The BIA previously held that a noncitizen convicted of causing a financial institution to fail to file currency transaction reports and of structuring currency transactions to evade reporting requirements[211] had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.[212]  The Ninth Circuit then reversed the BIA decision, finding that because the statute did not make intent to defraud the government an essential element of the offense, a person could be convicted under those statutes even if s/he were not aware that the conduct was illegal, and, even if the Supreme Court were to add the element of scienter to the offense, that construction would not of itself convert the crime into one of moral turpitude.[213]  The Board then reconsidered its Goldeshtein holding and found that, in the absence of any morally reprehensible conduct, convictions under 31 U.S.C. § § 5324(1) and (3) would not be considered CMTs.[214]

 

            The same offenses should also not constitute aggravated felonies, as fraud, deceit,[215] or theft,[216] for the same reasons.  See § § 7.80-7.82, 7.103, supra.

[211] 31 U.S.C. § § 5324(a)(1) and (3).

[212] Matter of Goldeshtein, 20 I. & N. Dec. 382 (BIA 1991).

[213] Goldeshtein v. INS, 8 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 114 S.Ct. 655, 661 (1994) (structuring transactions to avoid reporting requirements “is not inevitably nefarious”).  See also Smalley v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. Dec. 15, 2003)  (agreeing with Ninth Circuit in dictum that conviction of violating 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3), Financial Structuring, is not a crime involving moral turpitude).

[214] Matter of LVC, 22 I. & N. Dec. 594 (BIA 1999), overruling Matter of Goldeshtein, 20 I. & N. Dec. 382 (BIA 1991).

[215] INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).

[216] INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).

Other

SAFE HAVEN " STRUCTURE CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS " REASON TO BELIEVE ILLICIT TRAFFICKING GROUND OF INADMISSIBILITY
If the police reports and circumstances show that the person structured financial transactions knowing that she was aiding or colluding in trafficking, and the person cant controvert that she knew she was helping drug-trafficking, it could provide reason to believe illicit trafficking under INA 212(a)(2)(C)(i). There could be a relatively innocent reason for avoiding reporting requirements but it would have to be plausible enough to undermine the inference that she participated to knowingly assist drug trafficking. Counsel should examine the complete record of conviction. Counsel may be able to argue that a family member was only inadmissible as a family member under INA 212(a)(2)(C)(ii), which reaches people who reasonably should have known then that times out and the client is not permanently inadmissible. As far as other grounds go, look at Matter of L-V-C 19 I&N Dec. 594 (BIA 1999). Structuring financial transactions to evade reporting requirements should not be the aggravated felony of money laundering since that requires knowledge that the funds were the proceeds of specified unlawful activity whereas structuring does not. Knowingly failing to file or knowingly structuring to avoid reporting requirements is not the same as knowing that the money was the proceeds of specified criminal activity. Since the statute does not mention drugs or drug money specifically, it might be similar to accessory after the fact, discussed in Matter of Batista-Hernandez as not being not sufficiently related to a drug crime, and misprision of a felony, discussed in Matter of Velasco which did not incorporate the underlying drug crime. The crime of structuring itself is not an inchoate crime, but is separate and distinct and makes no reference to controlled substances. Thanks to Jonathan Moore.