BIA

AGGRAVATED FELONY " THEFT " RECEIPT OF STOLEN PROPERTY
Matter of Sierra, 26 I&N Dec. 288 (BIA 2014) (Nevada conviction for violation of NRS 193.330, 205.273, possession of a stolen vehicle, is not a categorical aggravated felony theft offense under INA 101(a)(43)(G), for immigration purposes, since the statute only requires reason to believe that the property received was stolen, but the generic definition of receipt of stolen property applicable to the aggravated felony definition requires knowledge).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " RECEIPT OF STOLEN PROPERTY
Matter of Sierra, 26 I & N Dec. 288, 292 (BIA 2014) (Nevada conviction of attempted possession of a stolen vehicle, in violation of Nevada Revised Statute 193.330 and 205.273, was not categorically an aggravated felony as an attempted theft offense, because Nevada law does not require actual knowledge that the property had been stolen, but only reason to believe; aggravated felony theft ground requires intent to deprive, which can be inferred from actual knowledge, but not from reason to believe); citing Matter of Garcia-Madruga, 24 I & N Dec. 436 (BIA 2008). NOTE: For any theft offense in which the mental state can be either knowledge or reason to know or believe, if the record shows that the defendant pled to the latter element, the defendant may be protected against the conviction being considered an aggravated felony. E.g., Massachusetts offense receiving a stolen motor vehicle, under M.G.L. ch. 266 28, only requires a reason to believe mental state.

AGGRAVATED FELONY " RECEIPT OF STOLEN PROPERTY
Matter of Sierra, 26 I & N Dec. 288, 292 (BIA 2014) (Nevada conviction of attempted possession of a stolen vehicle, in violation of Nevada Revised Statute 193.330 and 205.273, was not categorically an aggravated felony as an attempted theft offense, because Nevada law does not require actual knowledge that the property had been stolen, but only reason to believe; aggravated felony theft ground requires intent to deprive, which can be inferred from actual knowledge, but not from reason to believe); citing Matter of Garcia-Madruga, 24 I & N Dec. 436 (BIA 2008). NOTE: For any theft offense in which the mental state can be either knowledge or reason to know or believe, if the record shows that the defendant pled to the latter element, the defendant may be protected against the conviction being considered an aggravated felony. E.g., Massachusetts offense receiving a stolen motor vehicle, under M.G.L. ch. 266 28, only requires a reason to believe mental state.

RECEIPT OF STOLEN PROPERTY - ATTEMPT
Matter of Bahta, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1381 (BIA Oct. 4, 2000) (Nevada conviction for attempted possession of stolen property, in violation of Nevada Revised Statutes § 193.330 and 205.275, is a conviction for an attempted "theft offense (including receipt of stolen property)," and therefore an aggravated felony, within the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(G) and (U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) and (U)).

Fourth Circuit

CONCEALMENT OF MERCHANDISE - RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY
Ramtulla v. Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 202 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2002) (Virginia conviction of concealment of merchandise, in violation of Va.Code Ann. § 18.2-103, constitutes a "theft offense" and with a two-year suspended sentence therefore constitutes an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) for deportation purposes).

Fifth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - THEFT OFFENSE - RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY
Burke v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 102 (5th Cir. Dec. 10, 2007) (New York conviction of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 165.50 ["knowingly possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit himself or a person other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof, and when the value of the property exceeds three thousand dollars."], qualifies as a "theft offense" within the meaning of INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G)).

TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY - FRAUD OFFENSE
Omari v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. July 25, 2005) (federal conviction of interstate transportation of stolen, converted, and fraudulently obtained property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, is not an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i) for immigration purposes, as not all parts of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 necessarily involve fraud or deceit).

Seventh Circuit

POSSESSION OF STOLEN VEHICLE - RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY
Hernandez-Mancilla v. INS, 246 F.3d 1002 (7th Cir. Apr. 11, 2001) (Illinois conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle, in violation of 625 ILCS § 5/4-103(a)(1) a "theft offense," under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), and therefore constituted an "aggravated felony" rendering noncitizen deportable).

Ninth Circuit

POSSESSION OF STOLEN MAIL - THEFT OFFENSE
Randhawa v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2002) (federal conviction for possession of stolen mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708, held to be an "aggravated felony" triggering deportation, since the full range of conduct prohibited by the criminal statute fell within the aggravated felony definition of a "theft offense" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G)).

Tenth Circuit

AUTO - RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY
United States v. Vasquez-Flores, 265 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. Sept. 13, 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 1180 (2002) (Utah conviction for attempting to knowingly receive or transfer a stolen motor vehicle, in violation of U.C.A. 1953 § 41-1a-1316, was an "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) for enhancement purposes under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2) of an illegal re-entry sentence).

POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY - ATTEMPT
United States v. Vasquez-Flores, 265 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. Sept. 13, 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 1180 (2002) (Utah conviction for knowingly attempting to receive or transfer a stolen motor vehicle, in violation of Utah Code § 41-1a-1316 (1953), was an "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) for enhancement purposes under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2) of an illegal re-entry sentence).