-R.S. 14:81.2(A), is a crime of violence for Armed Career Criminal Act purposes, as a "forcible sex offense" since it requires as an element, "force, violence, duress, menace, psychological intimidation, threat of great bodily harm, or ... use of influence by virtue of a position of control or supervision over the juvenile"; finding that use of influence over juvenile was "constructive" use of force.)

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR - SOLICITATION OF A CHILD
United States v. Ramos-Sanchez, 483 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. Apr. 2, 2007) (Kansas conviction for violation of K.S.A. 21-3510(a)(1), solicitation of a child to perform an illegal sex act is "sexual abuse of a minor" and thus a "crime of violence" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, on the basis that the act "is abusive because of the psychological harm it can cause, even if any resulting sex is consensual").

INDECENT LIBERTIES WITH A CHILD - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
United States v. Izaguirre-Flores, 405 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. Mar. 31, 2005) (North Carolina conviction for taking indecent liberties with a child, in violation of North Carolina General Statute § 14-202.1(a)(1) - "being 16 years of age or more and at least five years older than the child in question, he . . . willfully takes or attempts to take any immoral, improper, or indecent liberties with any child of either sex under the age of 16 years for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire . . .." - constituted sexual abuse of a minor for purposes of enhancing a sentence for illegal re-entry after deportation, under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2003)).

SEXUAL BATTERY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Zaidi v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. June 21, 2004) (Oklahoma conviction for sexual battery ("the intentional touching, mauling or feeling of the body or private parts of any person sixteen (16) years of age or older, in a lewd and lascivious manner and without the consent of that other person . . . ."), in violation of Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1123(B), constituted a "crime of violence," as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and thus an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), rendering the noncitizen subject to removal, under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), because the unconsented touching created a substantial risk that force would be used to complete the offense, and consequently the court of appeal lacked jurisdiction to review the final order of removal).

AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT ON MINOR UNDER 14 - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Rayo-Valdez, 302 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. Aug. 12, 2002) (Texas conviction for aggravated sexual assault on a minor under 14, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.021, constituted a crime of violence, and was thus an aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), to enhance a sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 for illegal re-entry).

INDECENCY WITH CHILD BY EXPOSURE - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. June 13, 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 982, 121 S.Ct. 434 (2000) (Texas conviction of sexual indecency with a child by exposure under Texas Penal Code § 21.11(a)(2), constitutes an aggravated felony "sexual abuse of a minor" under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), for purposes of the aggravated felony sentencing enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, for illegal re-entry).

INDECENCY WITH CHILD - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Velazquez-Overa, 100 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. Nov. 15, 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1133 (1997) (Texas convictions of indecency with child involving sexual contact, in violation of Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1), were crimes of violence, and so constituted aggravated felonies under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) warranting 16-level increase in illegal re-entry base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2)).

Sixth Circuit

SEXUAL ASSAULT - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Patel v. Ashcroft, 401 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. Mar. 8, 2005) (Illinois conviction of criminal sexual abuse, in violation of 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/12-15, constituted a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and was therefore an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), "because of the disparate ages of the defendant and the victim, or the mental incapacity or physical helplessness of the victim, or the defendants position of authority over the victim, the crime, semper et ubique, includes a substantial risk of physical force.").

SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
United States v. Gonzales-Vela, 276 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. Nov. 21, 2001) (Kentucky misdemeanor conviction for sexual abuse of minor, in violation of K.R.S. § 510.120(1)(a, b), constituted aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), for purposes of sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b) for illegal re-entry).

