Convictions for violation of regulatory statutes generally are not considered to involve moral turpitude because there is nothing inherently wrong with engaging in the particular activity, except that someone has passed a law against it.[86]  See § 8.22, supra.    Convictions for violating the following laws do NOT involve moral turpitude, unless the statute violated requires fraud or evil intent as an essential element. 

 

Plasencia-Ayala v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 738, (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2008) (Nevada conviction of failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. § 179D.550, does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), because the offense of conviction is a regulatory offense that is not inherently evil, but is an offense solely because a law was passed regulating it), following Fong v. INS, 308 F.2d 191, 195 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding that a noncitizen who was deportable for failing to register with the Attorney General had committed “only a minor infraction” and that his record showed “no moral turpitude whatever”);[87]

Chaunt v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 147, 5 L.Ed.2d 120 (1960) (conviction of distributing handbills in violation of city ordinance, concealed in the course of a naturalization proceeding, held not to be a crime involving moral turpitude);

Eyoum v. INS, 125 F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1997) (importation of pancake turtles in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545 did not involve moral turpitude because it was illegal only because the defendant failed to complete the proper paperwork);

United States v. Carrollo, 30 F.Supp. 3 (W.D. Mo. 1939) (conducting a lottery was not considered CMT where intent to defraud was not a necessary element of the offense); 

Matter of Mahmoud, File No. A24-883-732, 14 Immigr. Rep. B1-14 (BIA 1994) (possession of altered food stamps with knowledge that they were altered, but without use or intent to use them unlawfully);

Matter of S, 9 I. & N. Dec. 688 (BIA 1962) (violation of gambling laws);

Matter of K, 8 I. & N. Dec. 310 (BIA 1959) (ration law violation);

Matter of P, 6 I. & N. Dec. 795 (BIA 1955) (sale of oleo margarine labeled as butter “with intent to deceive and mislead” in violation of a federal statute was held to be a crime which necessarily involved moral turpitude, since the offense was inherently wrong and morally reprehensible, not merely prohibited by statute of recent origin);

Matter of B, 6 I. & N. Dec. 98 (BIA 1954) (conviction of conspiracy to violate New York Banking Law § § 340 (which prohibits the conduct of a small loan business without a license) and 357 (which prohibits a nonlicensee from charging more than 6 percent interest) (usury) is not a crime involving moral turpitude since those sections are only a licensing and regulatory enactment, and do not require any criminal intent, as negligent overcollection of interest is sufficient for conviction);

Matter of P, 5 I. & N. Dec. 582 (BIA 1953) (ration law violation);

Matter of J, 4 I. & N. Dec. 512 (BIA 1951) (conviction of attempt to escape from reformatory in violation of Chapter 268, § 16 of the Annotated Laws of Massachusetts is “malum prohibitum” and does not involve moral turpitude, since “escape” is not defined by statute and the wording of the statute does not require a specific criminal intent);

Matter of J, 2 I. & N. Dec. 99 (BIA 1944) (selling liquor to Native Americans). 

 

Liquor law violations. Liquor law violations have generally been considered regulatory only, and not to involve moral turpitude. 

 

United States v. Smith, 420 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1970) (Alabama misdemeanor conviction of possessing tax paid alcoholic beverages in a ‘dry’ county, under 29 Code of Alabama, Recompiled 1958, § 98 (4621), was not a crime involving moral turpitude for impeachment purposes);

United States ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer, 113 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940);

Iorio v. Day, 34 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1929) (not every violation of a prohibition law is a crime involving moral turpitude);

Coykendall v. Skrmetta, 22 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1927) (conviction for winemaking for personal use of 150 gallons of wine was held not to be a crime involving moral turpitude);

Matter of G, 7 I. & N. Dec. 114 (BIA 1956) (conviction for violation of 26 U.S.C. § § 2803(a) and 2812, transportation and possession of distilled spirits without tax stamps affixed thereto, is not crime involving moral turpitude);

Matter of J, 2 I. & N. Dec. 99 (BIA, AG 1944) (conviction of unlawful sale of liquor to a Native American over whom the government exercises control, in violation of 25 U.S.C. § 241, is not an offense involving moral turpitude);

Matter of H, 1 I. & N. Dec. 394 (BIA 1943) (carrying on the business of a retail liquor dealer without having paid the special tax required by § 3281 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, under 26 U.S.C. § 1397(a)(1), is not held to be a crime involving moral turpitude, since the statute is merely a revenue, regulatory, or licensing statute).

