AGGRAVATED FELONY - THEFT OFFENSE - AUTO THEFT - AIDING AND ABETTING
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, ___ U.S. ___, 2007 WL 98723 (Jan. 17, 2007) (California conviction of unlawful taking of a vehicle, in violation of Vehicle Code 10851(a), constituted theft offense aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), since the crime of "aiding and abetting" a theft offense is included within the substantive offense).

BIA

AGGRAVATED FELONY " THEFT " RECEIPT OF STOLEN PROPERTY
Matter of Sierra, 26 I&N Dec. 288 (BIA 2014) (Nevada conviction for violation of NRS 193.330, 205.273, possession of a stolen vehicle, is not a categorical aggravated felony theft offense under INA 101(a)(43)(G), for immigration purposes, since the statute only requires reason to believe that the property received was stolen, but the generic definition of receipt of stolen property applicable to the aggravated felony definition requires knowledge).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " RECEIPT OF STOLEN PROPERTY
Matter of Sierra, 26 I & N Dec. 288, 292 (BIA 2014) (Nevada conviction of attempted possession of a stolen vehicle, in violation of Nevada Revised Statute 193.330 and 205.273, was not categorically an aggravated felony as an attempted theft offense, because Nevada law does not require actual knowledge that the property had been stolen, but only reason to believe; aggravated felony theft ground requires intent to deprive, which can be inferred from actual knowledge, but not from reason to believe); citing Matter of Garcia-Madruga, 24 I & N Dec. 436 (BIA 2008). NOTE: For any theft offense in which the mental state can be either knowledge or reason to know or believe, if the record shows that the defendant pled to the latter element, the defendant may be protected against the conviction being considered an aggravated felony. E.g., Massachusetts offense receiving a stolen motor vehicle, under M.G.L. ch. 266 28, only requires a reason to believe mental state.

AGGRAVATED FELONY " RECEIPT OF STOLEN PROPERTY
Matter of Sierra, 26 I & N Dec. 288, 292 (BIA 2014) (Nevada conviction of attempted possession of a stolen vehicle, in violation of Nevada Revised Statute 193.330 and 205.273, was not categorically an aggravated felony as an attempted theft offense, because Nevada law does not require actual knowledge that the property had been stolen, but only reason to believe; aggravated felony theft ground requires intent to deprive, which can be inferred from actual knowledge, but not from reason to believe); citing Matter of Garcia-Madruga, 24 I & N Dec. 436 (BIA 2008). NOTE: For any theft offense in which the mental state can be either knowledge or reason to know or believe, if the record shows that the defendant pled to the latter element, the defendant may be protected against the conviction being considered an aggravated felony. E.g., Massachusetts offense receiving a stolen motor vehicle, under M.G.L. ch. 266 28, only requires a reason to believe mental state.

AGGRAVATED FELONY - THEFT - WELFARE FRAUD
Matter of Garcia-Madruga, 24 I&N Dec. 436 (BIA Jan. 17, 2008) (Rhode Island conviction of welfare fraud, in violation of R.I. 40-6-15, is not an aggravated felony theft offense, because a "theft" offense, for aggravated felony purposes, requires "the taking of, or exercise of control over, property without consent, and with the criminal intent to deprive the ownership of the rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent" (emphasis added); welfare fraud is a fraud offense, in that it requires a taking with consent, obtained by fraud).

NOTE: When faced with a plea to a fraud offense involving a loss of over $10,000, counsel may wish instead to plea to a "theft" offense with a sentence imposed of 364 days or less. This may avoid issues regarding a finding of loss and "extra element" analysis under Matter of Babiaskov.

THEFT OFFENSE - AUTO THEFT
Matter of VZS, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1338 (BIA Aug. 1, 2000) (en banc) (California conviction for unlawful driving and taking of a vehicle in violation of California Vehicle Code § 10851 is a aggravated felony "theft offense" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) since "theft" for aggravated felony purposes is defined as a taking of property whenever there is criminal intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, even if the deprivation is less than total or permanent).

First Circuit

THEFT OFFENSE - ATTEMPTED THEFT
Vieira-Garcia v. INS, 239 F.3d 409 (1st Cir. Feb. 21, 2001) (Rhode Island conviction of attempted theft and sentence to term of ten years imprisonment constituted an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), triggering deportation).