Seventh Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " DOMESTIC BATTERY
Castellanos v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2011 WL 3067948 (7th Cir. Jul. 20, 2011) (Illinois conviction for second offense domestic battery (intentionally causing bodily harm to family member), in violation of 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12"3.2(a)(1), constitutes "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. 16(a) and thus is an aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), because the statute unambiguously requires proving physical force: to sustain [a] conviction for domestic battery, the [S]tate had to prove that [the defendant] caused bodily harm, which means that it had as an element the use of physical force against the person of another. Upton, 512 F.3d at 45 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); accord LaGuerre, 526 F.3d at 1039.).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
Gaiskov v. Holder, 567 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. May 28, 2009) (Indiana conviction of sexual misconduct with a minor, in violation of Ind.Code 35-42-4-9(b) ("performs or submits to any fondling or touching, of either the child or the older person, with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person" committed by a person 18 or older with a person 14-15 years old), constituted aggravated felony "sexual abuse of a minor," because the elements of the offense fall within the BIA's definition of "sexual abuse" ("[T]he employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexually explicit conduct or the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form of sexual exploitation of children, or incest with children[.]"), by reference to 18 U.S.C. 3509(a), a statute concerning the rights of child victims and child witnesses in the context of federal proceedings), following Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991, 993-94 (BIA 1999).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR - SOLICITATION OF INDECENT SEX ACT
Sharashidze v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 777666 (7th Cir. March 16, 2007) (Illinois conviction of misdemeanor indecent solicitation of a sex act, under 720 ILCS 5/11-14.1 ["offers a person not his or her spouse any money, property, token, object, or article or anything of value to perform any act of sexual penetration as defined in Section 12-12 of this Code, or any touching, or fondling of the sex organs of one person by another person for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification]," constituted sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), because it involved a minor, thus rendering Sharashidze deportable under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), where the complaint stated that he "offered Evelyn M. Aguila[,] a person not his spouse[,] mother of [child's name,] a child under 13 yrs of age, $20.00 USC, to allow him to have sexual contact with same for the purpose of his sexual gratification or arousal."), following Gattem v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 758, 765 (7th Cir.2005) (solicitation of sexual contact with a minor in violation of 720 ILCS 5/11-14.1 constitutes a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony, since complaint to which plea was entered identifies the complainant as a minor and states his age). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/7th/062661p.pdf

INDECENT SOLICITATION OF A CHILD - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
Hernandez-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2005) (Illinois conviction of indecent solicitation of a child, in violation of 720 ILCS § 5/11-6(a), constituted sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), for deportation purposes even though the person solicited was an adult police officer rather than a minor).

SOLICITATION OF A SEXUAL ACT - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
Gattem v. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. June 20, 2005) (Illinois conviction of misdemeanor solicitation to engage in a sexual act, in violation of 720 ILCS § 5/11-14.1(a), is an aggravated felony sexual abuse of a minor offense for immigration purposes where the criminal complaint (and no other document) shows that the victim was under the age of 18).

SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CHILD - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Martinez-Carillo, 250 F.3d 1101 (7th Cir. May 17, 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 285 (2001) (Illinois conviction for criminal sexual assault in violation of 720 ILCS § 5/12-13(a)(3), for inserting finger into daughters vagina, who was thirteen years old at the time, was a "crime of violence" for purposes of disqualifying defendant from downward departure of sentence for illegal re-entry based on minor nature of aggravated felony conviction).

SEXUAL ASSAULT - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
United States v. Martinez-Carillo, 250 F.3d 1101 (7th Cir. May 17, 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 285 (2001) (Illinois conviction for criminal sexual assault in violation of 720 ILCS § 5/12-13(a)(3), for inserting finger into daughters vagina, who was thirteen years old at the time, was an aggravated felony as sexual abuse of a minor, under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), for purposes of enhancing illegal re-entry sentence).

SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
Lara-Ruiz v. INS, 241 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. Mar. 6, 2001) (Illinois sexual assault conviction, in violation of Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, § 12-13(a)(1, 2), which involved four-year-old victim, was "aggravated felony" of "sexual abuse of a minor" within meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A) for deportation purposes).

SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. Mar. 5, 2001) (Illinois misdemeanor conviction for sexual abuse of minor in violation of 720 ILCS § 5/12-15(c), constituted aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A) for deportation purposes), pet. for rehearing denied, 256 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2001).

Lower Courts of Seventh Circuit

SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
Guadarrama v. Perryman, 48 F.Supp.2d 782 (N.D.Ill. May 6, 1999) (Wisconsin conviction of second-degree sexual abuse of a child constituted an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A) for removal purposes).

Eighth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
United States v. Medina-Valencia, 538 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. Aug. 13, 2008) (Texas conviction for indecency with a minor, in violation of Texas Penal Code 21.11(a)(1) not categorically sexual abuse of a minor for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes; "Subsection (a)(1), then, prohibits consensual sexual contact between two persons who are a day under 17, and of the same gender. This does not fit the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of sexual abuse of a minor.")

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
United States v. Medina-Valencia, 538 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. Aug. 13, 2008) (Texas conviction for indecency with a minor, in violation of Texas Penal Code 21.11, is sexual abuse of a minor for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes where indictment indicated that minor was under the age of seventeen and the defendant was at least 8 years older).

