AGGRAVATED FELONY " BURGLARY
Descamps v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___ (Jun. 20, 2013) (California conviction of burglary, in violation of Penal Code 459 (entry without requiring unlawful entry with intent to commit theft or any felony), is overbroad with respect to the generic federal definition of burglary, for purposes of federal sentence enhancement under the ACCA for a prior burglary conviction, because generic unlawful entry is never an element of 459, a conviction under that statute is never for generic burglary.).

BIA

AGGRAVATED FELONY " BURGLARY " HOME INVASION
Matter of Jasso Arangure, 27 I&N Dec. 178 (BIA 2017) (Michigan conviction of home invasion, in violation of M.C.L. 750.110a(2) is a categorical burglary offense for immigration purposes, since the intent to commit the crime need not be at entry, but may also be while remaining or upon exiting, under both the Michigan and generic federal definitions of burglary), following United States v. Quarles, 850 F.3d 836, 840 (6th Cir. 2017).

BURGLARY - AUTO
Matter of Perez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1325 (BIA June 6, 2000) (en banc) (Texas conviction of burglary of a vehicle, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 30.04(a), is not an aggravated felony "burglary offense" within the definition of INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G))

AGGRAVATED FELONY - BURGLARY - BURGLARY
United States v. Aguila-Montes, 553 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2009), on rehearing withdrawing and superseding previous opinion, 523 F.3d 1071 (California conviction for first-degree residential burglary, in violation of Penal Code 459, could not categorically constitute a crime of violence (burglary of a dwelling) under USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), cmt. n. 1(B)(iii), so as to warrant 16-level enhancement of sentence for illegal reentry, because the California offense encompasses a broader range of proscribed conduct than does the generic offense of the Guidelines since it does not require that the entry be "unlawful or unprivileged" as the federal definition does), following United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 393 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2005).

Fourth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " BURGLARY
United States v. Bonilla, 687 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. Jul. 17, 2012) (Texas conviction for burglary, in violation of Texas Penal Code 30.02(a)(3), constitutes a crime of violence for illegal reentry sentencing purposes, because it substantially corresponds to the elements of generic burglary as outlined in Taylor v. United States, notwithstanding that defendant may not have formulated his intent prior to the unlawful entry).

Fifth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - BURGLARY
United States v. Gonzalez-Terrazas, 529 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. May 22, 2008) (California conviction for burglary, in violation of Penal Code 459, was not a "burglary of a dwelling" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes because the California statute may be committed without an "unlawful or unprivileged" entry), following United States v. Ortega-Gonzaga, 490 F.3d 393 (5th Cir.2007).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - BURGLARY - UNLAWFUL ENTRY REQUIREMENT
United States v. Gonzales-Terrazas, 516 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. Feb. 1, 2008) (California conviction for violation of Penal Code 459 is not categorically a crime of violence for illegal-reentry sentencing purposes, because the state statute does not require as an element that the entry be unlawful [i.e. without consent]), following United States v. Ortega-Gonzaga, 490 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2007) (California conviction under Penal Code 459 for residential burglary does not constitute a crime of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - BURGLARY
United States v. Carbajal-Diaz, 508 F.3d 804 (5th Cir. Nov. 26, 2007) (Missouri conviction for burglary, in violation of Mo. Ann. Stat. 569.160, is a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes where the indictment shows that the offense involved residential burglary, an offense enumerated as a crime of violence.)

AGGRAVATED FELONY - BURGLARY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE
United States v. Castillo-Morales, 507 F.3d 873 (5th Cir. Nov. 8, 2007) (illegal reentry sentence is affirmed where there was no error in a 16-level offense enhancement, since relevant Florida court documents indicated that defendant committed the "crime of violence" of "burglary of a dwelling," as enumerated in U.S.S.G. 2L1.2).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - BURGLARY
United States v. Herrera-Montes, 490 F.3d 390 (5th Cir. Jun. 25, 2007) (Tennessee conviction of burglary of a dwelling, in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. 39-14-403, is not categorically a "crime of violence" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since the statute of conviction punishes burglary where the intent to commit the crime was not formed until after the actor unlawfully enters or remains in a dwelling).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - BURGLARY
United States v. Davis, 487 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. May 17, 2007) (Texas robbery conviction, in violation of Penal Code 29.02(a), is a crime of violence for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - BURGLARY - FLORIDA BURGLARY NOT AN AGGRAVATED FELONY
United States v. Gomez-Guerra, 485 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. April 23, 2007) (Florida conviction for burglary, in violation of Florida Statute 810.02(3) (1995), which forbids not only entry into a structure but also entry into its curtilage, where the charge was in accord, including the words "or the curtilage," did not constitute a crime of violence, pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2005), as an enumerated offense ( "burglary of a dwelling" under USSG 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii)), for purposes of imposing a 16-level enhancement to a sentence for illegal reentry after deportation, since the "ordinary, contemporary, common meaning" of "burglary of a dwelling" does not extend to the grounds around the dwelling, but actually requires unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, the dwelling itself), citing United States v. Garcia-Mendez, 420 F.3d 454, 457 (5th Cir.2005) (Texas conviction of burglary of a habitation, in violation of Texas Penal Code 30.02, "is equivalent to the enumerated [crime of violence] offense of burglary of a dwelling"); cf. James v. United States, 550 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1586, ___ (2007), slip op. at 18 ("We agree that the inclusion of curtilage takes Florida's underlying offense of burglary outside the definition of generic burglary set forth in Taylor, which requires an unlawful entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure. ") (emphasis in original), citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990).

