Third Circuit

DECEIT - MISAPPLICATION OF BANK FUNDS
Valansi v. Ashcroft, 203 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2000) (federal conviction of misapplication of bank funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 656, is not categorically an offense involving "deceit" for purposes of INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i) (fraud or deceit)).

Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " 18 US.C. 16(b) " POSSESSION OF SHORT-BARRELED SHOTGUN
United States v. Reyes, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, ___, 2012 WL 5389697 (N.D.Cal., 2012) (conviction of possession of a short-barreled shotgun is not a crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 16(b), because [T]he risk of physical force central to the definition of a crime of violence under 16(b) is the risk of its use in the course of committing the offense"its use in completing the crime.); noting that United States v. Dunn, 946 F.2d 615, 620"21 (9th Cir.1991), has been effectively overruled by Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004); see Covarrubias"Teposte v. Holder, 632 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2011) (embracing the reasoning of Leocal in defining a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), the court held that a California conviction for shooting at an inhabited dwelling or vehicle under California Penal Code 246 was not categorically a crime of violence: In order to be a predicate offense under either 16 approach, the underlying offense must require proof of an intentional use of force or a substantial risk that force will be intentionally used during its commission.), citing United States v. Gomez"Leon, 545 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " 18 US.C. 16(b) " POSSESSION OF SHORT-BARRELED SHOTGUN
United States v. Reyes, 907 F.Supp.2d 1068 (N.D.Cal., 2012) (conviction of possession of a short-barreled shotgun is not a crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 16(b), because [T]he risk of physical force central to the definition of a crime of violence under 16(b) is the risk of its use in the course of committing the offense"its use in completing the crime.); noting that United States v. Dunn, 946 F.2d 615, 620"21 (9th Cir.1991), has been effectively overruled by Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004); see Covarrubias"Teposte v. Holder, 632 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2011) (embracing the reasoning of Leocal in defining a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), the court held that a California conviction for shooting at an inhabited dwelling or vehicle under California Penal Code 246 was not categorically a crime of violence: In order to be a predicate offense under either 16 approach, the underlying offense must require proof of an intentional use of force or a substantial risk that force will be intentionally used during its commission.), citing United States v. Gomez"Leon, 545 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).