AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " 18 USC 16(b) -- POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS
United States v. Fish, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 715785 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (Massachusetts conviction for possession of burglarious tools, under M.G.L. ch. 266, 49, does not categorically constitute a crime of violence as defined at 18 U.S.C. 16, because it included neither an element of force under (a) nor the substantial risk that violent force would be used under (b)).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " BURGLARY
Descamps v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___ (Jun. 20, 2013) (California conviction of burglary, in violation of Penal Code 459 (entry without requiring unlawful entry with intent to commit theft or any felony), is overbroad with respect to the generic federal definition of burglary, for purposes of federal sentence enhancement under the ACCA for a prior burglary conviction, because generic unlawful entry is never an element of 459, a conviction under that statute is never for generic burglary.).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - AUTO THEFT
Nguyen v. Holder, 571 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. Jul. 2, 2009) (California conviction of auto theft, in violation of what is now codified at Penal Code 487(d)(i) (any person who (1) takes possession; (2) of an automobile; (3) owned or possessed by another; (4) by means of trespass and (5) with intent to permanently deprive the owner of such property; and (6) carries the automobile away), does not constitute a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), and is therefore not an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of rendering the defendant deportable, because the theft offense does not by its nature, involve a "substantial risk" that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense).

BIA

AGGRAVATED FELONY " BURGLARY " HOME INVASION
Matter of Jasso Arangure, 27 I&N Dec. 178 (BIA 2017) (Michigan conviction of home invasion, in violation of M.C.L. 750.110a(2) is a categorical burglary offense for immigration purposes, since the intent to commit the crime need not be at entry, but may also be while remaining or upon exiting, under both the Michigan and generic federal definitions of burglary), following United States v. Quarles, 850 F.3d 836, 840 (6th Cir. 2017).

AUTO BURGLARY - BURGLARY
Matter of Perez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1325 (BIA June 6, 2000) (en banc) (Texas conviction of burglary of a vehicle, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.04(a), is not an aggravated felony "burglary offense" within the definition of INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G)).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - BURGLARY - BURGLARY
United States v. Aguila-Montes, 553 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2009), on rehearing withdrawing and superseding previous opinion, 523 F.3d 1071 (California conviction for first-degree residential burglary, in violation of Penal Code 459, could not categorically constitute a crime of violence (burglary of a dwelling) under USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), cmt. n. 1(B)(iii), so as to warrant 16-level enhancement of sentence for illegal reentry, because the California offense encompasses a broader range of proscribed conduct than does the generic offense of the Guidelines since it does not require that the entry be "unlawful or unprivileged" as the federal definition does), following United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 393 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2005).

First Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " 18 USC 16(b) -- BREAKING AND ENTERING
United States v. Fish, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 715785 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (Massachusetts conviction for breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, M.G.L. ch. 266, 16, 18, did not categorically constitute a crime of violence, under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), because the minimum conduct punishable did not create a substantial risk that the defendant would use physical force against person or property, since the minimum conduct included nonviolent entries of rarely-occupied structures through unlocked doors or windows,; rejecting the governments argument that the court should look only to the typical case charged under the statute). NOTE: A conviction for breaking and entering a building with a sentence of imprisonment of one year or more, suspended or imposed, remains an aggravated felony under a different provision of the aggravated felony statute. 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) (theft offense or burglary offense with sentence of one year or more is aggravated felony); see Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990) (burglary defined as unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " 18 USC 16(a) -- POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS
United States v. Fish, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 715785 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (Massachusetts conviction for possession of burglarious tools, under M.G.L. ch. 266, 49, does not categorically constitute a crime of violence as defined at 18 U.S.C. 16, because it included neither an element of force under (a) nor the substantial risk that violent force would be used under (b)).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " 18 USC 16(b) -- POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS
United States v. Fish, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 715785 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (Massachusetts conviction for possession of burglarious tools, under M.G.L. ch. 266, 49, does not categorically constitute a crime of violence as defined at 18 U.S.C. 16, because it included neither an element of force under (a) nor the substantial risk that violent force would be used under (b)).

