Theft usually requires a permanent intent to deprive the owner of the benefit or use of the good.  Theft is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as "any of the following acts done with the intent to deprive the owner permanently of the possession, use or benefit of his property."[115]  In a consistent line of precedent decisions the BIA has held that in order for a theft conviction to constitute a crime of moral turpitude, it must involve the intent to permanently deprive a person of his or her property.[116] 

 

No intent to permanently deprive.  Offenses that do not involve intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property are NOT classified as theft crimes involving moral turpitude.[117]  Examples include:

 

Driving without consent of owner.

 

Matter of D, 1 I. & N. Dec. 143 (BIA 1941) (driving an automobile without the consent of the owner in violation of former California Vehicle Code § 503 is not a crime involving moral turpitude).

 

Joy riding is not a CMT, when no intent to deprive the owner permanently of the property is required as an essential element of the offense.

 

Matter of P, 2 I. & N. Dec. 887 (BIA 1947) (conviction of “joy-riding” in violation of Canada Criminal Code § 285(3) does not involve moral turpitude);

Matter of H, 2 I. & N. Dec. 864 (BIA 1947);

Matter of M, 2 I. & N. Dec. 686 (BIA 1946) (conviction of  “joy-riding” in violation of Canada Criminal Code § 285(3) does not involve moral turpitude because defendant did not intend to effect a permanent taking), citing Matter of C, 56172/434 (Oct. 14, 1944).

 

Divisible Statutes.  Where a theft statute prohibits both temporary and permanent taking, the statute is considered divisible, allowing the conviction record to be examined in order to determine whether the conviction was under the portion of the statute relating to permanent taking, and therefore involved moral turpitude, or under the portion of the statute prohibiting temporary taking, in which case it did not.[118]  See Chapter 7, supra.

 

In Matter of N,[119] however, the BIA held theft under Canadian law involves moral turpitude if the taking was permanent, and that it could go behind the record of conviction for the purpose of discovering whether or not the taking was a permanent one, but for that purpose and to that extent only.  Where the noncitizen, employed as a servant at the age of 17, stole articles of clothing from his employer and sold them for $150, the taking was a permanent taking, since the fact that he sold the goods for a substantial sum of money was consonant only with an intent to deprive the rightful owner of the property permanently.  This decision is inconsistent with the modern categorical analysis.

 

Likewise, in Matter of Jurado-Delgado,[120] the BIA found that a Pennsylvania conviction of retail theft, in violation of title 18, § 3929(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, was a crime involving moral turpitude, even though there was no element requiring specific intent permanently to deprive the owner of the property.  The BIA found it reasonable to assume that the taking was with the intent to retain the merchandise permanently, since the elements of the conviction require taking merchandise offered for sale by a store without paying for it and with the intention of depriving the owner of the goods.  This decision also goes against the well-established minimum conduct analysis,[121] and involves in impermissible inference,[122] and should not be followed.

 

Intent to permanently deprive.  All sorts of theft offenses that require as an essential element the intent permanently to deprive the owner of his or her property have consistently been held to involve moral turpitude.[123]

 

Okoro v. INS, 125 F.3d 920 (5th Cir. 1997) (conviction of theft under 11 Del.Code § 841 constituted crime involving moral turpitude);

Gutierrez-Chavez v. INS, 8 F.3d 26 (9th Cir. 1993) (Table) (Alaska conviction for second-degree theft by recklessness under Alaska Stat. § § 11.46.130(a), 11.46.190(a) is a crime of moral turpitude, since state courts have interpreted the statute to contain both an element of guilty knowledge and an implied element of intent to deprive the owner of property which has been stolen);

Farrell-Murray v. INS, 992 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1993) (Table) (theft involves moral turpitude);

United States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 985 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1993) (theft constitutes a crime of moral turpitude);

United States v. Villa-Fabela, 882 F.2d 434, 440 (9th Cir. 1989);

Soetarto v. INS, 516 F.2d 778, 780 (7th Cir. 1975);

Brett v. INS, 386 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. den., 392 U.S. 935, 20 L.Ed.2d 1394, 88 S.Ct. 2304 (1968);

Orlando v. Robinson, 262 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. den., 359 U.S. 980, 79 S.Ct. 898, 3 L.Ed.2d 929 (1959) (larceny of Christmas packages worth five dollars from an automobile was a crime involving moral turpitude);

Gubbels v. Hoy, 261 F.2d 952 (9th Cir. 1958);

Ventura v. Shaughnessy, 219 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1955) (Portuguese theft conviction);

United States v. Cunha, 209 F.2d 326 (1st Cir. 1954) (Massachusetts conviction of attempted larceny of automobile constituted a crime involving moral turpitude).