Second Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - THEFT
Almeida v. Holder, 588 F.3d 778 (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 2009) (Connecticut conviction for larceny, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-48 and 53a-123 was a "theft offense" for aggravated felony purposes; although the statute of conviction may be committed with intent to "deprive" or "appropriate," the court found that both terms meet the generic definition of theft: "criminal intent to deprive the owner [of property] of the rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent."), citing Matter of V-Z-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1338, 1346 (BIA 2000).

THEFT OFFENSE - LARCENY
Abimbola v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. Aug. 5, 2004) (Connecticut conviction of third-degree larceny, under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-124, constitutes an aggravated felony theft offense under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G)).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - THEFT - CONNECTICUT LARCENY IN SECOND DEGREE
Plummer v. Ashcroft, 258 F.Supp.2d 43 (D.Conn. 2003) (Connecticut conviction of larceny in the second degree, in violation of CGSA 53a-123(a)(3), with a sentence imposed of one year or more, constitutes an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G)).

THEFT OFFENSE - ROBBERY
Perez v. Greiner, 296 F.3d 123, 126 n.5 (2d Cir. July 19, 2002) (New York conviction for second degree robbery in violation of N.Y. Penal L. § 160.10(1), is an "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G)).

THEFT OFFENSE - PETTY THEFT
United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. Aug. 29, 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 904 (2001) (Rhode Island misdemeanor petty theft conviction, for which suspended sentence of one year was imposed, constituted an aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), warranting 16-level enhancement of illegal re-entry sentence).

Lower Courts of Second Circuit

THEFT OFFENSE - PETTY THEFT
Jaafar v. INS, 77 F.Supp.2d 360 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1999) (New York petit larceny conviction, in violation of N.Y. Penal L. § 155.25, a class A misdemeanor with a sentence to one year of imprisonment, was an "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) for removal purposes).

Third Circuit

THEFT OFFENSE - THEFT OF SERVICES
Ilchuk v. Attorney General, 434 F.3d 618 (3d Cir. Jan. 17, 2006) (Pennsylvania conviction of theft of services, in violation of 18 Penn. Consol. Stats. Ann. § 3926(b) ("guilty of theft if, having control over the disposition of services of others to which he is not entitled, he knowingly diverts such services to his own benefit or to the benefit of another not entitled thereto."), with a six- to 23-month sentence to home arrest, constituted theft offense aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), for immigration purposes because the offense requires the taking or exercise of control over something of value knowing that its owner has not consented).

THEFT OFFENSE - THEFT BY DECEPTION
Nugent v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. May 7, 2004) (Pennsylvania conviction of theft by deception, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3922(a), with an indeterminate sentence from a minimum of six months to a maximum of 23 months, does not trigger removal as an aggravated felony fraud conviction under INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), since the loss to the victim was under $10,000, and because it is a hybrid offense, as a theft offense as well as a fraud offense, it must qualify as an aggravated felony under both categories or it does not trigger removal).

THEFT OFFENSE - PETTY THEFT
United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 845 (1999) (New York conviction of petit larceny with sentence imposed of one year or more was "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), for purposes of illegal re-entry sentencing enhancement, even though it was a misdemeanor under state law).

Fourth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " THEFT OFFENSES " UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE " DEFINITION OF THEFT
Castillo v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 161952 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2015) (Virginia conviction of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, in violation of Virginia Code 18.2"102 [take, drive or use any ... vehicle ... not his own, without the consent of the owner [ ] and in the absence of the owner, and with intent temporarily to deprive the owner [ ] of his possession [ ], without intent to steal the same, shall be guilty], did not categorically qualify as an aggravated felony theft offense, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), because the full range of conduct covered by the Virginia crime of unauthorized use can and do arise based on circumstances in which the defendant's use of property deviates only slightly from the specific scope of consensual use, resulting in an insignificant effect on ownership interests. [Footnote omitted] These circumstances stand in stark contrast to crimes involving the intentional, nonconsensual takings that typically involve significant impairment of ownership rights and damage to the property as described by the BIA in its elaboration of the term theft offense. See VZS, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1349.); quoting Overstreet v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 234, 435 S.E.2d 906, 908 (Va.Ct.App.1993).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " THEFT OFFENSE " FRAUD LACKS THE WITHOUT CONSENT ELEMENT OF THEFT OFFENSE
Salem v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 1998330 (4th Cir. May 24, 2011) (Virginia conviction for petit larceny under Va.Code Ann. 18.2"96, did not categorically qualify as a an aggravated felony theft offense, because the statute might encompass either fraud or theft, and fraud did not constitute a theft offense); Soliman v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276, 282-83 (4th Cir.2005) (theft for purposes of the INA does not include fraud, because fraud lacks the without consent element of the taking that is essential to a finding of theft).