But see Rousseau v. Weedin, 284 F. 565 (9th Cir. 1922) (“jointist” convicted of operating disreputable establishment where liquor unlawfully sold held deportable).

 

But liquor law violations that deprive the government of revenue have been held to involve moral turpitude.

 

Morgano v. Pilliod, 299 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. den., 370 U.S. 924, 8 L.Ed.2d 505, 82 S.Ct. 1564 (1962) (conspiracy to defraud the United States of taxes on distilled spirits was held to be a crime involving moral turpitude);

U.S. ex rel. Carrollo v. Bode, 204 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. den., 346 U.S. 857, 74 S.Ct. 73, 98 L.Ed. 370 (1953) (conviction of conspiracy to defraud the United States by engaging in the business of wholesale liquor dealer while willfully failing to pay a special tax, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 3253, involved moral turpitude);

Maita v. Haff, 116 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1940) (conspiracy to violate the internal revenue laws by possessing and concealing distilled spirits with intent to defraud the United States of taxes, under 18 U.S.C. § 88, (now 18 U.S.C. § 371), and 26 U.S.C. § § 1155(f), 1440 and 1441 (now 26 U.S.C. § § 2806(f), 3320, 3321 (1934 ed.)), involves moral turpitude);

United States ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer, 113 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940) (conspiracy to violate the internal revenue laws by possessing and concealing distilled spirits with intent to defraud the United States of taxes, under 18 U.S.C. § 88, now 18 U.S.C. § 371, and 26 U.S.C. § § 1155(f), 1440 and 1441, now 26 U.S.C. § § 2806(f), 3320, 3321 (1934 ed.), is an offense that involves moral turpitude);

Guarneri v. Kessler, 98 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1938) (smuggling alcohol into the United States with intent to defraud the United States is a crime that involves moral turpitude);

Barrese v. Ryan, 203 F.Supp. 880, 882-883 (D. Conn. 1962) (conviction of carrying on retail liquor business without having paid federal occupational tax, in violation of Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 3253, was a crime involving moral turpitude, since intent to defraud the United States was an element of the offense);

Matter of D, 9 I. & N. Dec. 605 (BIA 1962) (conviction for smuggling liquor with intent to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545 held to be a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, even though there is no intent to have an impact on the revenue of the United States);

Matter of A, 6 I. & N. Dec. 242 (BIA 1954) (a conviction of violating 26 U.S.C. § 404 (R.S. 3296), removal of distilled spirits on which the tax has not been paid, to a place other than the distillery warehouse provided by law, is not a crime involving moral turpitude), citing Macklin v. United States, 79 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1935) (conviction for removal of spirits on which tax had not been paid from the warehouse, under 26 U.S.C. § 404 did not require any element of intent to defraud the United States of revenue as an essential element).

[86] But see, e.g., § § 9.96, 9.105, infra.

[87] But see Matter of Tobar-Lobo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 143 (BIA 2007) (California conviction of willful failure to register by a sex offender who has been previously apprised of the obligation to register, in violation of Penal Code § 290(g)(1), is a crime involving moral turpitude).

Third Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " UNLICENSED DEALING IN FIREARMS
Mayorga v. Attorney General U.S., ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 2898528 (3d Cir. Jun. 27, 2014) (federal conviction of unlicensed business of firearms dealing, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2), did not categorically constitute a crime of moral turpitude, since the offense is a regulatory/licensing offense); see Matter of Abreu"Semino, 12 I. & N. Dec. 775, 776 (BIA 1968) (the violation of a regulatory, or licensing, or revenue provision of a statute is not a crime involving moral turpitude).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER
Totimeh v. Attorney General, 666 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. Jan. 12, 2012) (Minnesota conviction of failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of Minn. Stat. 243.166.5, defined the offense as knowingly violat[ing] any of [the statutes] provisions or intentionally provid[ing] false information, is not a crime of moral turpitude, since it is a regulatory offense designed to assist law enforcement, and does not regulate a crime that of itself is inherently vile or intentionally malicious.); following Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2011) (Colorado conviction of failure to register as a sex offender, is not a CIMT).