United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Savoretti, 200 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1952);

Bufalino v. Irvine, 103 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1939);

Perkins v. United States, 99 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1938);

United States ex rel. Rizzio v Kenney, 50 F.2d 418 (D.Conn. 1931) (court stated theft always involves moral turpitude, except in unusual circumstances);

United States ex rel. Shladzien v. Warden of Eastern State Penitentiary, 45 F.2d 204 (D.Pa. 1930);

Gomes v. Tillinghast, 37 F.2d 935 (D.Mass. 1930);

United States ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1929), cert. den., 279 U.S. 868, 73 L.Ed. 1005, 49 S.Ct. 482 (1929); 

United States v. Qadeer, 953 F.Supp. 1570 (S.D.Ga. 1997) (stealing cellular phone air time for purposes of relaying telephone calls to foreign countries in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(5) involved moral turpitude, since it was a fraud offense);

United States v. Concepcion, 795 F.Supp. 1262 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (theft of United States government funds was a crime of “moral turpitude”);

Tahir v. Lehmann, 171 F.Supp. 589 (D.Ohio 1958), aff’d, 264 F.2d 892 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. den., 361 U.S. 876, 4 L.Ed.2d 114, 80 S.Ct. 139 (1959);

Gubbels v. Del Guercio, 152 F.Supp. 277 (S.D.Cal. 1957), rev’d on other grounds,

United States ex rel. Teper v. Miller, 87 F.Supp. 285, 286-287 (D.N.Y. 1949) (English conviction of stealing, in violation of the Larceny Act of 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. V., c. 50, which requires as an essential element the criminal intent to permanently deprive another of property of value, held a crime involving moral turpitude);

United States ex rel. Chartrand v. Karnuth, 31 F.Supp 799 (D.N.Y. 1940) (Canadian conviction of theft of $12 shoes);

United States ex rel. Fracassi v. Karnuth, 19 F.Supp. 581 (D.N.Y. 1937);

United States ex rel. Amato v Commissioner of Immigration, 18 F.Supp. 480 (D.N.Y. 1937);

United States ex rel. Patricola v. Karnuth, 9 F.Supp. 961 (D.N.Y. 1935);

United States ex rel. Valenti v. Karmuth, 1 F.Supp. 370 (D.N.Y. 1932);

Matter of De La Nues, 18 I. & N. Dec. 140 (BIA 1981);

Matter of Grazley, 14 I. & N. Dec. 330 (BIA 1973) (where cash was the object of theft, conviction of “theft” in violation of Canada Criminal Code § 283, is conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, even though the section penalizes temporary as well as permanent takings);

Matter of Moore, 13 I. & N. Dec. 711 (BIA 1971);

Matter of Chouinard 11 I. & N. Dec. 839 (BIA 1966);

Matter of Romandia-Herreros 11 I. & N. Dec. 772 (BIA 1966);

Matter of Chen, 10 I. & N. Dec. 671 (BIA 1964) (California conviction of grand theft);

Matter of Medina-Lopez, 10 I. & N. Dec. 7 (BIA 1962) (crimes of “robo” (theft of five dollars from the person) coupled with “lesiones” (assault) in violation of Articles 288 and 367 of the Penal Code of Mexico, arising as they do out of a single scheme of conduct, constitute the equivalent of robbery as defined in the District of Columbia Code, and were crimes involving moral turpitude because a permanent taking of the property of another was involved);

Matter of S, 5 I. & N. Dec. 552 (BIA 1953) (conviction for theft under Articles 379 and 401 of the Penal Code of France is a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude committed prior to entry, for exclusion purposes, it being assumed that the respondent intended to permanently deprive the owner of his property, even if the offense includes temporary as well as permanent takings, since the record of conviction gives no indication that there was a temporary taking);

Matter of G, 5 I. & N. Dec. 129 (BIA 1953) (crime of theft committed in Italy is an offense involving moral turpitude);

Matter of GT, 4 I. & N. Dec. 446 (BIA 1951) (conviction of theft by bailee in violation of Article 1429, Vernon’s Annotated Penal Code of Texas, is an offense involving moral turpitude, since the criminal intent to deprive the owner of his property is an essential element of the crime);

