Crimes of Moral Turpitude

Disorderly conduct may involve moral turpitude when the record of conviction shows that lewd or lascivious acts were committed. 

Wyngaard v. Kennedy, 295 F.2d 184, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (per curiam), cert. den., 368 U.S. 926, 82 S.Ct. 362, 7 L.Ed.2d 190 (1961) (disorderly conduct, in violation of New York Penal Law § 722(8), was a crime involving moral turpitude), citing Babouris v. Esperdy, 269 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. den., 362 U.S. 913 (1960);

United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956);

Hudson v. Esperdy, 290 F.2d 879 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. den., 368 U.S. 918, 82 S.Ct. 240, 7 L.Ed.2d 134 (1961) (New York conviction under disorderly conduct statute prohibiting loitering about public place soliciting men for purpose of committing crime against nature or other lewdness held to be crime of moral turpitude);

Babouris v. Esperdy, 269 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. den., 362 U.S. 913 (1960) (disorderly conduct in violation of New York Penal Law § 722(8), prohibiting loitering in any public place soliciting men for the purpose of committing a crime against nature or other lewdness, constituted a crime involving moral turpitude, even if, under New York law, a violation of the statute involved was deemed an offense, rather than a crime);

Matter of Alfonso-Bermudez, 12 I. & N. Dec. 225 (BIA 1967) (conviction of disorderly conduct in violation of California Penal Code § 647(a), soliciting of a person or persons to engage in, and engaging in lewd and dissolute conduct in a public place, referring to overt and public homosexual activity, is a crime involving moral turpitude), distinguishing Matter of GR, 5 I. & N. Dec. 18 (BIA 1952), citing United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956);

Babouris v. Esperdy, 269 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. den., 362 U.S. 913 (1960);

Matter of G, 7 I. & N. Dec. 520 (BIA 1957) (conviction for disorderly conduct under New York Penal Law § 722(8) (loitering about a public place soliciting men for the purpose of committing a crime against nature) is a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, despite the fact that New York courts have defined such violations as “offenses”), citing United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956) (lying about a conviction of this offense was material since offense involved moral turpitude);

Matter of FR, 6 I. & N. Dec. 813 (BIA 1955) (conviction of a violation of New York Penal Law § 722(8), disorderly conduct by frequenting or loitering about any public place soliciting men for the purpose of committing a crime against nature or other lewdness, not considered crime of moral turpitude), citing Matter of GR, 5 I. & N. Dec. 18 (BIA 1953).

See also United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956). 

Conversely, moral turpitude is NOT present in such cases where an evil intent is not necessarily involved.

Lewis v. Frick, 189 F. 146 (D.Mich. 1911), rev’d on other grounds, 195 F. 693 (6th Cir. 1911), aff’d, 233 U.S. 291, 58 L.Ed. 967, 34 S.Ct. 488 (1914) (“disorderly conduct” held not CMT where it was apparently not a sexual offense but was a reduced charge to which the noncitizen pleaded guilty and was fined $10 after having been arrested on the charge of housebreaking);

Matter of Mueller, 11 I. & N. Dec. 268 (BIA 1965) (Wisconsin conviction of indecent exposure); 

Matter of H, 7 I. & N. Dec. 301 (BIA 1956) (indecent exposure);

Matter of S, 5 I. & N. Dec. 576 (BIA 1953) (gross indecency);

Matter of Z, 2 I. & N. Dec. 316 (BIA 1945) (gross indecency held not CMT where an evil intent is not an essential element of the offense);

Matter of P, 2 I. & N. Dec. 117 (BIA 1944) (contributing to the delinquency of a minor).

Riot has been held NOT to be a crime involving moral turpitude.[76]

Matter of O, 4 I. & N. Dec. 301 (BIA 1951) (conviction of participation in riot in violation of § 115 of the German Criminal Code, accompanied by an assault of an official in the lawful exercise of his office in violation of § 113 of such code, does not involve moral turpitude, because knowledge that the person assaulted was a police officer is not necessarily an element of the offense).

[76] 9 U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) § 40.21(a) N.2.3-3(b)(10).