Second Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " THIRD-DEGREE BURGLARY
United States v. Folkes, 622 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. Sept. 29, 2010) (per curiam) (New York conviction of third degree burglary, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 140.20 [knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein.], did not categorically constitute crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since the statute does not necessarily involve use of force against another).

Fourth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " BURGLARY
United States v. Bonilla, 687 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. Jul. 17, 2012) (Texas conviction for burglary, in violation of Texas Penal Code 30.02(a)(3), constitutes a crime of violence for illegal reentry sentencing purposes, because it substantially corresponds to the elements of generic burglary as outlined in Taylor v. United States, notwithstanding that defendant may not have formulated his intent prior to the unlawful entry).

Fifth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " BURGLARY
United States v. Martinez-Garcia, 625 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. Oct. 27, 2010) (Georgia conviction of burglary, in violation of Ga.Code Ann. 16-7-1(a), constituted the Guidelines' enumerated crime of violence of burglary of a dwelling, for purposes of illegal reentry sentencing, because the term dwelling within the Georgia burglary statute comports with the ordinary, common meaning of that term, and does not now -- though it once did -- include structures within the cartilage); distinguishing United States v. Gomez-Guerra, 485 F.3d 301, 303-304 (5th Cir. 2007) (The ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of burglary of a dwelling does not extend to the grounds around the dwelling, and demands an entry into or remaining in the dwelling. . . . If a state burglary statute may be violated by entry only into the curtilage, a conviction under that statute is not a crime of violence. [internal quotes omitted]).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - BURGLARY
United States v. Constante, 544 F.3d 584 (5th Cir. Oct. 6, 2008) (Texas conviction for burglary, in violation of Texas Penal Code 30.02(a)(3) [enters a building or habitation and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft, or an assault] did not constitute a crime of violence for ACCA purposes where statute of conviction does not require specific intent).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - BURGLARY
United States v. Cardenas-Cardenas, 543 F.3d 731 (5th Cir. Sept. 25, 2008) (Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation, in violation of Texas Penal Code 30.02(a)(1), is a crime of violence for illegal re-entry purposes, since the offense is equivalent to "residential burglary."

AGGRAVATED FELONY - BURGLARY
United States v. Gonzalez-Terrazas, 529 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. May 22, 2008) (California conviction for burglary, in violation of Penal Code 459, was not a "burglary of a dwelling" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes because the California statute may be committed without an "unlawful or unprivileged" entry), following United States v. Ortega-Gonzaga, 490 F.3d 393 (5th Cir.2007).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - BURGLARY - UNLAWFUL ENTRY REQUIREMENT
United States v. Gonzales-Terrazas, 516 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. Feb. 1, 2008) (California conviction for violation of Penal Code 459 is not categorically a crime of violence for illegal-reentry sentencing purposes, because the state statute does not require as an element that the entry be unlawful [i.e. without consent]), following United States v. Ortega-Gonzaga, 490 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2007) (California conviction under Penal Code 459 for residential burglary does not constitute a crime of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - BURGLARY
United States v. Carbajal-Diaz, 508 F.3d 804 (5th Cir. Nov. 26, 2007) (Missouri conviction for burglary, in violation of Mo. Ann. Stat. 569.160, is a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes where the indictment shows that the offense involved residential burglary, an offense enumerated as a crime of violence.)