Matter of N, 3 I. & N. Dec. 723 (BIA 1949) (conviction of theft as a servant in Canada involved a permanent “taking,” and so was deemed to involve moral turpitude);

Matter of T, 3 I. & N. Dec. 641 (BIA 1949) (English conviction of “stealing” a fur in violation of the Larceny Act of 1916 involves a criminal intent to permanently deprive another of property or something of value, and therefore involves moral turpitude), citing United States ex rel. Rizzio v. Kinney, 50 F.2d 418 (D.Conn. 1931);

Matter of W, 2 I. & N. Dec. 795 (BIA 1947) (conviction of theft in violation of Canada Criminal Code § 347 involves moral turpitude where evidence shows a “permanent taking” was intended);

Matter of M, 2 I. & N. Dec. 686 (BIA 1946) (conviction of stealing from the person in violation of Canada Criminal Code § 379 does involve moral turpitude, the intent to deprive the rightful owner of his property permanently being indicated);

Matter of F, 2 I. & N. Dec. 517 (BIA 1946) (conviction of theft in violation of Canada Criminal Code § 386 involves moral turpitude where the evidence shows a “permanent taking” was intended);

Matter of T, 2 I. & N. Dec. 22 (BIA, AG 1944) (“Theft or stealing” under Canadian statute includes offenses which would not be so characterized under United States law, since it precludes temporary as well as permanent taking, so the BIA may go beyond the foreign statute and to consider such facts as may appear from the record of conviction or the admissions of the noncitizen, in order to determine by independent judgment whether, under United States law, the offense of conviction involves moral turpitude);

Matter of W, 1 I. & N. Dec. 485 (BIA 1943) (conviction by court martial for stealing the property of another soldier in violation of the Army Act of the Dominion of Canada is conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude).

 

Cf. Chiaramonte v. INS, 626 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1980) (foreign crimes of theft of olives, however they may be technically translated into domestic penal provisions, are presumed to involve moral turpitude);

Matter of Afzal, File No. A73-042-981 (BIA June 12, 2000), reported in 77 Interpreter Releases 942 (July 17, 2000) (placing international phone calls using electronically stored account information to which the noncitizen did not have authorized access was not a crime involving moral turpitude where the statute did not require a permanent taking or fraud);

Matter of F, 7 I. & N. Dec. 386 (BIA 1957) (larcenous taking of letter from U.S. mail);

Matter of T, 2 I. & N. Dec. 22 (BIA, AG 1944) (court examined record of conviction for Canadian conviction where intent to deprive the owner permanently of the property was not clear).

 

Grand theft is held to be CMT. 

 

Rashtabadi v. INS, 23 F.3d 1562 (9th Cir. 1994) (grand theft, under California Penal Code § 487(1) (West 1988), is a crime of moral turpitude), citing Matter of Chen, 10 I. & N. Dec. 671, 672 (BIA 1964);

Nwobu v. INS, 907 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1990) (Table) (California conviction of grand theft is a crime involving moral turpitude), citing United States v. Villa-Fabela, 882 F.2d 434, 440 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Proa-Tovar, 975 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1992);

Silva v. Carter, 326 F.2d 315, 317 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. den., 377 U.S. 917 (1964);

Chiaramonte v. INS, 626 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1980) (Italian conviction for stealing 27 kilograms of olives);

Giammario v. Hurney, 311 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1962) (Australian conviction of larceny, grand or petit, involves moral turpitude, regardless of sentence imposed);

Blumen v. Haff, 78 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1935), cert. den. 296 U.S. 644, 80 L.Ed. 458, 56 S.Ct. 248 (1935);

United States ex rel. Meyer v. Day, 54 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1931) (attempted grand larceny in the second degree was held to involve moral turpitude, since attempt requires specific intent to commit the underlying offense);

Parenti v. Martineau, 50 F.2d 902 (D.Conn. 1930).

 

Possible exception based on insignificance of the offense.  It has sometimes been suggested that extremely minor thefts or ones committed under extenuating circumstances might not involve moral turpitude.  These cases provide some support for the argument that a theft statute punishing de minimis theft should not be a CMT unless the record of conviction shows a theft of significant value.