LASCIVIOUS ACTS WITH A CHILD - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Garcia-Juarez, 421 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. Aug. 29, 2005) (Iowa conviction of lascivious acts with a child, in violation of Iowa Code § 709.8, is an aggravated felony crime of violence both for immigration and sentencing purposes).

SEXUAL ASSAULT OF A MINOR - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
United States v. Mendez-Morales, 384 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. Oct. 6, 2004) (Nebraska conviction of first-degree sexual assault of a minor constituted aggravated felony sexual abuse of a minor, for purposes of illegal re-entry sentence enhancement).

SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILD - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Alas-Castro, 184 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. June 26, 1999) (Nebraska conviction for sexual assault of a child, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-320.01(1), was a crime of violence for which term of imprisonment was at least one year, and thus constituted an "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) requiring a 16-level enhancement to defendants base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (1998)).

SEX OFFENSE WITH MINOR - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. Nov. 9, 1992) (Iowa conviction of performing lascivious acts with minors, in violation of I.C.A. § 709.8, constituted crime of violence within INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) and 18 U.S.C. 16(b), for purposes of enhancing sentence for illegal re-entry).

Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR " CHILD MOLESTATION
United States v. Martinez, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 3406178 (9th Cir. May 28, 2015) (Washington conviction of third-degree child molestation, in violation of Wash. Rev.Code 9A.44.089, is categorically not an aggravated felony sexual abuse of a minor offense, under INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), since the offense is not divisible and includes touching over clothing; sexual abuse of a minor requires skin on skin contact); see State v. Soonalole, 992 P.2d 541, 544 & n.13 (Wash.Ct.App.2000) (holding that the fondling and thigh rubbing over the victim's clothes constituted a separate act of third-degree child molestation under state criminal law for double jeopardy purposes); see also United States v. Castro, 607 F.3d 566, 570 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended (holding that a California statute prohibiting lewd and lascivious acts on a child, under Penal Code 288(a), was categorically broader than the generic definition for sexual abuse of a minor because [l]ewd touching [under the state statute] can occur through a victim's clothing and can involve any part of the victim's body).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " SEXUAL CONDUCT WITH A MINOR
United States v. Gomez, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 1623725 (9th Cir. Apr. 24, 2014) (Arizona conviction for violation of ARS 13-405, sexual conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen, is not necessarily a crime of violence, as sexual abuse of a minor, for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, under current law), applying tests of Estrada"Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " LEWD AND LASIVIOUS BATTERY
United States v. Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2013) (Florida conviction for "lewd and lascivious battery," in violation of Florida Statutes 800.04(4)(a) [[e]ngag[ing] in sexual activity with a person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age.], did not categorically constitute a crime of violence for illegal reentry sentencing purposes, since lack of consent is not an element of the crime; nor is the statute divisible, so the modified categorical analysis cannot be employed); United States v. Gomez"Mendez, 486 F.3d 599, 604 (9th Cir. 2007) (Florida conviction of lewd and lascivious battery, in violation of Fla. Stat. 800.04(4)(a) is a strict liability crime[,] criminalizing [e]ngag[ing] in sexual activity with a person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age, ibid., regardless of whether the victim, in fact, consents); see United States v. Rangel"Castaneda, 709 F.3d 373, 376 (4th Cir.2013) (Tennessee conviction of sexual penetration ... when the victim is at least thirteen (13) but less than eighteen (18) years of age and the defendant is at least ten (10) years