Fourth Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPIUTDE " SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
Mohamed v. Holder, 769 F.3d 885 (4th Cir. Oct. 17, 2014) (Virgina conviction for violation of VaCodeAnn. 18.2-472.1, failure to register as a sex offender, is not a crime involving moral turpitude for immigration purposes, since it is merely a regulatory offense), disagreeing with Matter of Tobar-Lobo, 24 I&N Dec. 143 (BIA 2007).

Seventh Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " FAILURE TO APPEAR IN COURT
Obi v. Holder, 558 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2009) (federal conviction of failure to appear in court, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 3146, is mentioned in dictum as a crime involving moral turpitude); but see Hussein v. Ashcroft, 2002 WL 31027604 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2002) (federal conviction of failure to appear in court, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 3146, was not found to be a crime of moral turpitude, but court denied naturalization based on a conclusion that other convictions showed a lack of good moral character).

Ninth Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " MISUSE OF PASSPORT
Nguyen v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___ n.4, 2014 WL 3953758 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2014) (whether federal conviction of misuse of a passport without intent to facilitate an act of international terrorism, under 18 U.S.C. 1544, 2331, categorically constitutes a crime of moral turpitude, is an open question).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " SEX OFFENSES " FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER
Pannu v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 1782959 (9th Cir. May 11, 2011) (remand to BIA to review issue of whether California conviction of failure to register as a sex offender, Penal Code 290(g)(1), categorically constituted a crime of moral turpitude), citing Plasencia-Ayala v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 738, 743 n.2, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (Nevada conviction for failure to register as a sex offender under a similar law (Nev. Rev. Stat. 179D.550) did not categorically constitute a CMT, since that statute creates strict liability for failing to register or notify of a change of address, so that a defendant could be convicted for forgetting to register or even for accidentally sending his registration forms to the wrong address).

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE WHILE KNOWING LICENSE HAS BEEN SUSPENDED IS A CMT
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Arizona conviction of driving under the influence while knowing that that one had a suspended license, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes 28-1383(A)(1),constitutes a crime of moral turpitude for immigration purposes), deferring to Matter of Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188 (BIA 1999).

Other

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " REGULATORY OFFENSES " PRACTICE ADVISORY
Offenses classed as regulatory offenses generally are not considered to involve moral turpitude because although the behavior is illegal, there is nothing inherently wrong, fraudulent or evil about it. If it is not intrinsically wrong, the fact that it is illegal " standing alone -- does not make it turpitudinous. However, there are inconsistencies in the BIA case law. See Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 693 (9th Cir. 2007) (Where an act is only statutorily prohibited, rather than inherently wrong, the act generally will not involve moral turpitude.), citing Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2000); Matter of J, 4 I. & N. Dec. 512, 1951 WL 7052 (BIA 1951). For a comprehensive digest of moral turpitude holdings on regulatory cases, see Tooby, Rollin & Foster, Crimes of Moral Turpitude 8.22 (2008 and monthly updates since at nortontooby.com).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE"POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY AN UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANT
Possession of a firearm, under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5), should not be considered to be a crime involving moral turpitude. Since possessing a firearm is not inherently evil and not malum prohibitum, the fact of being unlawfully undocumented when doing so should not make it a crime of moral turpitude. See Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I&N Dec. 262 (BIA 1990) (possessing a sawed-off shotgun not a crime of moral turpitude). See also Matter of Gabryelski, 20 I&N Dec. 750 (1993): [W]e point out that while the respondent's conviction for possession of a firearm establishes his deportability under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act, see Matter of Chow, Interim Decision 3199 (BIA 1993), it does not render him inadmissible for purposes of section 245 adjustment, as there is no corresponding exclusion ground. In Matter of Rainford, supra, the Board specifically held that a conviction for criminal possession of weapon did not preclude a finding of admissibility in connection with an application for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act, because it is not a ground of excludability. (Ibid.) Since it is not a ground of inadmissibility, it is not a crime involving moral turpitude. Thanks to Jonathan Moore.