 

Diaz v. Haig, 594 F.Supp. 1 (D.Wyo. 1981) (theft of food by hungry child or theft of garments by ill-clothed child does not constitute crime of “moral turpitude”);

Quilodran-Brau v. Holland, 232 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1956) (court expressly did not decide whether there might be exception in extreme case);

United States ex rel. Rizzio v. Kenney, 50 F.2d 418 (D.Conn. 1931) (court stated theft always involves moral turpitude, except in unusual circumstances).

 

            As a general matter, however, petty theft has been found to be CMT, irrespective of the lack of gravity of the offense.

 

Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955) (petty theft of a dozen golf balls held CMT on principle);

Brett v. INS, 386 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. den., 392 U.S. 935, 88 S.Ct. 2304, 20 L.Ed.2d 1394 (1968) (petty larceny involved moral turpitude);

Morasch v. INS, 363 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1966);

Khalaf v. INS, 361 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1966) (two Jordan convictions for minor thefts committed before sixteenth birthday held CMT);

Wyngaard v. Kennedy, 295 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. den., 368 U.S. 926 (1961);

Orlando v. Robinson, 262 F.2d 850, 851 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. den., 359 U.S. 980, 3 L.Ed.2d 929, 79 S.Ct. 898 (1959) (larceny of sealed Christmas package that, when opened, proved worth only five dollars held CMT);

Quilodran-Brau v. Holland, 232 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1956) (court expressly did not decide whether there might be exception in extreme case);

Pino v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1954), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Wilson v. Carr, 41 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1930);

Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1929) (noncitizen convicted of stealing $15 and sentenced to confinement for one year was deportable, even though Massachusetts law classified the offense as a “misdemeanor”);

United States v. Samaei, 260 F.Supp.2d 1223 (M.D.Fla. May 5, 2003) (Florida conviction of petit theft under Florida Stat. § 812.014 is a crime involving moral turpitude for immigration purposes);

DeLuca v. Ashcroft, 203 F.Supp.2d 1276 (M.D.Ala. May 16, 2002) (Alabama conviction of theft in the second degree, in violation of Alabama Code § 13A-8-4, is a crime involving moral turpitude for immigration purposes);

Henry v. Ashcroft, 175 F.Supp.2d 688 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (petty larceny held to be a crime involving moral turpitude);

United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F.Supp.2d 1084 (S.D.Cal. 1998), aff’d, 193 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. den., 531 U.S. 842, 121 S.Ct. 107, 148 L.Ed.2d 64 (2000) (petty theft in violation of California Penal Code § 484 constitutes a crime of moral turpitude).  But see United States v. Rodrigues, 68 F.Supp.2d 178 (E.D.N.Y. 1999);

Zgodda v. Holland, 184 F.Supp. 847 (E.D.Pa. 1960) (German conviction as a young girl in 1944, of simple larceny for stealing a small sum of money and a few articles of clothing, apparently motivated by privation, at a time when that city was under severe air attack and the population lived largely underground, held CMT, even though the conviction was expunged from the records under German law in 1954);

Matter of Grazley, 14 I. & N. Dec. 330 (BIA 1973) (Canadian petty theft conviction, where intent to permanently deprive was shown);

Matter of Garcia, 11 I. & N. Dec. 521 (BIA 1966) (BIA precluded from going beyond record of conviction to consider mitigating circumstances). 

 

The failure of the courts to differentiate between grand and petty larceny has been criticized. See dissenting opinion in Tillinghast, supra; Tutrone v. Shaughnessy, 160 F.Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).  An effort to support such a distinction was made by petitioner in the Pino case, supra, in the Supreme Court, but was not reached by the Court in its decision.  See petitioner’s brief in Pino v. Landon, No. 333, Oct. 1954 Term, U.S. Supreme Court.

 

            Crimes of deception also involve moral turpitude. 

 

Rukavina v. INS, 303 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1962) (Illinois conviction in 1933 for obtaining money by means of a confidence game, was a crime involving moral turpitude, even if the decision was required to be based on the accepted moral standards of 1933), distinguished by Kelch v. Kennedy, 209 F.Supp. 416 (D.Md. 1962);

Bermann v. Reimer, 123 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1941) (obtaining goods by false representations);

Mercer v. Lence, 96 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1938), cert. den., 305 U.S. 611, 83 L.Ed. 388, 59 S.Ct. 69 (1938) (conspiracy to defraud by deceit and falsehood);

Ponzi v. Ward, 7 F.Supp. 736 (D.Mass. 1934) (unlawful use of mail);

Matter of M, 9 I. & N. Dec. 132  (BIA 1960) (Italian conviction of swindling, where record showed that noncitizen was an accomplice in a fraudulent undertaking with the intent of cashing money orders).

