Third Circuit

RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 540-541 (3d Cir. Jan. 3, 2006) (Pennsylvania misdemeanor conviction of recklessly endangering another person, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 2705, with a sentence of one year or more, did not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), and was not a felony conviction, and therefore did not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), and therefore was not an aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), since it requires a mens rea of no more than recklessness).

Fourth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT
Massis v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. Dec. 9, 2008) (Maryland misdemeanor conviction of reckless endangerment, in violation of Md. Code Ann. art. 27, 120 (1995) ("recklessly engages in conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another" with a five-year maximum), does not constitute an aggravated felony crime of violence, under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), because recklessness is an insufficient mental state where "a crime of violence requires a substantial likelihood that the perpetrator will intentionally employ physical force. See, e.g., Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 207-08 (2d Cir.2001); United States v. Hernandez-Castellanos, 287 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir.2002).").

Fifth Circuit

CHILD ENDANGERMENT - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Calderon-Pena, 339 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. July 17, 2003) (Texas conviction of child endangerment, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.041(c), would not on its face constitute a crime of violence under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of illegal re-entry sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2000, 2001), since it may be committed by omission; however, since the indictment in this case shows the elements involved in this particular conviction necessarily included placing a child in imminent danger of bodily injury through an intentional act, it did constitute a crime of violence in the instant case).

Ninth Circuit

FELONY ENDANGERMENT - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Hernandez-Castellanos, 287 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. Apr. 25, 2002) (Arizona conviction of felony endangerment in violation of A.R.S. § 13-1201 was not categorically an aggravated felony under a crime of violence theory under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) for illegal re-entry enhancement purposes under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), because a "substantial risk of imminent death or physical injury" as contained in the state statute is not the same as a "substantial risk that physical force . . . may be used," which is necessary to constitute a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)).