AGGRAVATED FELONY - BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Castillo-Morales, 507 F.3d 873 (5th Cir. Nov. 8, 2007) (illegal reentry sentence is affirmed where there was no error in a 16-level offense enhancement, since relevant Florida court documents indicated that defendant committed the "crime of violence" of "burglary of a dwelling," as enumerated in U.S.S.G. 2L1.2).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - BURGLARY
United States v. Herrera-Montes, 490 F.3d 390 (5th Cir. Jun. 25, 2007) (Tennessee conviction of burglary of a dwelling, in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. 39-14-403, is not categorically a "crime of violence" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since the statute of conviction punishes burglary where the intent to commit the crime was not formed until after the actor unlawfully enters or remains in a dwelling).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - BURGLARY
United States v. Davis, 487 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. May 17, 2007) (Texas robbery conviction, in violation of Penal Code 29.02(a), is a crime of violence for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - BURGLARY - FLORIDA BURGLARY NOT AN AGGRAVATED FELONY
United States v. Gomez-Guerra, 485 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. April 23, 2007) (Florida conviction for burglary, in violation of Florida Statute 810.02(3) (1995), which forbids not only entry into a structure but also entry into its curtilage, where the charge was in accord, including the words "or the curtilage," did not constitute a crime of violence, pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2005), as an enumerated offense ( "burglary of a dwelling" under USSG 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii)), for purposes of imposing a 16-level enhancement to a sentence for illegal reentry after deportation, since the "ordinary, contemporary, common meaning" of "burglary of a dwelling" does not extend to the grounds around the dwelling, but actually requires unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, the dwelling itself), citing United States v. Garcia-Mendez, 420 F.3d 454, 457 (5th Cir.2005) (Texas conviction of burglary of a habitation, in violation of Texas Penal Code 30.02, "is equivalent to the enumerated [crime of violence] offense of burglary of a dwelling"); cf. James v. United States, 550 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1586, ___ (2007), slip op. at 18 ("We agree that the inclusion of curtilage takes Florida's underlying offense of burglary outside the definition of generic burglary set forth in Taylor, which requires an unlawful entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure. ") (emphasis in original), citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - UNAUTHORIZED USE OF MOTOR VEHICLE
De La Paz Sanchez v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. Dec. 12, 2006) (per curiam) (Texas conviction of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle offense constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b) for removal purposes), following United States v. Galvan-Rodriguez, 169 F.3d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1999); see In re Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766, 767-70 (BIA 2005) (Texas UUMV conviction was a crime of violence under 16(b) and therefore an aggravated felony); cf. United States v. Charles, 301 F.3d 309, 314 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc) (limiting Galvan-Rodriguez to its property aspects and to 16(b) cases). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/5th/0560973cv0p.pdf

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Mendoza-Sanchez, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 1966655 (5th Cir. Jul. 14, 2006) (Arkansas conviction of burglary, in violation of Ark.Code Ann. 5-39-201(a), constituted enumerated offense of "burglary of a dwelling," justifying application of sentencing guideline's 16-level crime of violence enhancement; although the record of conviction did not show burglary of a dwelling, defendant admitted to district court in illegal re-entry prosecution that offense was, in fact, burglary of a dwelling).

BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Valdez-Maltos, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 766601 (5^th Cir. Mar. 27, 2006) (Texas conviction of burglary of a habitation, is a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).

CRIME OF VIOLENCE - BURGLARY
United States v. Murillo-Lopez, __ F.3d __ (5^th Cir. Mar. 22, 2006) (California conviction for burglary, in violation of Penal Code § 459, is a crime of violence for purposes of 16-level sentence enhancement upon conviction of illegal re-entry, where defendant admitted, and did not dispute, that he was convicted of burglary of a dwelling, specifically listed as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2).

BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 388 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. Oct. 15, 2004) (Texas conviction under Penal Code § 30.02, burglary of a building, is not a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes since the statute does not require the use of force as an element).

BURGLARY OF BUILDING - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 323 F.3d 317 (5th Cir. Feb. 27, 2003) (Texas conviction of burglary of a building, in violation of Texas Penal Code Ann. § 31.07(a), is not a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) because the offense is not listed in Application Note 1(B)(ii)(II) and does not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another).

AUTO BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Santos v. Reno, 228 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. Sept. 26, 2000) (Texas conviction of burglary of vehicle, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.04(c), with sentence of five years deferred adjudication, constituted crime of violence and was therefore an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) for purposes of deportation).

AUTO BURGLARY - BURGLARY
Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. May 1, 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1069 (2001) (Texas conviction of burglary of vehicle with intent to commit theft, in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 30.04(a), with suspended sentence of four years imprisonment, was not a burglary offense under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) sufficient to render noncitizen deportable).