THEFT OFFENSE - FRAUDULENT USE OF A CREDIT CARD TO OBTAIN PROPERTY
Soliman v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2005) (Virginia conviction of fraudulent use of a credit card, in violation of Virginia Code § 18.2-195, with intent to obtain $200.00 in property, is not an aggravated felony theft offense; the BIA erred in finding that fraud offenses necessarily included theft; theft is distinguishable from fraud, in that theft requires the taking of property without consent, while fraud requires an intent to deprive through consent obtained through misrepresentation).

Fifth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " THEFT OFFENSES " THEFT WITHOUT EFFECTIVE CONSENT
United States v. Rodriguez-Salazar, 768 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. Sept. 30, 2014) (Texas conviction of theft [appropriation of property without effective consent of the owner, where consent to temporary possession is not effective if it was induced by deception or coercion], under Penal Code 31.03(b)(1), is categorically an aggravated felony theft offense under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) for immigration purposes). NOTE: The analysis presented in this decision is short and not very clear.

AGGRAVATED FELONY " THEFT OFFENSE " THEFT
Nolos v. Holder, 611 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. Jul. 9, 2010) (Nevada conviction for violation of Nevada Statute 205.0832, theft, is a divisible statute; looking to the record of conviction, the portion of the statute violated, 205.0832(1)(b), is an aggravated felony theft offense for immigration purposes).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - THEFT - UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A VEHICLE
Serna-Guerra v. Mukasey, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 2228868 (5th Cir. 2008) (Texas conviction for the unauthorized use of a vehicle, in violation of Tex. Pen. Code 31.07,constitutes an aggravated felony theft offense, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), for removal purposes, but "we urge and recommend that that precedent should be reconsidered and overruled by our en banc court."), reluctantly following Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Galvan- Rodriguez, 169 F.3d 217 (5th Cir. 1999). http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions%5Cunpub%5C07/07-60634.0.wpd.pdf

AGGRAVATED FELONY - THEFT OFFENSE - RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY
Burke v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 102 (5th Cir. Dec. 10, 2007) (New York conviction of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 165.50 ["knowingly possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit himself or a person other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof, and when the value of the property exceeds three thousand dollars."], qualifies as a "theft offense" within the meaning of INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G)).

THEFT OFFENSE - PETTY THEFT WITH A PRIOR CONVICTION - SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT
Mutascu v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __ (5^th Cir. Apr. 3, 2006) (California conviction of petty theft with a prior, in violation of Penal Code § 666, with one-year sentence imposed is an aggravated felony theft offense), rejecting United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201 (9^th Cir. 2002).

THEFT OFFENSE - CONSPIRACY TO ENGAGE IN CHECK FRAUD
United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1202, 121 S.Ct. 1214 (2001) (federal conviction for conspiracy to perpetrate a checking and savings account kite scheme, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b), was an "aggravated felony," under an attempted theft theory of INA § 101(a)(43)(G), (U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), (U), so as to permit enhancement of the illegal re-entry sentence in defendants base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)).

Seventh Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - AUTO BURGLARY
Vaca-Tellez v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. Sept. 2, 2008) (Illinois conviction for auto burglary with intent to commit theft, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) is an aggravated felony attempted theft for immigration purposes).

Lower Courts of Seventh Circuit

THEFT OFFENSE - ARMED ROBBERY
Hernandez-Gonzalez v. Moyer, 907 F.Supp. 1224, 1227 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 8, 1995) (Illinois conviction of armed robbery constitutes a theft offense, with a sentence imposed of at least five years, and is therefore an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(43)(G) for immigration purposes).