 

Theft by false pretenses.

 

Offenses involving swindling, obtaining money or property under false pretenses, and “confidence games,” have without exception been held to be crimes involving moral turpitude. 

 

Squires v. INS, 689 F.2d 1276, 1278, N. 1 (6th Cir. 1982) (Canadian conviction of theft by false pretenses necessarily involves fraud);

Ramirez v. United States INS, 134 App. D.C. 131, 413 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. den., 396 U.S. 929, 24 L.Ed.2d 226, 90 S.Ct. 267 (1969) (conviction of “false pretenses with intent to defraud,” in violation of 22 D.C. Code § 1301, was a crime involving moral turpitude);

Matter of Grazley, 14 I. & N. Dec. 330 (BIA 1973) (conviction of “false pretence” in violation of Canada Criminal Code § § 319, or 320, was a crime involving moral turpitude);

Matter of Kinney, 10 I. & N. Dec. 548 (BIA 1964) (conviction of obtaining goods under false pretenses in violation of § 8698, General Statutes of Connecticut, 1949 Revision (C.G.S.A. § 53-362), is not a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, because intent to defraud was not an element);

Matter of M, 9 I. & N. Dec. 132 (BIA 1960) (Italian conviction of swindling in violation of § 413 of the Italian Criminal Code of 1889 and § 640 of the Criminal Code of 1930 involves moral turpitude);

Matter of B, 6 I. & N. Dec. 702 (BIA 1955) (conviction under second portion of 18 U.S.C. § 912, held to be a divisible statute, of obtaining money by falsely pretending to be government officer, since this offense requires fraud as an element).

 

Where a conviction under a statute prohibiting stealing invariably involved moral turpitude, the court was not permitted to examine the record of conviction to determine it did not involve CMT. 

 

Matter of Batten, 11 I. & N. Dec. 271 (BIA 1965) (embezzlement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 656);

Matter of T, 3 I. & N. Dec. 641 (BIA 1949).

 

            Cf. Matter of T, 2 I. & N. Dec. 22 (BIA, AG 1944) (theft in Canada considered a divisible crime). 

See Matter of J, 2 I. & N. Dec. 503 (BIA 1946) (theft coupled with breaking and entering held to create presumption, in absence of contrary evidence, that crime related to permanent taking).

 

Theft, shoplifting.

 

Matter of Jurado-Delgado, 24 I. & N. Dec. 29 (BIA Sept. 28, 2006) (Pennsylvania conviction of retail theft in violation of title 18, § 3929(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, is a crime involving moral turpitude, even though there is no element requiring specific intent permanently to deprive the owner of the property, because the BIA found it reasonable to assume that the taking is with the intent to retain the merchandise permanently where the elements of the conviction require taking merchandise offered for sale by a store without paying for it and with the intention of depriving the owner of the goods);

Smirko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. Oct. 26, 2004) (shoplifting under 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 3929(a) is a crime involving moral turpitude);

Da Rosa Silva v. INS, 263 F.Supp.2d 1005 (E.D.Pa. May 8, 2003) (New Jersey conviction of shoplifting in violation of New Jersey Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-11(b)(1) is a crime of moral turpitude as a larceny offense for immigration purposes);

Hing Cheung Wong v. INS, 980 F.2d 721 (1st Cir. 1992) (Table) (shoplifting considered a crime of moral turpitude) (dictum).

 

Theft, attempt.

 

Quilodran-Brau v. Holland, 232 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1956) (conviction of theft of government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 82, involved moral turpitude regardless of the value of the stolen property);

Matter of FG, 4 I. & N. Dec. 717 (BIA 1952) (Cuban conviction of crime of frustrated theft – theft in which the defendant is apprehended before escape – is an offense involving moral turpitude).

 

Larceny.