older than the victim. did not categorically constitute a crime of violence as a forcible sex offense under the guidelines because the fact that Tennessee law renders the consent of a statutory rape victim formally irrelevant does not mean that the offense necessarily requires sexual conduct that is forcible ..."that is, involving actual compulsion.); The court reasoned: First, the absence of a consent defense to statutory rape is analytically distinct from situations in which a victim's consent ... is [deemed] not legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct is involuntary, incompetent, or coerced. U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(B)(iii). The three examples cited by the Sentencing Commission, see supra at pp. 1054"55, involve instances in which the victim does not in fact have the state of mind of willing acquiescence"either because her consent is coerced, or because her actual state of mind is such that she is not capable of willingly consenting, as in the case of incompetence or intoxication. We have acknowledged, however, that the assumption that a minor's legal incapacity implies that the proscribed sexual intercourse is non-consensual does not always hold true[.] Valencia v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir.2006). Some minors are able to engage in sexual intercourse voluntarily, despite being legally incapable of consent. Id. In other words, because statutory rape is a strict liability crime, the minor's actual state of mind does not matter, nor does the minor's actual capacity for mature deliberation. . The term statutory rape is ordinarily, contemporarily, and commonly understood to mean the unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of consent specified by state statute. Gomez"Mendez, 486 F.3d at 603. If all sex offenses where consent ... is not legally valid on the basis of age are, by definition, forcible, there would be no need to separately enumerate statutory rape. See U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(B)(iii). The same would be true of sexual abuse of a minor, whereby we define the term abuse ... in light of the age of the victim in question, United States v. Medina"Villa, 567 F.3d 507, 513 (9th Cir.2009), and have held that [s]exual conduct with younger children is per se abusive[,] Valencia"Barragan, 608 F.3d at 1107. A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant. Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted). This basic interpretive canon [,] id., applies to the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Wenner, 351 F.3d 969, 974"75 (9th Cir.2003). Yet, when asked at argument, the government could identify no circumstance in which a statutory rape would not also be a forcible sex offense under its interpretation. Nor can we. It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted). We are reluctan[t] to treat ... as surplusage, id., the Guidelines' enumeration of statutory rape and sexual abuse of a minor as separate crimes of violence. Third, deeming as forcible sex offenses all sexual acts with persons under the age of majority would ignore contemporary limitations on the concept of statutory rape. In particular, there has been a move among the states to reform statutory rape laws in cases involving partners of a similar age"for instance, foreclosing prosecutions of 16"year"olds for heavy petting with 14"year"olds, or reducing sentences of 19"year"olds for sexual intercourse with 17"year"olds. See, e.g., Charles A. Phipps, Misdirected Reform: On Regulating Consensual Sexual Activity Between Teenagers, 12 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 373, 390"91 (2003). In recognition of this growing consensus, we have held that, for federal purposes, an age difference of at least four years is an element of sexual abuse of a minor, Estrada"Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1158 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc), and of statutory rape as well, United States v. Gomez, 732 F.3d 971, 988"89 (9th Cir.2013). Reading the term forcible sex offenses"which requires no age difference"to encompass all sexual conduct with minors, would obliterate those limitations. A so-called Romeo"and"Juliet offender[,] Doe v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 503 (6th Cir.2007), could be deemed to have been convicted of a forcible sex offense by virtue of the victim's age, despite being expressly and intentionally excluded from the generic federal definitions of statutory rape and sexual abuse of a minor. (Ibid. at 1055-1056.)

