Second Circuit

FIREARMS TRAFFICKING - CONSPIRACY TO EXPORT WITHOUT LICENSE
Kuhali v. Reno, 266 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 2001) (federal conviction for conspiracy to export firearms without license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 22 U.S.C. 2778, constitutes an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(C), (U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(C), (U), for immigration purposes, since it necessarily exhibits a business or merchant nature, regardless of any nexus with commerce as an element of the offense or of a similar "match" between elements).

Third Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " FIREARMS AND DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES " ARSON " FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT
Bautista v. Atty Gen. of the U.S., 744 F.3d 54 (3d Cir. Feb. 28, 2014) (New York conviction of attempted arson in the third degree, in violation of Penal Law 110 and 150.10, did not categorically constitute a match for the elements of 18 U.S.C. 844(i), and is therefore not an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(E)(i), because the New York arson statute does not require the federal jurisdictional element that the object of the arson be used in interstate commerce, which the Supreme Court has found to be a critical and substantive element of that arson offense). The court reasoned as follows: We must assume that Congress was aware of the limits imposed by the Commerce Clause on the reach of the statutes it passes and that it restricted the breadth of 101(a)(43)(E) with the substantive constraints of the included jurisdictional elements in mind. See United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 279"80, 95 S.Ct. 2150, 45 L.Ed.2d 177 (1975) (comparing Congress's use of in commerce versus affected commerce to show that Congress is aware of its Commerce Clause power and the extent to which it asserts that power in drafting statutes). We cannot undermine the categorical approach and Congress's deliberate choice to include 844(i), rather than generic arson, in 101(a)(43)(E)(i). Further, were we to ignore the jurisdictional element in our categorical approach to 844(i), as the BIA has here, we would be characterizing a state conviction for arson of the intrastate house in Jones as an aggravated felony described in 844(i), when the Supreme Court clearly excised the arson of such intrastate objects from the scope of that federal statute. Id. at 64-66.

AGGRAVATED FELONY " FIREARMS AND DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES " ARSON " FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT
Bautista v. Atty Gen. of the U.S., 744 F.3d 54 (3d Cir. Feb. 28, 2014) (New York conviction of attempted arson in the third degree, in violation of Penal Law 110 and 150.10, did not categorically constitute a match for the elements of 18 U.S.C. 844(i), and is therefore not an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(E)(i), because the New York arson statute does not require the federal jurisdictional element that the object of the arson be used in interstate commerce, which the Supreme Court has found to be a critical and substantive element of that arson offense). The court reasoned as follows: We must assume that Congress was aware of the limits imposed by the Commerce Clause on the reach of the statutes it passes and that it restricted the breadth of 101(a)(43)(E) with the substantive constraints of the included jurisdictional elements in mind. See United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 279"80, 95 S.Ct. 2150, 45 L.Ed.2d 177 (1975) (comparing Congress's use of in commerce versus affected commerce to show that Congress is aware of its Commerce Clause power and the extent to which it asserts that power in drafting statutes). We cannot undermine the categorical approach and Congress's deliberate choice to include 844(i), rather than generic arson, in 101(a)(43)(E)(i). Further, were we to ignore the jurisdictional element in our categorical approach to 844(i), as the BIA has here, we would be characterizing a state conviction for arson of the intrastate house in Jones as an aggravated felony described in 844(i), when the Supreme Court clearly excised the arson of such intrastate objects from the scope of that federal statute. Id. at 64-66.

FIREARMS TRAFFICKING
Joseph v. Attorney General of U.S., ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2796256 (3d Cir. Oct. 2, 2006) (federal conviction of importing a firearm into a state, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3), does not constitute an "aggravated felony" of "illicit trafficking in firearms" under INA §§ 101(a)(43)(C) and 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(C), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), because § 922(a)(3) does not include a "trafficking element").

AGGRAVATED FELONY - FIREARMS TRAFFICKING - TRANSPORTATION ACROSS STATE LINES
Joseph v. United States Atty Gen., 465 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. Oct. 2, 2006) (federal conviction of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(3) and 924(a)(1)(D) [transporting firearm across state lines] is not an aggravated felony firearms trafficking offense under INA 101(a)(43)(C) for immigration purposes because the statute does not at a minimum require "trafficking" in firearms; the offense may be committed by bringing ones own firearm across state lines).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - FIREARMS TRAFFICKING - TRANSPORTATION ACROSS STATE LINES
Joseph v. United States Atty Gen., 465 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. Oct. 2, 2006) (federal conviction of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(3) and 924(a)(1)(D) [transporting firearm across state lines] is not an aggravated felony firearms trafficking offense under INA 101(a)(43)(C) for immigration purposes because the statute does not at a minimum require "trafficking" in firearms; the offense may be committed by bringing ones own firearm across state lines).

Seventh Circuit

FIREARMS TRAFFICKING
United States v. Gonzalez, 112 F.3d 1325, 1327 n.1 (7th Cir. May 6, 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 962 (1997) (federal conviction of illicit trafficking in firearms (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1), and 26 U.S.C. 5861(d) and (e), constituted an "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(C), for purposes of enhancing sentence for illegal re-entry).