Eighth Circuit

THEFT OFFENSE - IDENTITY THEFT
United States v. Mejia-Barba, 327 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. May 5, 2003) (Iowa conviction of identity theft, in violation of Iowa Code § 715A.8, constitutes aggravated felony as a "theft offense" as defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), for purposes of eight-level sentence enhancement under United States Sentencing Guideline § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), for illegal re-entry conviction).

Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " THEFT OFFENSE
Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2015) (California theft conviction, including any offense for which the underlying substantive offense charged was a violation of Penal Code 484, is not aggravated felony theft, since because the California definition of theft includes theft of labor, false credit reporting, and theft by false pretenses, which do not fall within the definition of aggravated felony theft).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " THEFT OFFENSE " THEFT
Garcia v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 2385402 (9th Cir. May 20, 2015) (California conviction of theft, under Penal Code 487(a), is not categorically a theft aggravated felony because the California offense includes theft of labor, and because the California statute may be violated even if the victim consented to transfer his property by false pretenses), citing Carrillo"Jaime v. Holder, 572 F.3d 747, 751"53 (9th Cir. 2009).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " FELONY PETTY THEFT " THEFT OFFENSE
United States v. Rivera, 658 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2011) (California felony petty theft convictions under Penal Code 484(a) and 666 constituted aggravated felony theft offenses, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes); declining to follow United States v. Corona"Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); following United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 382-386 (2008) (an increased, recidivist sentence is a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because [it is] a repetitive one so the sentence imposed for the sentence enhancement does relate to the commission of the repeat offense and is clearly part of the sentence prescribed by law; therefore a recidivist sentence constitutes a sentence imposed for determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a predicate offense).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " THEFT OFFENSE " COMMERCIAL BURGLARY
Hernandez-Cruz v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Jul. 7, 2011) (California conviction of second-degree commercial burglary, in violation of Penal Code 459, did not categorically constitute an attempted theft aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), because 459 criminalizes conduct beyond generic attempted theft offenses"for example, entering a locked vehicle with the intent to commit not theft, but arson or vandalism. . . . Because one can be convicted under 459 for a crime that does not qualify as generic attempted theft, the statute is not a categorical match for the generic aggravated felony offense.); Ngaeth v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 796, 800, 801 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - THEFT
Ramirez-Villalpando v. Holder, 601 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. April 9, 2010) (California conviction for violation of Penal Code 487(a), grand theft, is an aggravated felony theft offense for immigration purposes where abstract of judgment and complaint indicated noncitizen was convicted of stealing personal property).

Carrillo-Jaime v. Holder, 572 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. Jul. 15, 2009) (California conviction of owning and operating a chop shop, in violation of Vehicle Code 10801 ("premises where any person has been engaged in altering, destroying, disassembling, dismantling, reassembling, or storing any motor vehicle or motor vehicle part known to be illegally obtained by theft, fraud, or conspiracy to defraud"), did not constitute a theft aggravated felony within the meaning of INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), under the categorical approach, since the offense permits exercising control over property obtained by fraud, which is necessarily committed with the consent of the owner, and the conviction therefore does not require that the exercise of control over the property be "without consent" as required by the generic definition of theft aggravated felony).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - THEFT OFFENSE - AUTO BURGLARY CONSTITUTES ATTEMPTED THEFT
Ngaeth v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2008) (California conviction for entering locked vehicle with intent to commit theft, in violation of California Penal Code 459 is an aggravated felony for immigration purposes as attempted theft).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - THEFT - JOYRIDING
Penuliar v. Ashcroft, 528 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. Jun. 10, 2008) (California conviction for violation of California Vehicle Code 10851, unlawful driving of a motor vehicle, is not categorically an aggravated felony "theft" offense for immigration purposes, since that statutes includes accessories after the fact), following United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2007)

