BIA

ARSON - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Matter of Palacios-Pinera, 22 I. & N. Dec. 434 (BIA Dec. 18, 1998) (en banc) (Alaska conviction of arson in the first degree under section 11.46.400 of the Alaska Statutes, with a seven-year sentence, was a "crime of violence" and therefore an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).

Third Circuit

ARSON - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Tran v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 464 (3d Cir. July 12, 2005) (Pennsylvania conviction of "reckless burning or exploding," in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(d)(2), did not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and was therefore not an aggravated felony crime of violence under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) for purposes of removal, since the crime required only a reckless mens rea, and involved no risk that the defendant would intentionally use force in the commission of the crime).

Fifth Circuit

CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Landeros-Gonzales, 262 F.3d 424 (5th Cir. Aug. 14, 2001) (Texas conviction for violation of "criminal mischief" statute, for the intentional marking of anothers property, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 28.03(a)(1-3), was not a "crime of violence" and, consequently, was not an "aggravated felony" warranting an enhanced sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 for illegal re-entry, since it does not "by its nature, involve[] a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)).

Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " STATE CONVICTION " FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT AGGRAVATED FELONY " ARSON
Sandoval-Gomez v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 4668962 (9th Cir. Sept. 22, 2014) (California conviction of attempted arson, in violation of Penal Code 455, constituted aggravated felony arson under, INA 101(a)(43)(E), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(E) under the modified categorical approach; the federal element found in section 844 is a purely jurisdictional element which must be disregarded in determining whether the state law qualifies as an aggravated felony under federal law), vacated 771 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2014).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ARSON - SAFE HAVEN - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - OFFENSE MUST BE AGAINST PERSON OR PROPERTY OF ANOTHER
Jordison v. Keisler, 501 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2007, amended Oct. 30, 2007) (California conviction for "recklessly set[ting] fire to ... a structure or forest land" in violation of Penal Code 452(c) is not categorically an aggravated felony "crime of violence" for purposes of removal since the offense may be committed by burning the defendant's own land or structure whereas a crime of violence is one that involves violence or potential violence against the person or property of others).

POSSESSION OF STOLEN VEHICLE - RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY
Huerta-Guevara v. Ashcroft, 321 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 2003) (Arizona conviction of possession of a stolen vehicle, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-1802, did not fall within the generic definition of "theft offense" necessary to constitute an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), since the Arizona statute was overbroad, with respect to the generic definition, because (a) it prohibited "theft of services," which are not considered property and therefore fall outside the generic definition of theft, (b) it prohibited aiding and abetting, and (c) it "is a divisible statute, four subparts of which do not require intent.").