BIA

MANSLAUGHTER - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Matter of Vargas-Sarmiento, 23 I. & N. Dec. 651 (BIA Feb. 5, 2004) (New York conviction of first-degree manslaughter, in violation of Penal Law § 125.20(1) and (2), constitutes a crime of violence and therefore an aggravated felony for immigration purposes, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), because acting with intent to cause serious physical injury or death to a person "by its nature involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense," under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)); see Chery v. Ashcroft, 347 F.3d 404 (2d Cir. Oct. 17, 2003); Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 2003); Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2003); but see Jobson v. Ashcroft, 326 F.3d 367 (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2003).

MANSLAUGHTER, ABORTION - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Matter of Vargas-Sarmiento, 23 I. & N. Dec. 651, 654 (BIA Feb. 5, 2004) (New York conviction of first-degree manslaughter, abortion, in violation of Penal Law § 125.20(3), does not constitute a crime of violence and is therefore not an aggravated felony for immigration purposes, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).

ATTEMPTED MANSLAUGHTER - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Matter of Yeung, 21 I. & N. Dec. 610 (BIA Nov. 27, 1996) (Florida conviction of attempted manslaughter with a knife constituted aggravated felony as crime of violence with sentence imposed of one year or more under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).

INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Matter of Alcantar, 20 I. & N. Dec. 801 (BIA May 25, 1994) (Illinois conviction for involuntary manslaughter under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, para. 9-3(a), with a sentence to 10 years in prison, constituted a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and an "aggravated felony" as defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), for immigration purposes).

Second Circuit

SECOND DEGREE MANSLAUGHTER - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Jobson v. Ashcroft, 326 F.3d 367 (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2003) (New York conviction of manslaughter in the second degree, under N.Y.P.L. § 125.15(1), is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and thus is not an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), for deportation purposes, since the minimum criminal conduct required to violate the statute does not necessarily present a substantial risk that the defendant will intentionally use physical force against the person or property of another, because the scope of the law is broad; passive conduct or omissions alone are sufficient for conviction).

Lower Courts of Second Circuit

MANSLAUGHTER - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Greenidge v. INS, 204 F.Supp.2d 594 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2001) (Arizona manslaughter conviction, in violation of A.R.S. § 151-54, is a crime of violence, and therefore an aggravated felony pursuant to INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)), for removal purposes).

Third Circuit

VEHICULAR HOMICIDE - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Francis v. Reno, 269 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. Oct. 16, 2001) (Pennsylvania conviction of vehicular homicide, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732, did not constitute an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), since misdemeanor vehicular homicide was not a "felony" under the INA, and even if conviction could be converted into felony, it did not involve a substantial risk of physical force required to make it an "aggravated felony").

Fourth Circuit

INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Bejarano-Urrutia v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 444 (4th Cir. July 5, 2005) (Virginia conviction for simple involuntary manslaughter, in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-36 (2004), which requires the killing of a person as a proximate result of the defendants reckless disregard for human life, did not constitute a crime of violence aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), 18 U.S.C. § 16, because the conclusion of the court in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 377 (Nov. 9, 2004) that "[i]n no ordinary or natural sense can it be said that a person risks having to use physical force against another person in the course of operating a vehicle while intoxicated and causing injury," id. at 383, strongly indicates that the result in Leocal would have been the same even had a violation of the statute there at issue required recklessness rather than mere negligence).

Fifth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " MANSLAUGHTER
United States v. Garcia-Perez, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 753759 (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 2015) (Florida conviction of manslaughter, in violation of Florida Statute 782.07, did not qualify as a crime of violence under United States Sentencing Guideline 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), because Florida manslaughter conviction does not require proof of force, and my be committed with negligent intent).

CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Dominguez-Ochoa, 386 F.3d 639 (5th Cir. Sept. 22, 2004) (Texas conviction of criminally negligent homicide, under Tex. Penal Code § 19.05, did not constitute crime of violence aggravated felony under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), for purposes of a 16-level enhancement of sentence for illegal re-entry, since it does not include as an element the intentional "use, attempted use, or threatened use" of force and it is not one of the offenses enumerated in the Guidelines or its equivalent because it does not require the mens rea of recklessness which is required for manslaughter).

Seventh Circuit

VEHICULAR HOMICIDE BY INTOXICATION - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. July 5, 2001) (Wisconsin conviction for homicide by intoxicated use of vehicle, in violation of Wis.St.1996, § 940.09, was not an aggravated felony crime of violence, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for deportation purposes, since offense required that offender actually hit someone, but did not require that he intentionally use force to achieve that result).

Eighth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " MANSLAUGHTER
United States v. Roblero-Ramirez, ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 2927916 (8th Cir. Jun. 17, 2013) (Nebraska conviction for violation of Neb.Rev.St. 28-305, sudden quarrel manslaughter, is not an aggravated felony crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes where the statute does not require intent to kill).

