Obstruction of justice.

 

Padilla v. Gonzalez, 397 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2005) (knowingly furnishing false information to a police officer with intent to avoid apprehension or obstruct the prosecution or defense of any person, in violation of 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/31-4(a), is a crime of moral turpitude for immigration purposes);

Knoetze v. U. S. Dept. of State, 634 F.2d 207 (11th Cir. 1981), cert. den., 454 U.S. 823, 102 S.Ct. 109, 70 L.Ed.2d 95 (1981) (South Africa conviction for “Attempting to Obstruct or Impede the Process of Justice” is reasonably believed to correspond to an American felony, the federal crime of “Influencing or Injuring an Officer, Juror or Witness,” 18 U.S.C. § 1503, which has fraud as an element, and is therefore a crime involving moral turpitude).

Fifth Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " MISPRISION OF A FELONY
Villegas-Sarabia v. Sessions, 874 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. Oct. 31, 2017) (federal conviction of misprision of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 4 ((1) knowledge that a felony was committed; (2) failure to notify the authorities of the felony; and (3) an affirmative step to conceal the felony."), was a crime against moral turpitude, because misprision of a felony required an intentional act of deceit); following Patel v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. April 29, 2008); Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that misprision of felony is a categorical CIMT); distinguishing Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 711 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that misprision of felony is not a CIMT for lack of a sufficiently evil mental state).

Ninth Circuit

PRACTICE ADVISORY " CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " MISPRISON OF A FELONY PRACTICE ADVISORY " AGGRAVATED FELONY " OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE " MISPRISION OF A FELONY
Federal conviction of misprision of a felony, under 18 U.S.C. 4, does not constitute an aggravated felony, or a crime of moral turpitude, at least within the Ninth Circuit. This offense is not considered a drug-trafficking aggravated felony, even if the principals felony was a drug-trafficking offense and the client were to receive a sentence of one year or more. See Matter of Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I & N Dec. 889 (BIA 1999), distinguishing, but not overruling Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 955 (BIA 1997), while holding that misprision conviction does not constitute obstruction of justice aggravated felony). Compare Matter of Batista-Hernandez, supra (holding that noncitizen convicted of accessory to drug crime is deportable under obstruction of justice aggravated felony ground). The BIA considers this offense to be a crime of moral turpitude, which can trigger deportation or inadmissibility. Matter of Robles, 24 I & N Dec. 22 (BIA 2006). The Ninth Circuit reversed, saying the BIA interpretation was so unreasonable that it was not a permissible interpretation of the moral turpitude deportation statute. Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2012). That is the law, at least in the Ninth Circuit, at least right now. This rule, however, applies only within the Ninth Circuit. The BIA Robles rule prevails in all other circuits in the country. For example, the Eleventh Circuit has held misprision was categorically a CMT. Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. Apr. 22, 2002). There is therefore a circuit split, giving rise to the possibility that the Supreme Court might take up the issue in the future. In the meantime, the client risks being placed in removal proceedings for this conviction if found in the U.S. outside the Ninth Circuit. To avoid this possibility, the client should therefore enter and leave the United States through Ports of Entry within the Ninth Circuit.