BURGLARY - AUTO
Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. May 1, 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1069 (2001) (Texas conviction of burglary of vehicle with intent to commit theft, in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 30.04(a), with suspended sentence of four years imprisonment, was not a burglary offense under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) sufficient to render noncitizen deportable).

Lower Courts of Fifth Circuit

BURGLARY
Rios-Delgado v. United States, 117 F.Supp.2d 581 (W.D.Tex. Oct. 11, 2000) (California: trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object, at sentencing, that defendants prior conviction for commercial burglary was not an aggravated felony, for sentence enhancement purposes, under the soon-to-be-announced rule of United States v. Reyna-Espinosa, 117 F.3d 826 (5th Cir. July 11, 1997) (federal conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a noncitizen under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) does not constitute an "aggravated felony" for purposes of increasing the defendants offense level for illegal re-entry by 16 levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2), since it is not one of the five paragraphs of INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) that are expressly incorporated into that guideline, although, in dictum, the court said the conviction does constitute an aggravated felony for immigration purposes)).

Seventh Circuit

BURGLARY - AUTO - ATTEMPT
United States v. Martinez-Garcia, 268 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. Sept. 28, 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 1111 (2002) (Illinois conviction of burglary of vehicle with intent to commit theft constituted "attempt," under INA § 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U), to commit a "theft offense" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) for purposes of enhancing under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) an illegal re-entry sentence, since conduct admitted by defendant in plea was sufficient; since neither plea nor charging document encompassed an admission or charge that he completed act of taking property from vehicle, the offense was aggravated felony attempt).

BURGLARY - AUTO
Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. Mar. 10, 2000) (Illinois conviction of "burglary" of automobile, in violation of 720 ILCS § 5/19-1(a), was not an aggravated felony "burglary offense" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) that would trigger deportation).

Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " BURGLARY
United States v. Ramos-Medina, 682 F.3d 852, 857 (9th Cir. Jun. 21, 2012) (California conviction of burglary, under Penal Code 459, constituted a crime of violence under immigration laws, based on United States v. Becker, 919 F.2d 568 (9th Cir.1990), finding Penal Code 459 a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), and Lopez"Cardona v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2011), which establish that burglary under California Penal Code 459 is categorically a crime of violence and thus an aggravated felony for the purposes of the INA: "[e]very violation of 459 might not present that level of risk: but the proper inquiry for the categorical approach is whether the conduct covered by the crime presents the requisite risk of injury in the ordinary case. ).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " BURGLARY " BURGLARY
United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2011) (en banc) (California conviction of burglary, under Penal Code 459, does not qualify as a generic burglary conviction for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, even if the defendant pleaded guilty to entering a building unlawfully or a jury found the defendant guilty as charged in an indictment reciting that allegation, since the California definition of unlawful entry includes a licensed or privileged entry into a building with intent to commit a crime, where the generic definition of burglary requires that the entry itself be unlicensed or unprivileged).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " BURGLARY OF A DWELLING
Reina-Rodriguez v. United States, 645 F.3d 1129, 2011 WL 2465462 (9th Cir. Jun. 22, 2011) (Utah conviction of burglary of a dwelling, under UCA 76"6"202(2), did not constitute a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, because a non-building adapted for accommodation"e.g., a vehicle or boat" does not categorically qualify as a dwelling under the Guidelines); retroactively applying United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 851 n.5 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (overruling prior decisions to the extent that [they] suggest[ed] that state statutes satisfy [Taylor 's] categorical inquiry when they define burglary to include non-buildings adapted for overnight accommodation ....).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - BURGLARY
United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. Jun. 5, 2007) (en banc) (Oregon conviction of second-degree burglary, in violation of Or.Rev.Stat. 164.215(1), is not a categorical burglary for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), to apply a sentence enhancement requiring a minimum of 180 months in prison, because it encompasses burglary of non-buildings, and therefore falls outside the federal definition of generic burglary), overruling United States v. Cunningham, 911 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1990) (Oregon conviction of second-degree burglary is a categorical burglary under Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), for purposes of applying the Armed Career Criminal Act).

BURGLARY - UNLAWFUL ENTRY
United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 393 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. Jan. 5, 2005) (California: because defendants guilty plea to California residential burglary included the word "unlawfully," the conviction satisfied the unlawful entry requirement absent in Californias statutory definition of burglary under Penal Code § 459, and constituted aggravated felony for purposes of triggering enhancement of illegal re-entry sentence for "crime of violence" under Sentencing Guidelines).

BURGLARY
United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 2002) (California conviction of second-degree burglary, in violation of California Penal Code § 459, was an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), for purposes of imposition of a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) for illegal re-entry conviction, even though the state statute was far broader than the Taylor federal definition of burglary, since the charging paper and judgment established the elements of the federal definition).

BURGLARY - AUTO
Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. June 9, 2000) (California conviction of vehicle burglary in violation of California Penal Code § 459 did not constitute "burglary" within the federal aggravated felony definition, INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), nor "crime of violence" within INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for immigration purposes).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - BURGLARY - BURGLARY
United States v. Bonat, 106 F.3d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1997) (although language of Arizona burglary statute met generic definition of burglary for federal career criminal act sentence enhancement purposes, Arizona judicial decisions had expanded the definition to include a conviction in which the intent to commit the crime had been formed after entry of the structure, so the Arizona offense could be committed by shoplifting in a building, which does not satisfy the Taylor generic definition of burglary offense).

BURGLARY - UNLAWFUL ENTRY
United States v. Parker, 5 F.3d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 1993) (California Information charging burglary did not satisfy Taylor because of failure to allege "unlawful or unprivileged" entry).

Other

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