AGGRAVATED FELONYMANSLAUGHTER - 18 U.S.C. 16(a) - MINNESOTA CONVICTION FOR SECOND-DEGREE MANSLAUGHTER NOT A COV SINCE NO ELEMENT OF USE OF FORCE
United States v. Torres-Villalobos, 487 F.3d 607, ___, (8th Cir. May 9, 2007) (Minnesota conviction for second-degree manslaughter, in violation of Minn.Stat. 609.205, did not qualify as crime of violence, under 18 U.S.C. 16(a), and is therefore not an "aggravated felony," under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), since it does not have as an essential element the intentional use of force: "Under Minnesota law, a person can commit second-degree manslaughter without using force or risking the intentional use of force. Minn.Stat. 609.205. A person can commit this crime by recklessly leaving a child alone with lit candles that later start a fire, State v. Boyer, No. C8-01-617, 2001 WL 1491450, at * 1 (Minn.Ct.App. Nov. 27, 2001), by allowing a child to die of dehydration while in the person's care, State v. Williams, No. A04-1694, 2005 WL 3046328, at * 1 (Minn.Ct.App. Nov. 15, 2005), by leaving explosives and blasting caps stored in an automobile where they are later ignited by the use of jumper cables, State v. Bicek, 429 N.W.2d 289, 291 (Minn.Ct.App.1988), and, indeed, by driving drunk with "culpable negligence" in a manner that causes the death of a passenger. State v. Geary, 239 N.W. 158, 159-60 (Minn.1931). As such, the "use of force," as Leocal interpreted that phrase, is not an element of a second-degree manslaughter conviction."), overruling United States v. Moore, 38 F.3d 977, 981 (8th Cir. 1994) (decided under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)); see also Omar v. INS, 298 F.3d 710, 715-17 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that criminal vehicular homicide is a crime of violence under 16 for immigration purposes).

AGGRAVATED FELONYMANSLAUGHTER - 18 U.S.C. 16(b) - MINNESOTA CONVICTION FOR SECOND-DEGREE MANSLAUGHTER NOT A COV SINCE NO SUBSTANTIAL RISK THAT THE ACTOR WILL INTENTIONALLY USE FORCE IN THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE
United States v. Torres-Villalobos, 487 F.3d 607, ___, (8th Cir. May 9, 2007) (Minnesota conviction for second-degree manslaughter, in violation of Minn.Stat. 609.205, did not qualify as crime of violence, under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), and is therefore not an "aggravated felony," under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), since it does not "involve a risk that the perpetrator will intentionally use physical force in the course of committing the offense. A perpetrator's knowing disregard of a serious risk of injury, as required by the Minnesota manslaughter statute, is different from a robber or burglar ignoring the risk that he may resort to the intentional use of force in committing the offense."), overruling United States v. Moore, 38 F.3d 977, 981 (8th Cir. 1994) (decided under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)); see also Omar v. INS, 298 F.3d 710, 715-17 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that criminal vehicular homicide is a crime of violence under 16 for immigration purposes).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - MANSLAUGHTER - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Torres-Villalobos, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 528195 (8th Cir. Feb. 22, 2007) (Minnesota conviction for second-degree manslaughter, in violation of Minn. Stat. 609.205, was not a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. 16 because the offense can be committed with mere reckless intent). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/8th/061876p.pdf

AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 335 F.3d 793 (8th Cir. July 14, 2003) (Utah conviction of automobile homicide, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1), held to be a crime of violence for purposes of illegal reentry 16-level sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1), since the Utah offense has as an element the use of physical force against another, irrespective of the predicate offense's mens rea element; no argument made that specific offense of conviction did not require use of force).

VEHICULAR HOMICIDE - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Omar v. INS, 298 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. Aug. 5, 2002) (Minnesota conviction of criminal vehicular homicide, in violation of M.S.A. § 609.21, subd. 1(4), was a crime of violence, and therefore was an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for removal purposes).

MANSLAUGHTER - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Moore, 38 F.3d 977 (8th Cir. Oct. 24, 1994) (federal conviction of manslaughter is a crime of violence within meaning of federal sentencing statute different from 18 U.S.C. § 16 and the aggravated felony definition contained in INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).

Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
Quijada-Aguilar v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 5103038 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 2015) (California conviction for voluntary manslaughter, under Penal Code 192(a), did not qualify as a particularly serious crime that would render noncitizen ineligible for withholding of removal, since it did not constitute an aggravated felony crime of violence, because it encompassed reckless conduct).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - NEGLIGENT VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER DOES NOT CONSTITUTE "MANSLAUGHTER" WITHIN GUIDELINES
United States v. Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2008) (California conviction for vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated without gross negligence, in violation of Penal Code 192(c)(3) (1998), was not "crime of violence" for purposes of sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) for illegal reentry following conviction for qualifying felony, because the elements require only proof of ordinary negligence, so cannot fall within the contemporary meaning of manslaughter as enumerated in U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 cmt. 1(B)(iii)).

VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Lara-Cazares v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. May 23, 2005) (California conviction of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, in violation of Penal Code § 191.5(a), which can be committed by gross negligence, does not qualify as a crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16, and so does not constitute a crime of violence aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) for immigration purposes, even if a sentence of one year or more has been imposed, holding that gross negligence is not the same as recklessness), disapproving Park v. INS, 252 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. June 5, 2001), and cases therein cited as no longer good law in light of Leocal v Ashcroft, 125 S.Ct. 377 (Nov. 9, 2004).

VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Bonilla-Montenegro, 331 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. June 9, 2003) (California conviction of voluntary manslaughter, in violation of Penal Code § 192(a), held to be a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of enhancing illegal re-entry sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), even though the elements of the offense do not require intentional use of force, because it is listed in the Guideline).

INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Park v. INS, 252 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. June 5, 2001) (California conviction for violation of California Penal Code § 192(b), involuntary manslaughter, constitutes an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)).

Lower Courts of Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - VEHICULAR HOMICIDE
United States v. Garcia-Espana, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15696 (E.D. Wash. March 6, 2007) (defendant may not be convicted of illegal reentry after deportation, where INS erred in concluding that he was deportable because of his vehicular homicide conviction, which in turn, invalidated his deportation order, which violated his due process rights and therefore cannot serve as a predicate element of his 1326 conviction).

Other

MANSLAUGHTER - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Matter of Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec. 373 (AG May 2, 2002) (New York conviction of second-degree manslaughter, under N.Y. Penal Law § 125.15(1), may constitute a "crime of violence" and therefore an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).