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " LEWD CONDUCT
United States v. Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2013) (Florida conviction for "lewd and lascivious battery," in violation of Florida Statutes 800.04(4)(a), [[e]ngag[ing] in sexual activity with a person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age.], did not categorically constitute a forcible sex offense, and thus cannot be a crime of violence as defined under the federal sentencing guidelines).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " LEWD AND LASIVIOUS BATTERY
United States v. Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2013) (Florida conviction for "lewd and lascivious battery," in violation of Florida Statutes 800.04(4)(a) [[e]ngag[ing] in sexual activity with a person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age.], did not categorically constitute a crime of violence for illegal reentry sentencing purposes, since lack of consent is not an element of the crime; nor is the statute divisible, so the modified categorical analysis cannot be employed); United States v. Gomez"Mendez, 486 F.3d 599, 604 (9th Cir. 2007) (Florida conviction of lewd and lascivious battery, in violation of Fla. Stat. 800.04(4)(a) is a strict liability crime[,] criminalizing [e]ngag[ing] in sexual activity with a person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age, ibid., regardless of whether the victim, in fact, consents); see United States v. Rangel"Castaneda, 709 F.3d 373, 376 (4th Cir.2013) (Tennessee conviction of sexual penetration ... when the victim is at least thirteen (13) but less than eighteen (18) years of age and the defendant is at least ten (10) years older than the victim. did not categorically constitute a crime of violence as a forcible sex offense under the guidelines because the fact that Tennessee law renders the consent of a statutory rape victim formally irrelevant does not mean that the offense necessarily requires sexual conduct that is forcible ..."that is, involving actual compulsion.); The court reasoned: First, the absence of a consent defense to statutory rape is analytically distinct from situations in which a victim's consent ... is [deemed] not legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct is involuntary, incompetent, or coerced. U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(B)(iii). The three examples cited by the Sentencing Commission, see supra at pp. 1054"55, involve instances in which the victim does not in fact have the state of mind of willing acquiescence"either because her consent is coerced, or because her actual state of mind is such that she is not capable of willingly consenting, as in the case of incompetence or intoxication. We have acknowledged, however, that the assumption that a minor's legal incapacity implies that the proscribed sexual intercourse is non-consensual does not always hold true[.] Valencia v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir.2006). Some minors are able to engage in sexual intercourse voluntarily, despite being legally incapable of consent. Id. In other words, because statutory rape is a strict liability crime, the minor's actual state of mind does not matter, nor does the minor's actual capacity for mature deliberation. . The term statutory rape is ordinarily, contemporarily, and commonly understood to mean the unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of consent specified by state statute. Gomez"Mendez, 486 F.3d at 603. If all sex offenses where consent ... is not legally valid on the basis of age are, by definition, forcible, there would be no need to separately enumerate statutory rape. See U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(B)(iii). The same would be true of sexual abuse of a minor, whereby we define the term abuse ... in light of the age of the victim in question, United States v. Medina"Villa, 567 F.3d 507, 513 (9th Cir.2009), and have held that [s]exual conduct with younger children is per se abusive[,] Valencia"Barragan, 608 F.3d at 1107. A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant. Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted). This basic interpretive canon [,] id., applies to the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Wenner, 351 F.3d 969, 974"75 (9th Cir.2003). Yet, when asked at argument, the government could identify no circumstance in which a statutory rape would not also be a forcible sex offense under its interpretation. Nor can we. It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted). We are reluctan[t] to treat ... as surplusage, id., the Guidelines' enumeration of statutory rape and sexual abuse of a minor as separate crimes of violence. Third, deeming as forcible sex offenses all sexual acts with persons under the age of majority would ignore contemporary limitations on the concept of statutory rape. In particular, there has been a move among the states to reform statutory rape laws in cases involving partners of a similar age"for instance, foreclosing prosecutions of 16"year"olds for heavy petting with 14"year"olds, or reducing sentences of 19"year"olds for sexual intercourse with 17"year"olds. See, e.g., Charles A. Phipps, Misdirected Reform: On Regulating Consensual Sexual Activity Between Teenagers, 12 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 373, 390"91 (2003). In recognition of this growing consensus, we have held that, for federal purposes, an age difference of at least four years is an element of sexual abuse of a minor, Estrada"Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1158 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc), and of statutory rape as well, United States v. Gomez, 732 F.3d 971, 988"89 (9th Cir.2013). Reading the term forcible sex offenses"which requires no age difference"to encompass all sexual conduct with minors, would obliterate those limitations. A so-called Romeo"and"Juliet offender[,] Doe v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 503 (6th Cir.2007), could be deemed to have been convicted of a forcible sex offense by virtue of the victim's age, despite being expressly and intentionally excluded from the generic federal definitions of statutory rape and sexual abuse of a minor. (Ibid. at 1055-1056.)

