Crimes of Moral Turpitude

 

Voluntary manslaughter, committed in a jurisdiction following the common-law classification of manslaughter into voluntary and involuntary, has generally been held to involve moral turpitude, criminal intent being inferred from the voluntary aspect of the crime. [55]

 

Sildora v. Ashcroft, 11 Fed.Appx. 876 (9th Cir. 2001) (Hawaii conviction of manslaughter in violation of Hawaii Rev. Statutes § 706-660 held a crime of moral turpitude);

Carter v. INS, 90 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1996) (conviction for manslaughter stemming from assault and battery held crime involving moral turpitude);

United States v. Bell, 351 F.2d 868, 873 (6th Cir. 1965);

DeLucia v. Flagg, 297 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. den., 369 U.S. 837 (1962) (Italian conviction of voluntary homicide “with grave provocation” held CMT since term “voluntary” indicated intent to kill was required; court stated that as long as homicide is voluntary and not justifiable, no amount of provocation can remove it from the class of crimes involving moral turpitude);

Matter of Rosario, 15 I. & N. Dec. 416 (BIA 1975) (conviction of “first-degree manslaughter” (homicidio voluntario), an intentional killing of a human being, in violation of § 635 of Title 33 of the Laws of Puerto Rico, held a crime involving moral turpitude);

Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I. & N. Dec. 269 (BIA 1975);

Matter of Pataki, 15 I. & N. Dec. 324 (BIA 1975) (conviction of voluntary manslaughter in the death of his mother-in-law under Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.321 held to be crime involving moral turpitude);

Matter of Lopez, 13 I. & N. Dec. 725 (BIA 1971);

Matter of Ptasi, 12 I. & N. Dec. 790 (BIA 1968) (conviction of manslaughter in violation of § 53-13 of the Connecticut General Statutes);

Matter of Abi-Rached, 10 I. & N. Dec. 551 (BIA 1964) (conviction of voluntary manslaughter in violation of § 9-2, Chapter 38, Illinois Revised Statutes, is conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude);

Matter of S, 9 I. & N. Dec. 496 (BIA 1961) (conviction under Article 153 of the Penal Code of Peru for killing another under the influence of violent emotion which circumstances may render excusable is equivalent to conviction in the United States for voluntary manslaughter and is a crime involving moral turpitude);

Matter of B, 4 I. & N. Dec. 493 (BIA 1951);

Matter of D, 3 I. & N. Dec. 51 (BIA 1947) (conviction of voluntary manslaughter is an offense involving moral turpitude);

Matter of S, 1 I. & N. Dec. 519 (BIA 1943) (manslaughter, first degree, as defined by § 619:14 (2) and § 619:15 (2), Minnesota Statutes, 1941, which is the equivalent of the common-law crime of voluntary manslaughter, involves moral turpitude).

 

Manslaughter involving recklessness has been held to involve moral turpitude. 

 

Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1995) (conviction under Missouri Revised Statute § 565.024 for involuntary manslaughter, recklessly causing death of another person, held CMT);

Matter of Wojtkow, 18 I. & N. Dec. 111 (BIA 1981) (second-degree manslaughter under New York Penal Law § 125.15(1), and definition of “recklessness” in New York Penal Law § 15.05(3) held CMT; modifies Matter of Gantus-Bobadilla, 13 I. & N. Dec. 777 (BIA 1971) and distinguishes Mongiovi v. Karnuth, 30 F.2d 825 (W.D.N.Y. 1929)).

           

Manslaughter convictions in which willfulness, recklessness, or evil intent are not essential elements, have been held NOT to involve moral turpitude.  

 

Tutrone v. Shaughnessy, 160 F.Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);

Vidal y Planas v. Landon, 104 F.Supp. 384 (S.D. Cal. 1952);

In re DiCola, 7 F.Supp. 194 (D.R.I. 1934) (homicide involving negligent operation of automobile);

Mongiovi v. Karnuth, 30 F.2d 825 (W.D.N.Y. 1929);

Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I. & N. Dec. 269 (BIA 1975);

Matter of Gantus-Bobadilla, 13 I. & N. Dec. 777 (BIA 1971) (New York conviction of manslaughter in the second degree under New York Penal Law § 125.15(1), recklessly causing the death of another, held not to be crime involving moral turpitude); modified by Matter of Wojtkow, 18 I. & N. Dec. 111 (BIA 1981).

Matter of Szegedi, 10 I. & N. Dec. 28 (BIA 1962) (Wisconsin conviction of reckless homicide);

Matter of E, 2 I. & N. Dec. 134, 141 (BIA, AG, 1944) (conviction under predecessor to New York Penal Law § 125.15(1) was in this case not held to be a crime involving moral turpitude).

 

A conviction of manslaughter stemming from assault and battery was properly classified as a crime of moral turpitude.  

 

Carter v. INS, 90 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1996).

 

Accessory to Manslaughter.

 

Matter of Sanchez-Marin, 11 I. & N. Dec. 264 (BIA 1965) (Massachusetts conviction of accessory to manslaughter under Chapter 274, § 4 of the Annotated Laws of Massachusetts; constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude where the principal was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter, a crime involving moral turpitude).

[55] Ibid.