Crimes of Moral Turpitude

Involuntary manslaughter has generally been found not to involve moral turpitude because it is committed without contemplating death, without malice, and without intent, usually while engaged in a lawful act, through carelessness or the absence of due caution or circumspection. [56]  This is an example of the generala rule that an offense that may be committed with mere negligence is not a CMT.  See § 8.13, supra.

Tutrone v. Shaughnessy, 160 F.Supp. 433 (D.N.Y. 1958) (New York conviction of second-degree manslaughter conceded not to be CMT);

Vidal y Planas v. Landon, 104 F.Supp. 384 (D. Cal. 1952) (Spanish homicide conviction was held not to involve CMT where the judgment established the crime was committed in self-defense, the acts committed by the deceased were sufficient to produce in the accused a “blind rage,” by virtue of which the Spanish law allowed the court to impose the minimum penalty, and the court had held the defendant guilty of “a crime of homicide, with a mitigating circumstance.”  The Solicitor of the United States Department of Justice, in listing crimes involving moral turpitude for the information of immigration officers, had specifically excepted from the list those offenses which were “the outcome merely of natural passion, of animal spirits, of infirmity of temper, of weakness of character, or of mistaken principles, unaccompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind.”);

Matter of Schiano Di Cola, 7 F.Supp. 194 (D.R.I. 1934) (involuntary manslaughter through negligent or reckless operation of an automobile did not involve moral turpitude);

United States ex rel. Mongiovi v Karnuth, 30 F.2d 825 (D.N.Y. 1929)  (second-degree manslaughter held not to involve moral turpitude where the noncitizen’s daughter was shot to death by the accidental discharge of a pistol over which he and his wife struggled during a quarrel);

Matter of Szegedi, 10 I. & N. Dec. 28 (BIA 1962) (Wisconsin conviction of reckless homicide found not to involve turpitude where the killing occurred during a quarrel in which the deceased tried to hit the noncitizen with a gun, and the gun was not in the noncitizen’s hand at the time it went off during the ensuing scuffle.  The BIA pointed out that the offense of homicide by reckless conduct did not contain the element of “depraved mind” present in the second-degree murder statute, and the noncitizen had been found not to have had a specific intent to kill or to do any act the natural consequences of which could cause death).

            Where there is a heightened intent, however, usually that of criminal recklessness,[57] involuntary manslaughter has been considered CMT.[58]

Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1995) (conviction for involuntary manslaughter, pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes § § 562.016(4) and 565.024(1), was a crime of moral turpitude, where Missouri law requires that the convicted person must have consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk, which constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation).

But see Matter of N, 1 I. & N. Dec. 181 (BIA 1941) (involuntary manslaughter in violation of § 4586 of the Arizona Code is not a crime involving moral turpitude).

            Vehicular manslaughter will not be held to involve moral turpitude, if the mental state required is negligence, even if it factually appears the defendant acted recklessly.[59]

[56] 9 U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) § 40.21(a) N.2.3-3(a)(10)(b) (“a conviction for the statutory offense of vehicular homicide or other involuntary manslaughter which only requires a showing of negligence will not involve moral turpitude even if it appears the defendant in fact acted recklessly”).

[57] See § 8.15, supra.

[58] 9 U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) § 40.21(a) N.2.3-3(b)(6) (involuntary manslaughter not CMT “when killing is not the result of recklessness”).

[59] 9 U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) § 40.21(a) N.2.3-3(a)(10)(b)(“A conviction for the statutory offense of vehicular homicide or other involuntary manslaughter which only requires a showing of negligence will not involve moral turpitude even if it appears the defendant in fact acted recklessly.”).