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " LEWD ACT WITH 15-YEAR-OLD
Rodriguez-Castellon v. Holder, 733 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 2013) (California conviction for lewd and lascivious acts upon a 15-year-old girl when the actor is at least ten years older, under Penal Code 288(c)(1), is a categorical crime of violence and therefore an aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), because this offense, in the ordinary case, poses a substantial risk of the use of physical force under 18 U.S.C. 16(b)). Note: Although not a positive case, the discussion does carefully address prior Ninth Circuit case law and has some very useful analysis distinguishing 18 U.S.C. 16(b), substantial risk analysis from the minimum-conduct analysis required for other portions of the Act, including Sexual Abuse of a Minor, Child Abuse, Domestic Violence, and 18 U.S.C. 16(a). Thanks to Joseph Justin Rollin.

AGGRAVATED FELONY " SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR " SEXUAL BATTERY
Sanchez-Avalos v. Holder, 693 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2012) (California conviction of sexual battery, in violation of Penal Code 243.4(a), did not categorically constitute a sexual abuse of a minor aggravated felony, because the elements do not require that the victim be a minor, and the evidence admissible under the modified categorical analysis did not establish that the victim was a minor).

AGGRAVATED FELONY "SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
United States v. Tafoya-Montelongo, 659 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2011) (Utah attempted sexual abuse of a child, under Utah Code 76"5"404.1, punishing anyone who touches the anus, buttocks, or genitalia of any child [under 14], the breast of a female child, or otherwise takes indecent liberties with a child, or causes a child to take indecent liberties with the actor or another with intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain to any person or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, constitutes sexual abuse of a minor, for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " MODIFIED CATEGORICAL APPROACH
United States v. Gonzalez-Aparicio, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2207322 (9th Cir. Jun. 8, 2011) (Arizona conviction for sexual conduct with a minor, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes 13"1405, constituted an enumerated crime of violence offense (statuory rape) for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, under the modified categorical approach). NOTE This decision notes tension between statutory rape/sexual abuse of a minor cases in the sentencing and immigration contexts.

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR - SEXUAL CONTACT
Rivera-Cuartas v. Holder, 605 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. May 20, 2010) (Arizona conviction for violation of ARS 14-1405, sexual conduct with a minor under 18, is not categorically an aggravated felony for immigration purposes, since it does not meet the generic federal definition of "sexual abuse of a minor"), following Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc), United States v. Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d 507 (9th Cir.2009).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
United States v. Castro, 599 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. Mar. 26, 2010) (California conviction for lewd acts with a child 14-15 years of age, under California Penal Code 288(c)(1), did not categorically constitute a "sexual abuse of a minor," and therefore did not qualify as a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since sexual conduct with a 15 year old is not per se abusive), following Pelayo-Garcia v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1010, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2009).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR - SODOMY IN THE FIRST DEGREE
Ledezma-Garcia v. Holder, 599 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 2010) (Oregon conviction for sodomy in the first degree, in violation of Or.Rev.Stat. 163.405 (1988), constituted aggravated felony sexual abuse of a minor for immigration purposes).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
Pelayo-Garcia v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 2009) (California conviction of "unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor" under Penal Code 261.5(d) is not categorically a sexual abuse of a minor as defined in INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), for immigration purposes: "Because section 261.5(d) does not include the relevant scienter requirement of 2243, and criminalizes sexual conduct that is not necessarily abusive, we conclude that section 261.5(d) does not qualify as the generic federal crime of "sexual abuse of a minor," and therefore is not categorically an aggravated felony under 1101(a)(43)(A).").

NOTE: The Ninth Circuit applied two separate definitions of "sexual abuse of a minor." Where the offense involves what is known as "statutory rape," the relevant test is whether the statute of conviction falls within 18 U.S.C. 2243 ("Whoever ... knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who-(1) has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years; and (2) is at least four years younger than the person so engaging; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both."). The mens rea of "knowingly" in 2243(a) requires only that the act was "knowingly" committed, not that the defendant knew the age of the victim or the age difference.

In non-statutory rape case, the definition of "sexual abuse of a minor" means: "(1) the conduct prohibited by the criminal statute is sexual, (2) the statute protects a minor, and (3) the statute requires abuse. Id. at 513 (internal quotation omitted). A criminal statute includes the element of "abuse" if it expressly prohibits conduct that causes "physical or psychological harm in light of the age of the victim in question." Id. at 513. Sexual conduct involving younger children is per se abusive. Id." Citing United States v. Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d 507 (9th Cir. 2009).

The court looked to both definitions, and found that California Penal Code 261.5(d) did not meet either. The California offense did not meet the first definition since it could be committed without "knowledge" (i.e. through intoxication of the defendant), and did not meet the second definition since the state statute does not require "abuse," as an element, and sex with a minor 1 day short of 16 is not per se abusive.

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
United States v. Medina-Villa, 570 F.3d 213 (9th Cir. June 23, 2009) (California conviction of lewd act with a minor under 14, in violation of Penal Code 288(a), constituted "sexual abuse of a minor," qualifying as a "crime of violence" that warranted a sixteen-level increase under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 in the sentence for illegal reentry after deportation), following United States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999).