AUTO BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. May 1, 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1069, 121 S.Ct. 757 (2001) (Texas conviction of burglary of vehicle with intent to commit theft, in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 30.04(a) (West 1987), with suspended sentence of four years imprisonment, was a "crime of violence," and therefore an aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)).

AUTO BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Ramos-Garcia, 95 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. Sept. 5, 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1083 (1997) (Texas conviction for burglary of vehicle in violation of Penal Code § 30.04 (1993) was an "aggravated felony " under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) within meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b) sentence enhancement for illegal re-entry after deportation, despite change in Texas law, Texas Penal Code Ann. § 30.04 (1994), reducing burglary of vehicle from felony to misdemeanor).

AUTO BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman, 56 F.3d 18 (5th Cir. June 6, 1995) (Texas conviction for burglary of automobile, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.04 (1994), was a crime of violence, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), constituting an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2) for illegal re-entry after deportation), overruled by United States v. Turner, 305 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. Sept. 6, 2002) (Rodriguez decision improperly applied 18 U.S.C. § 16 definition of crime of violence in sentencing context).

COMMERCIAL BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman, 56 F.3d 18 (5th Cir. June 6, 1995) (Texas conviction for burglary of nonresidential building in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.02 (1994), was a crime of violence, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), constituting an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2) for illegal re-entry after deportation), overruled by United States v. Turner, 305 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. Sept. 6, 2002) (Rodriguez decision improperly applied 18 U.S.C. § 16 definition of crime of violence in sentencing context).

BURGLARY OF DWELLING - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Guadardo, 40 F.3d 102 (5th Cir. Dec. 2, 1994) (Texas conviction of burglary of habitation in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.02 was a crime of violence, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), constituting an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2) for illegal re-entry after deportation).

Lower Courts of Fifth Circuit

BURGLARY
Rios-Delgado v. United States, 117 F.Supp.2d 581 (W.D.Tex. Oct. 11, 2000) (California: trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object, at sentencing, that defendants prior conviction for commercial burglary was not an aggravated felony, for sentence enhancement purposes, under the soon-to-be-announced rule of United States v. Reyna-Espinosa, 117 F.3d 826 (5th Cir. July 11, 1997) (federal conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a noncitizen under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) does not constitute an "aggravated felony" for purposes of increasing the defendants offense level for illegal re-entry by 16 levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2), since it is not one of the five paragraphs of INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) that are expressly incorporated into that guideline, although, in dictum, the court said the conviction does constitute an aggravated felony for immigration purposes)).

Seventh Circuit

BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Alvarez-Martinez, 286 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. Apr. 12, 2002) (Illinois burglary conviction, in violation of 720 ILCS § 5/19-1(a), was a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and thus an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 for unlawful re-entry, even though the statute was divisible, since defendants acquiescence to the pre-sentence report amounted to implied stipulation that he broke into vehicle, thus using force against property).

ATTEMPTED AUTO BURGLARY - BURGLARY
United States v. Martinez-Garcia, 268 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. Sept. 28, 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 1111 (2002) (Illinois conviction of burglary of vehicle with intent to commit theft constituted "attempt," under INA § 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U), to commit a "theft offense" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) for purposes of enhancing under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) an illegal re-entry sentence, since conduct admitted by defendant in plea was sufficient; since neither plea nor charging document encompassed an admission or charge that he completed act of taking property from vehicle, the offense was aggravated felony attempt).

AUTO BURGLARY - BURGLARY
Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. Mar. 10, 2000) (Illinois conviction of "burglary" of automobile, in violation of 720 ILCS § 5/19-1(a), was not an aggravated felony "burglary offense" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) that would trigger deportation).

Eighth Circuit

AUTO BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Guzman-Landeros, 207 F.3d 1034, 1035 (8th Cir. Mar. 27, 2000) (Texas convictions for burglary of vehicle constituted aggravated felonies as crimes of violence under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) to sentence for illegal re-entry).

Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " BURGLARY
United States v. Ramos-Medina, 682 F.3d 852, 857 (9th Cir. Jun. 21, 2012) (California conviction of burglary, under Penal Code 459, constituted a crime of violence under immigration laws, based on United States v. Becker, 919 F.2d 568 (9th Cir.1990), finding Penal Code 459 a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), and Lopez"Cardona v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2011), which establish that burglary under California Penal Code 459 is categorically a crime of violence and thus an aggravated felony for the purposes of the INA: "[e]very violation of 459 might not present that level of risk: but the proper inquiry for the categorical approach is whether the conduct covered by the crime presents the requisite risk of injury in the ordinary case. ).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY
Kwong v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 6061513 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2011) (California conviction of first-degree burglary, in violation of Penal Code 459, 460(a), constituted an aggravated felony crime of violence, since the abstract of judgment established the conviction was of first-degree burglary, as defined in Penal Code 460(a) -- burglary of an inhabited dwelling house, vessel ... which is inhabited and designed for habitation, floating home ..., or trailer coach ..., or the inhabited portion of any other building.); following United States v. Becker, 919 F.2d 568, 573 (9th Cir. 1990) (California conviction of first-degree burglary under Penal Code 459 is a crime of violence because it involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used in the course of committing the offense); Lopez"Cardona v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 5607634 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2011) (California conviction of first-degree burglary, in violation of California Penal Code 459, was a crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 16(b)), distinguishing United States v. Aguila"Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir.2011) (en banc) (California conviction of first-degree burglary, under Penal Code 459, did not categorically constitute burglary).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY
Lopez-Cardona v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 5607634 (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 2011) (California conviction for residential burglary, in violation of Penal Code 459, constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), and is therefore a particularly serious crime); see United States v. Becker, 919 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1990) (California conviction of first-degree burglary under California Penal Code 459 is categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b) because the crime inherently involves a substantial risk of physical force); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004) (The reckless disregard in[18 U.S.C.] 16 relates not to the general conduct or to the possibility that harm will result from a person's conduct, but to the risk that the use of physical force against another might be required in committing a crime. The classic example is burglary. A burglary would be covered under 16(b) not because the offense can be committed in a generally reckless way or because someone may be injured, but because burglary, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that the burglar will use force against a victim in completing the crime.) (footnote omitted).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " BURGLARY " BURGLARY OF A DWELLING
United States v. Reina-Rodriguez, 655 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 2011) (Utah conviction of second-degree burglary of a dwelling, under Utah Code Ann. 76"6"202(2), did not categorically constitute a burglary of a dwelling crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) & n.1(B)(iii), because Utah law defined dwelling more broadly than it is defined in the federal Guidelines definition of burglary of a dwelling); following United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 851 n.5 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (state statutes do not categorically constitute burglary when they define it to include non-buildings adapted for overnight accommodation; courts must utilize the modified categorical approach to determine whether a dwelling in Utah meets the Guidelines' definition of dwelling.; A non-building adapted for accommodation"e.g., a vehicle or boat"may still qualify as a dwelling under the Guidelines, but it does not do so categorically.).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " BURGLARY " BURGLARY
United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2011) (en banc) (California conviction of burglary, under Penal Code 459, does not qualify as a generic burglary conviction for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, even if the defendant pleaded guilty to entering a building unlawfully or a jury found the defendant guilty as charged in an indictment reciting that allegation, since the California definition of unlawful entry includes a licensed or privileged entry into a building with intent to commit a crime, where the generic definition of burglary requires that the entry itself be unlicensed or unprivileged).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " THEFT OFFENSE " COMMERCIAL BURGLARY
Hernandez-Cruz v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Jul. 7, 2011) (California conviction of second-degree commercial burglary, in violation of Penal Code 459, did not categorically constitute an attempted theft aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), because 459 criminalizes conduct beyond generic attempted theft offenses"for example, entering a locked vehicle with the intent to commit not theft, but arson or vandalism. . . . Because one can be convicted under 459 for a crime that does not qualify as generic attempted theft, the statute is not a categorical match for the generic aggravated felony offense.); Ngaeth v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 796, 800, 801 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " BURGLARY " BURGLARY
United States v. Snyder, 643 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. Jun. 30, 2011) (Oregon conviction for violation of ORS 164.215, second degree burglary, is a burglary offense for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act; although Oregon definition of building may not coincide with the generic definition, the charging document made clear that the defendant entered a generically defined building).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " BURGLARY OF A DWELLING
Reina-Rodriguez v. United States, 645 F.3d 1129, 2011 WL 2465462 (9th Cir. Jun. 22, 2011) (Utah conviction of burglary of a dwelling, under UCA 76"6"202(2), did not constitute a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, because a non-building adapted for accommodation"e.g., a vehicle or boat" does not categorically qualify as a dwelling under the Guidelines); retroactively applying United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 851 n.5 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (overruling prior decisions to the extent that [they] suggest[ed] that state statutes satisfy [Taylor 's] categorical inquiry when they define burglary to include non-buildings adapted for overnight accommodation ....).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " BURGLARY
United States v. Park, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2418906 (9th Cir. Jun. 17, 2011) (California conviction of first-degree burglary, in violation of Penal Code 459, categorically constituted a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a) [in that it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another . U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)] for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - THEFT OFFENSE - AUTO BURGLARY CONSTITUTES ATTEMPTED THEFT
Ngaeth v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2008) (California conviction for entering locked vehicle with intent to commit theft, in violation of California Penal Code 459 is an aggravated felony for immigration purposes as attempted theft).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - BURGLARY
United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. Jun. 5, 2007) (en banc) (Oregon conviction of second-degree burglary, in violation of Or.Rev.Stat. 164.215(1), is not a categorical burglary for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), to apply a sentence enhancement requiring a minimum of 180 months in prison, because it encompasses burglary of non-buildings, and therefore falls outside the federal definition of generic burglary), overruling United States v. Cunningham, 911 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1990) (Oregon conviction of second-degree burglary is a categorical burglary under Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), for purposes of applying the Armed Career Criminal Act).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Reina-Rodriguez, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) (Utah conviction of second-degree attempted aggravated burglary, under Utah Code Ann. 76-6-203, does not necessarily constitute a "crime of violence" illegal reentry sentencing purposes since Utah conviction of attempted aggravated burglary does not require an entry into a dwelling). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0510475p.pdf