AGGRAVATED FELONY - THEFT OFFENSE - IDENTITY THEFT
Mandujano-Real v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 585 (9th Cir. May 22, 2008) (Oregon conviction of identity theft, under Oregon Revised Statute 165.800, did not categorically qualify as an aggravated felony theft offense, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), for purposes of removal, because use of a false identity does not deprive anyone of "ownership" and the statute punishes use of another persons identity even if that the use was with consent).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - THEFT OFFENSE - UNAUTHORIZED DRIVING OF A MOTOR VEHICLE
Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 2007) (California conviction of unauthorized driving of a vehicle, in violation of Vehicle Code 10851(a), constitutes an aggravated felony theft offense, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G); rejecting an argument that the statute does not define a categorical theft offense because it prohibits aiding and abetting as well as direct commission of the act, and rejecting respondent's argument that applying the modified categorical approach, there is no evidence in the record of conviction showing he committed a theft offense), following Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 127 S.Ct. 815, 818, 823 (2007) (holding the generic term "theft offense" in INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), includes the crime of aiding and abetting, and vacating a Ninth Circuit decision holding that 10851(a) was not a categorical theft offense).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - THEFT OFFENSE - UNAUTHORIZED DRIVING
United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 2007) (9-6 en banc) (California conviction for unlawful driving or taking of vehicle, under Penal Code 10851(a), did not categorically qualify as an aggravated felony theft offense under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) for purposes of enhancement of illegal reentry sentence, since the offense includes accessory after the fact, which is not listed in INA 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) as an aggravated felony inchoate offense).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - THEFT OFFENSE - THEFT BY CONTROL
Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 3302660 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) (Arizona misdemeanor conviction of "theft by control of property with a value of $250 or more," in violation of A.R.S. 1301802(A)(1), (C) [knowingly, and without lawful authority, controlling the property of another with intent to deprive the owner of it], with sentence of twelve months, constituted an aggravated felony theft offense for removal purposes), following Huerta-Guevara v. Ashcroft, 321 F.3d 883, 886-887 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1204-1205 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).

THEFT OFFENSE - TAKING OF VEHICLE
United States v. Vidal, 426 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2005) (California conviction of unlawful taking of a vehicle, in violation of Vehicle Code § 10851, constitutes an aggravated felony under the, for purposes of an eight-level increase in the base offense level for an illegal re-entry sentence).

THEFT OFFENSE
Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. June 1, 2005) (Arizona conviction of theft, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1802(A)(1) and (C), defined as knowingly, and without lawful authority, controlling the property of another with the intent to deprive that person of it, with a sentence of 14 months in custody, constitutes a theft offense aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G)).

THEFT OFFENSE - THEFT OF MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION
Penuliar v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 2005) (California conviction of unlawful driving or taking a vehicle, in violation of Vehicle Code § 10851(a), was not a theft offense, within the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), because the statute and charge both were overbroad with respect to the definition of a theft offense by encompassing not only substantive theft offenses but aiding and abetting them as well).

THEFT OFFENSE
Martinez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. Dec. 29, 2004) (California conviction for grand theft by taking property from the person of another, in violation of Penal Code § 487(c), constitutes a theft offense, and therefore is an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), for deportation purposes, because California courts have held an intent permanently to deprive the owner of property is an essential element of this offense, and because the record of conviction - i.e., the charge and the absence of any codefendants - negated the possibility the defendant was convicted on an aiding and abetting theory which renders the statute divisible), opinion withdrawn and superseded by 417 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2005).

THEFT OFFENSE - SHOPLIFTING
United States v. Sanchez-Sanchez, 333 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. June 26, 2003) (Arizona conviction under Arizona Revised Statute 13-1805(I), a class 4 felony punishing anyone "who commits shoplifting and has previously committed or been convicted within the past five years of two or more offenses involving burglary, shoplifting, robbery, [etc.]," is not an aggravated felony offense under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), INA 101(a)(43)(G), in light of Corona-Sanchez v. INS, 291 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. June 6, 2002), since the offense is a felony only on the basis of a prior conviction-based sentence).

THEFT OFFENSE - CONTROLLING STOLEN MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION
Nevarez-Martinez v. INS, 326 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. Apr. 16, 2003) (Arizona conviction of controlling anothers means of transportation, knowing or with reason to believe it had been stolen, in violation of Arizona Revised Statute § 13-1814(A)(5), did not constitute a theft offense aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), since the statute did not require intent to deprive the owner of the other property) (alternative holding).