POST CON RELIEF - FEDERAL - AEDPA STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - STATE CONVICTIONS
Allen v. Siebert, 128 S.Ct. 2 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2007) (when a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, "that [is] the end of the matter" for purposes of tolling the AEDPA's 1-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition, and the inquiry does not turn on the nature of the particular time limit relied upon by the state court at issue).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR - PUBLIC INDECENCY TO CHILD
Rebilas v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2007) (Arizona conviction of attempted public sexual indecency to a minor, in violation of ARS 13-1001 and 13-1403(B), includes conduct that falls outside the federal definition of attempted sexual abuse of a minor under INA 101(a)(43)(A), (U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A) and (U); statute includes acts that do not involve touching or knowledge of the child, and therefore do not involve sexual abuse of a minor). Note: the court examined Arizona state caselaw, applying Duenas.

SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR - CONVICTION DID NOT CATEGORICALLY CONSTITUTE SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR BECAUSE THE ELEMENTS DID NOT REQUIRE PSYCHOLOGICAL OR PHYSICAL ABUSE
United States v. Baza-Martinez, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2729691 (9th Cir. Sept. 26, 2006) (North Carolina conviction of taking indecent liberties with a child, in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1 [take or attempt an immoral, improper, or indecent liberty with a child under 16 by defendant more than five years older, for purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, which can be committed by mere words], was not categorically sexual abuse of a minor, because the statute did not require as an element the infliction of psychological or physical harm to the minor, and therefore did not constitute a crime of violence under USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) for purposes of imposing a 16-level enhancement of sentence for illegal reentry), disagreeing with United States v. Izaguirre-Flores, 405 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2005); Bahar v. Ashcroft, 264 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2001) (interpreting same statute of conviction but reaching opposite conclusion).

LEWD ACT WITH CHILD - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Teeples, 432 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. Jan. 5, 2006) (California conviction for violation of California Penal Code § 288(a), lewd act with child, was a crime of violence for purposes of career offender sentencing).

COMMUNICATION WITH MINOR FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
Parrilla v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. July 11, 2005) (Washington conviction of communication with a minor for immoral purposes, in violation of Washington Revised Code § 9.68A.090, is not categorically an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), because the statute broadly included "immoral purposes" such as providing information on how to get an unlawful abortion, displaying pornography visible from a public thoroughfare, and allowing a minor onto the premises of a live erotic performance, which, while not commendable, were not abusive in nature).

ABUSIVE SEXUAL CONTACT - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Granbois, 376 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. July 22, 2004) (federal conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(3), sexual contact with a child, is a "crime of violence" for purposes of the Career Offender Guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1); see United States v. Pereira-Salmeron, 337 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2003) (crimes involving sexual abuse of a minor are per se "crimes of violence" for sentencing purposes following conviction for illegal re-entry).

ANNOY MOLEST - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 2004) (California conviction of violating Penal Code § 647.6(a), annoy or molest a child under 18, is conviction under a "divisible statute," and does not constitute an aggravated felony "sexual abuse of a minor" offense for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).

LEWD ACT WITH CHILD - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Medina-Maella, 351 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2003) (California conviction for lewd or lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 14 years, under California Penal Code § 288, constitutes a "crime of violence" for purposes of unlawful re-entry under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, even though the offense does not have force as an element; recent amendments to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 irrelevant).

LEWD ACT WITH A CHILD - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
Cedano-Viera v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 2003) (Nevada conviction of lewd act on a child, in violation of Nevada Revised Statute § 201.230(1), constituted sexual abuse of a minor and was therefore an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), depriving the court of appeals of jurisdiction to review a removal order).

SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
United States v. Mendoza-Iribe, 198 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. Oct. 18, 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1061 (2000) (California conviction under California Penal Code § 289(j) for penetrating genital or anal openings of child under 14 years of age with foreign object was sexual abuse of a minor under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), and therefore "aggravated felony" warranting sentence enhancement for illegal re-entry).

LEWD ACT WITH A CHILD - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
United States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167 (2001) (California conviction for committing a lewd act on a child under 14, in violation of California Penal Code § 288(a), constitutes "sexual abuse of a minor," and is therefore an "aggravated felony" within the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A) for purposes of a sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) for illegal re-entry).

Lower Courts of Ninth Circuit

SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
Santiago v. U.S. INS, 134 F.Supp.2d 1102 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 26, 2001) (California conviction of committing a lewd act with a child, in violation of California Penal Code § 288(A), constituted aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) as sexual abuse of a minor for immigration purposes).

