BIA

AGGRAVATED FELONY " MURDER " MENTAL STATE OF EXTREME RECKLESSNESS SUFFICIENT DESPITE LACK OF INTENT TO KILL
Matter of MW, 25 I&N Dec. 748 (BIA 2012) (Michigan conviction for violation of 750.317 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, second degree murder, is categorically an aggravated felony murder offense for immigration purposes; under the categorical approach, a conviction for the aggravated felony of murder, as defined in INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), includes a conviction for murder in violation of a statute requiring a showing that the perpetrator acted with extreme recklessness or a malignant heart, notwithstanding that the requisite mental state may have resulted from voluntary intoxication and that no intent to kill was established).

MURDER
Matter of Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. 224 (BIA Aug. 18, 1998) (Texas conviction of attempted murder constitutes aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A) for deportation purposes).

Second Circuit

MURDER - ATTEMPTED MURDER
United States v. Morgan, 380 F.3d 698 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2004) (New York conviction for second-degree attempted murder, with sentence to indeterminate term of two-and-a-half to seven-and-a-half years imprisonment, properly treated as an "aggravated felony" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, even though it was not an aggravated felony under the relevant immigration statute at the time of the conviction).

Third Circuit

USE OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE FACILITIES FOR MURDER FOR HIRE - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Ng v. Attorney General, 436 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. Feb. 7, 2006) (federal conviction of use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of a murder-for-hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958, constitutes a crime of violence aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) for purposes of removal, because it "poses a substantial risk that physical force will be used against another," even though the putative hitman had no intent to murder: "That some violations of § 1958 will never culminate in an actual agreement or the commission of a murder does not alter our view that the natural consequence of using interstate commerce facilities in the commission of a murder-for-hire is that physical force will be used upon another.", citing United States v. Luskin, 926 F.3d 372, 379 (4th Cir. 1991) (use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of a murder-for-hire under 18 U.S.C. § 1952A, the predecessor statute to 1958, constitutes a crime of violence); United States v. Cox, 74 F.3d 189, 190 (9th Cir. 1996) (conviction for soliciting the murder of wife constitutes a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, which defines a crime of violence as "conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another").

Ninth Circuit

MURDER
Castiglia v. INS, 108 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 1997) (second-degree murder conviction constituted aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A)).

Eleventh Circuit

MURDER
Lettman v. Reno, 207 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. Mar. 31, 2000) (Florida: conviction of third-degree murder constitutes an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), for deportation purposes).