THEFT OFFENSE - UNAUTHORIZED USE OF MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION
Nevarez-Martinez v. INS, 326 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. Apr. 16, 2003) (Arizona conviction of unauthorized use of a means of transportation, in violation of Arizona Revised Statute § 13-1814(A)(2), did not constitute a theft offense aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), since the statute did not require intent to deprive the owner of the property) (alternative holding).

THEFT OFFENSE - POSSESSION OF STOLEN MAIL
Randhawa v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2002) (federal conviction for possession of stolen mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708, held to be an "aggravated felony" triggering deportation, since the full range of conduct prohibited by the criminal statute fell within the aggravated felony definition of a "theft offense" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G)).

THEFT OFFENSE - UNLAWFUL USE OF VEHICLE
United States v. Perez-Corona, 295 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. July 8, 2002) (Arizona conviction for unlawful use of a means of transportation, or joyriding, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-1803, did not constitute a "theft offense," since there was no element of any intent to deprive the owner of his or her property (even if the deprivation was less than permanent), and the conviction was thus not an "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), for purposes of enhancing a sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) for a conviction of illegal re-entry after deportation).

THEFT OFFENSE - PETTY THEFT WITH PRIOR
United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. June 6, 2002) (en banc) (California felony conviction of petty theft with a prior conviction, under California Penal Code § 484(a), 666, is a divisible statute with respect to the aggravated felony generic definition of theft offense, under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) since the California offense includes conduct such as theft of labor and solicitation of a false credit report that is not included within the federal aggravated felony definition of theft).

Lower Courts of Ninth Circuit

THEFT OFFENSE - PETTY THEFT
United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F.Supp.2d 1084 (S.D.Cal. May 18, 1998) (California conviction of theft, in violation of California Penal Code § 484, could constitute an "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), for purposes of the illegal re-entry sentence enhancement, even though the California statute is overbroad with respect to the common-law aggravated felony definition of theft since the statute includes theft of services), affirmed, 193 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. Oct. 19, 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 842 (2000).

Eleventh Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " THEFT " SHOPLIFTING
Ramos v. U.S. Attorney General, 709 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. Feb. 19, 2013) (Georgia conviction of shoplifting, in violation of Georgia Code 16"8"14(a)(1) [theft has two alternative intent elements: the intent of appropriating merchandise to his own use without paying for the same or to deprive the owner of possession thereof or of the value thereof, in whole or in part ...], is not categorically an aggravated felony theft offense, for purposes of deportability, because it can be committed with mere intent to appropriate, which falls outside the generic definition of aggravated felony theft); following Jaggernauth v. U.S. Attorney General, 432 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2005) (a theft statute that included two disjunctive intent requirements"an intent to deprive and an intent to appropriate"was divisible and did not categorically constitute an aggravated felony theft offense).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " THEFT " SHOPLIFTING
Ramos v. U.S. Attorney General, ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 599552 (11th Cir. Feb. 19, 2013) (Georgia conviction of shoplifting, in violation of Georgia Code 16"8"14(a)(1) [theft has two alternative intent elements: the intent of appropriating merchandise to his own use without paying for the same or to deprive the owner of possession thereof or of the value thereof, in whole or in part ...], is not categorically an aggravated felony theft offense, for purposes of deportability, because it can be committed with mere intent to appropriate, which falls outside the generic definition of aggravated felony theft); following Jaggernauth v. U.S. Attorney General, 432 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2005) (a theft statute that included two disjunctive intent requirements"an intent to deprive and an intent to appropriate"was divisible and did not categorically constitute an aggravated felony theft offense).

THEFT OFFENSE - GRAND THEFT
Jaggerneuth v. U.S. Atty General, 432 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. Dec. 19, 2005) (Florida conviction of grand theft, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 812.014(1), did not constitute aggravated felony theft, under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), for immigration purposes, because the statute was divisible as subsection (b) required only intent to appropriate use of the property, and the record of conviction did not establish that the defendant was convicted under subsection (a) which would have qualified as an aggravated felony).

THEFT OFFENSE - PETTY THEFT
United States v. Christopher, 239 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. Jan. 22, 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 178 (2001) (Georgia conviction for misdemeanor shoplifting, with a maximum of one year, qualified as an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), for enhancing illegal re-entry sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), even though it was a misdemeanor under state law, since a 12-month suspended sentence was imposed).

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