Tenth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR" INDECENT PROPOSAL TO A CHILD
United States v. Martinez-Zamaripa, 680 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. Jun. 1, 2012) (Oklahoma conviction of indecent proposal to a child, in violation of Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, 1123(A)(1) (1995) (any oral ... lewd or indecent proposal to any child under sixteen (16) years of age for the child to have unlawful sexual relations ... with any person.), constituted enumerated offense sexual abuse of a minor, under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 cmt. N. 1(B)(iii), for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR - ATTEMPTED SEXUAL ASSAULT ON A CHILD
United States v. De La Cruz-Garcia, 590 F.3d 1157 (10th Cir. Jan. 5, 2010) (Colorado conviction of attempted sexual assault on a child, in violation of Colo.Rev.Stat. 18-3-405(1) ("Any actor who knowingly subjects another not his or her spouse to any sexual contact commits sexual assault on a child if the victim is less than fifteen years of age and the actor is at least four years older than the victim."), categorically constituted "sexual abuse of a minor," and therefore qualified as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1), that warranted a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement).

SEX OFFENSE WITH CHILD - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Coronado-Cervantes, 154 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. Sept. 18, 1998) (federal conviction of knowingly engaging in sexual contact with Native American juvenile under 12 years of age, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153, 2244(a)(1), 2245(3), was "crime of violence" and thus was predicate to federal sentence as career offender).

SEX OFFENSE OF CHILD - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377 (10th Cir. Dec. 30, 1993) (Utah conviction of attempted sexual abuse of child, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(1) (1990), was crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and thus an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of deportation of noncitizen, even if actual physical force was not used, as crime involved nonconsensual act upon another person, which necessarily included substantial risk that physical force would be used).

Eleventh Circuit

PERSUADE MINOR TO ENGAGE IN UNLAWFUL SEXUAL ACTIVITY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Searcy, 418 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. July 28, 2005) (federal conviction of using interstate commerce to persuade a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), constitutes a crime of violence for career offender classification purposes).

INDECENT ASSAULT ON MINOR - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
Chuang v. U.S. Attorney General, 382 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. Sept. 2, 2004) (Florida conviction for "indecent assault child under 16," in violation of Fla. Stat. § 800.04, qualified as sexual abuse of a minor, thus rendering him deportable as an aggravated felon under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A)).

INDECENT LIBERTIES - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
Bahar v. Ashcroft, 264 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. Sept. 10, 2001) (North Carolina conviction of taking indecent liberties with a minor, in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1, constituted "sexual abuse of a minor," triggering removal as aggravated felon under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), even though the defendant did not engage in some form of physical contact with minor).

LEWD ACT ON CHILD - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
United States v. Padilla-Reyes, 247 F.3d 1158 (11th Cir. Apr. 11, 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 256 (2001) (Florida conviction of violating Florida Statute § 800.04, "Lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in presence of child; sexual battery," constitutes "sexual abuse of a minor," and therefore an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), for purposes of enhancing illegal re-entry sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), even though the offense does not arise to the level of rape or sexual battery, since sexual abuse of a minor meant physical or nonphysical misuse or maltreatment of a minor for a purposes associated with sexual gratification).

CHILD MOLESTATION - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
United States v. Marin-Navarette, 244 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. Mar. 23, 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 317 (2001) (Washington conviction of third-degree child molestation constitutes "sexual abuse of a minor," and therefore an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), for purposes of enhancing illegal re-entry sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)).

LEWD ASSAULT OF MINOR - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Rutherford, 175 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. May 13, 1999) (Florida conviction for lewd assault of minor, in violation of Florida Statutes § 800.04, was a crime of violence for purposes of sentencing defendant as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1).

Other

AGGRAVATED FELONY " SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR " STATUTORY RAPE
United States v. Vidal-Mendoza, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2011 WL 1560987 (D.Or. Apr. 25, 2011) (Oregon conviction of rape in the third degree, under Or. Rev. Statute 163.355 [sexual intercourse with another person under 16 years of age.], held not categorically an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), because the Oregon statute allows for a conviction if the person has sexual intercourse with another person under 16 years of age, O.R.S. 163.355(1), which is broader than the elements of sexual abuse of a minor as defined in federal criminal law at 18 U.S.C. 2243: Because O.R.S. 163.355 does not require a four year age difference between the defendant and the minor, it is broader than the generic offense of sexual abuse of a minor and, therefore, is not categorically an aggravated felony under [8 U.S.C.] 1101(a)(43)(A).); Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1158 (9th Cir. 2008).