AGGRAVATED FELONY - BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Reina-Rodriguez, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) (Utah conviction of second-degree attempted aggravated burglary, under Utah Code Ann. 76-6-203, a crime of violence for illegal reentry sentencing purposes where the charging document and judgment of conviction, show the conviction was for burglary of a dwelling). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0510475p.pdf

BURGLARY OF DWELLING - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Guerrero-Velasquez, 434 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 2006) (Washington conviction of second-degree burglary, under Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.030(1) ("A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, he enters or remains unlawfully in a building other than a vehicle or a dwelling."), held to constitute crime of violence for purposes of imposing a 16-level increase in base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) for illegal re-entry sentence, where signed plea agreement admitted fact charged in information that defendant illegally entered a residence).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - BURGLARY - ENTRY REQUIREMENT MET WHERE CHARGE TO WHICH PLEA WAS ENTERED ALLEGED UNLAWFUL ENTRY EVEN THOUGH STATUTE DID NOT HAVE UNLAWFUL ENTRY AS AN ELEMENT
United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 393 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. Jan. 5, 2005) (California burglary conviction under the modified categorical analysis included the unlawful entry requirement absent in California's statutory definition of burglary, since the defendant pleaded guilty to the unlawful entry language of the charge, so the conviction met the definition of "burglary of a dwelling" under Taylor and is, therefore, a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. 2L1.2, cmt. n. 1(B)(iii)), citing Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d at 852-52 (holding that a California burglary conviction was burglary under a modified-categorical approach because Velasco-Medina pled guilty where the indictment alleged "unlawful" entry).

BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Matthews, 374 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. July 7, 2004) (conviction of burglary of an occupied building did not constitute a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), where the parties agreed the term "occupied" did not require a persons actual physical presence).

BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 364 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2004) (California conviction for burglary of an inhabited building, under California Penal Code § 460, is an aggravated felony and a "crime of violence" for sentencing purposes).

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Wenner, 351 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2003) (Washington conviction of residential burglary, in violation of Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.025(1), is not a "burglary of a dwelling" crime of violence as defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), since the statute classifies railway cars, fenced areas, and cargo containers as dwellings although they are not structures under Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); Taylor applies to sentencing as well as immigration context).

BURGLARY
United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 2002) (California conviction of second-degree burglary, in violation of California Penal Code § 459, was an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), for purposes of imposition of a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) for illegal re-entry conviction, even though the state statute was far broader than the Taylor federal definition of burglary, since the charging paper and judgment established the elements of the federal definition).

BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Sandoval-Venegas, 292 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. June 14, 2002) (California conviction of violating Penal Code § 459 (burglary) not a crime of violence for purposes of federal career criminal enhancement of bank robbery sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, 4B1.2(a), where record of conviction did not establish that burglary was of a dwelling).

AUTO BURGLARY - BURGLARY
Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. June 9, 2000) (California conviction of vehicle burglary in violation of California Penal Code § 459 did not constitute "burglary" within the federal aggravated felony definition, INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), nor "crime of violence" within INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for immigration purposes).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - BURGLARY - BURGLARY
United States v. Bonat, 106 F.3d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1997) (although language of Arizona burglary statute met generic definition of burglary for federal career criminal act sentence enhancement purposes, Arizona judicial decisions had expanded the definition to include a conviction in which the intent to commit the crime had been formed after entry of the structure, so the Arizona offense could be committed by shoplifting in a building, which does not satisfy the Taylor generic definition of burglary offense).

UNLAWFUL ENTRY - BURGLARY
United States v. Parker, 5 F.3d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 1993) (California Information charging burglary did not satisfy Taylor because of failure to allege "unlawful or unprivileged" entry).

Tenth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - BURGLARY
United States v. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. Dec. 29, 2009) (Arizona conviction of second degree burglary, in violation of Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. 13-1507(A), is a "crime of violence" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since the "crime of violence" definition at U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1), includes "burglary of a dwelling," which may include mobile dwellings), distinguishing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990).

SOLICITATION TO COMMIT BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Cornelio-Pena, 435 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. Jan. 30, 2006) (Arizona conviction of solicitation to commit second-degree burglary of a dwelling, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1002, 1507, is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), justifying a 16-level sentence enhancement for illegal re-entry, even though the Guidelines do not expressly list solicitation where they "include" "aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting, to commit such offenses." U.S.S.G. § 2L1 .2 cmt. application n.5, because "include" is non-exhaustive and the examples expressly listed merely illustrative; since the mens rea and actus reus required for solicitation are similar to those required for aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and attempt, solicitation is sufficiently similar to the offenses listed in the application note to be encompassed by the note).

BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Soto-Ornelas, 312 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. Dec. 3, 2002) (conviction of burglary of a dwelling constitutes a crime of violence, and thus an aggravated felony conviction under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of 16-level illegal re-entry sentence enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2.L1.2, comment n. 1(B)(ii)(II) (2001)).

BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Frias-Trujillo, 9 F.3d 875 (10th Cir. Nov. 9, 1993) (Texas burglary conviction was a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and thus an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of sentencing enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(2) for illegal re-entry conviction).

Eleventh Circuit

BURGLARY OF DWELLING - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Fuentes-Rivera, 323 F.3d 869 (11th Cir. Mar. 4, 2003) (California conviction for burglary of an inhabited dwelling under Penal Code § 459, 460(a), was a "crime of violence," for purposes of a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), applicable to defendants convicted of illegal re-entry after having committed a crime of violence, notwithstanding fact that California law lacked physical force as an element of the offense).