 

Laryea v. United States, 300 F.Supp.2d 404 (E.D.Va. Jan. 28, 2004) (Virginia conviction of petit larceny was a crime of moral turpitude for immigration purposes);

Zgodda v. Holland, 184 F.Supp. 847, 850 (D.Pa. 1960) (larceny is a crime involving moral turpitude, regardless of extenuating circumstances);

Matter of Westman, 17 I. & N. Dec. 50 (BIA 1979) (conviction of larceny by trick with “intent to deprive or defraud” in violation of RCW 9.54.010 constitutes a CMT);

Matter of G, 4 I. & N. Dec. 548 (BIA 1951) (conviction of larceny in Sydney, New South Wales, Australia, in violation of § 116 of the Crimes Act of 1900 for New South Wales, Australia; the Larceny Act of 1916 (6 and 7 Geo. V., c. 50) in effect in all Australia, involves moral turpitude, since a general intent to deprive the owner of the enjoyment of his property permanently is required by the statute);

Matter of P, 4 I. & N. Dec. 252 (BIA 1951) (violation of Michigan Penal Code § 28.592, larceny from dwelling house, store, factory, ship, or other building, held crime involving moral turpitude);

Matter of M, 2 I. & N. Dec. 530 (BIA 1946) (conviction of the crime of larceny under § 53 of Chapter 272 of the General Laws of Massachusetts involves moral turpitude), citing Lane ex rel Cronin v. Tillinghast, 38 F.2d 231 (1st Cir. 1930).

 

Fare evasion is generally NOT a CMT.

 

United States ex rel. Fontan v. Uhl, 16 F.Supp. 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) (holding that the offense, under French law, of not having paid one’s ship passage does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude, even though designated as a “robbery”);

Matter of G, 2 I. & N. Dec. 235 (BIA 1945) (New York conviction of violating New York Penal Law § 1293(c), for operating a subway turnstile with a metal disc instead of a nickel, was not a crime involving moral turpitude, since criminal intent and the element of fraud were not ingredients of the offense).

 

But cf. Santos-Gonzalez v. Reno, 93 F.Supp.2d 286, 288 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“turnstile jumping” is a crime of moral turpitude and can subject a noncitizen to deportation) (dictum), citing Mojica v. Reno, 970 F.Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).

 

            Other Examples.

 

Hashish v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. Mar. 24, 2006) (Illinois conviction of theft, i.e., knowingly obtaining or exerting unauthorized control over the property of another, in violation of 720 ILCS § 5/16-1(A)(1), constituted theft under categorical analysis, since it required the knowing exertion of authority or control over the property of another, with intent to permanently deprive, and was therefore a crime of moral turpitude for purposes of barring eligibility for cancellation of removal for non-LPR). 

First Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " LARCENY
Patel v. Holder, 707 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. Feb. 1, 2013) (Connecticut conviction of fourth degree larceny under Conn. Gen.Stat. 53a"125, is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude because the offense may be committed without intent to permanently deprive).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " LARCENY
Patel v. Holder, 707 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. Feb. 1, 2013) (Connecticut conviction of fourth degree larceny under Conn. Gen.Stat. 53a"125, is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude because the offense may be committed without intent to permanently deprive).

Ninth Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " UNAUTHORIZED DRIVING A VEHICLE
Almanza-Arenas v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 2014) (California conviction of violating Vehicle Code 10851(a), a statute that criminalizes both conduct that would constitute a crime of moral turpitude " taking a vehicle with intent permanently to deprive the owner, and conduct that does not amount to a crime of moral turpitude " taking with intent temporarily to deprive the owner " was not categorically a crime of moral turpitude and does not render respondent ineligible for non-LPR cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b) in the context of removal proceedings for inadmissibility); see Castillo-Cruz v. Holder, 581 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2009) (a theft offense is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude if the statute of conviction is broad enough to criminalize a taking with intent to deprive the owner of his property only temporarily.).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " IDENTITY THEFT
Ibarra-Hernandez v. Holder, 770 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2014) (Arizona conviction of identity theft, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes 13-2008(A), is a crime involving moral turpitude, under the modified categorical analysis, since the statute is divisible and the record shows that petitioner stole a real person's identity without their consent for the purpose of obtaining employment, which is inherently fraudulent and involves moral turpitude).

Tenth Circuit

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE " THEFT " RETURN OF PROPERTY
Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. Nov. 14, 2017) (conviction under Westminster, Colo., Municipal Code 6-3-1(A) did not categorically qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude because the statute was divisible, since one portion of the statute " demanding consideration for return of property " did not involve a permanent taking; because it was unclear from the record of conviction whether he committed a CIMT, he did not sustain his burden to prove eligibility for cancellation of removal). NOTE: The court found that Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I. & N. Dec. 847, 849-52 (BIA 2016), expanding what constitutes CMT theft, was prospective only.