Reckless driving.

 

Matter of C, 2 I. & N. Dec. 716 (BIA 1946) (conviction of reckless driving does not involve moral turpitude) (dictum).

 

False driver’s license, possession.

 

Montero-Ubri v. INS, 229 F.3d 319 (1st Cir. 2000) (Massachusetts offense of possession of a false driver’s license, in violation of Mass.Gen.Laws, c. 90 § 24B, does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude).

 

Driving without consent of owner.

 

Matter of D, 1 I. & N. Dec. 143 (BIA 1941) (driving an automobile without the consent of the owner in violation of former California Vehicle Code § 503 is not a crime involving moral turpitude).

 

            Hit and run.  While the Fifth Circuit has found that the Texas offense of failing to stop and render aid to an injured person was a CMT[179] this arguably should not be the case where the statute of conviction is violated merely by failing to stop to give identifying information, rather than aiding the injured, or if the statute applies even where there is only damage to property, rather than personal injury.  The Ninth Circuit held that a conviction of leaving the scene of an accident, even one resulting in bodily injury or death, without leaving identifying information, was not a CMT, because the minimum conduct punishable under the California statute was merely failing to provide certain types of information, even where there was no injury to persons.[180] 

 

Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2008) (California conviction of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in bodily injury or death, in violation of Vehicle Code § 20001(a) is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of deportation for two or more CMTs, under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii));

Garcia-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. Jun. 29, 2007) (Texas conviction of failure to stop and render aid under Texas Transportation Code § 550.021 is a CMT for immigration purposes; “subsection of section 550.21 that criminalizes failure to render aid proscribes behavior that runs contrary to accepted societal duties.”)  NOTE: The statute of conviction does not require any intent. The court seems to imply a knowledge element, but does not cite any statutory language or cases that require knowledge.

Cf., Tate v. State Bar of Texas, 920 S.W.2d 727 (Ct.App.- Houston 1996) (failure to stop and/or provide information and/or render aid, in violation of Tex. Trans. Code § 550.021 does not “per se” involve moral turpitude for disbarment purposes).

 

Joy riding is NOT held to be a crime involving moral turpitude, when no intent to deprive the owner permanently of the property was required as an essential element of the offense.

 

Matter of P, 2 I. & N. Dec. 887 (BIA 1947) (conviction of “joy-riding” in violation of Canada Criminal Code § 285(3) does not involve moral turpitude);

Matter of H, 2 I. & N. Dec. 864 (BIA 1947);

Matter of M, 2 I. & N. Dec. 686 (BIA 1946) (conviction of  “joy-riding” in violation of Canada Criminal Code § 285(3) does not involve moral turpitude), citing Matter of C, 56172/434 (Oct. 14, 1944).

[179] Garcia-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. Jun. 29, 2007).

[180] Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2008).

Ninth Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " HIT AND RUN
Conejo Bravo v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. Nov.17, 2017) (California conviction of hit and run, under Vehicle Code 20001(a), is under a divisible statute; the record established that noncitizen failed to render aid, which is a crime of moral turpitude); see Garcia-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 284, 290 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that Texas hit and run law qualifies as a CIMT, as "the failure to stop and render aid after being involved in an automobile accident is the type of base behavior that reflects moral turpitude").

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE - DRIVING OFFENSES - HIT AND RUN
Latu v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. Nov. 3, 2008) (Hawaii conviction for hit & run, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statute 291C-12.5, is not a crime of moral turpitude), following Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2008).

Eleventh Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE - CRIMINAL RECKLESS CONDUCT
Keungne v. U.S. Attorney General, ___ F.3d ___ (11th Cir. Mar. 10, 2009) (Georgia conviction of criminal reckless conduct, under Ga. Code Ann. 16-5-60(b) ["causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation"], constitutes a crime of moral turpitude for purposes of establishing deportability, pursuant to INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), for one conviction of a CMT within five years of admission, because the minimum conduct for which conviction can be had requires conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm or death to another).
NOTE: This is a bad decision, since it did not consider that not all reckless conduct necessarily involves moral turpitude.