Crimes of Moral Turpitude

 

Receiving stolen goods is held to be a crime involving moral turpitude, but only where guilty knowledge, or subjective belief that the property is stolen, is an essential element of the offense.[113]

 

Smirko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. Oct. 26, 2004) (Pennsylvania conviction of receiving stolen property under 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 3925(a) is a crime involving moral turpitude).

De Leon-Reynoso v. Ashcroft, 294 F.3d 1143 (3d Cir. June 11, 2002) (Pennsylvania conviction of receiving stolen property, under Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3925(a), which provides that “a person is guilty of theft if the person “intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen,” held a CMT since the subjective belief involved is morally equivalent to actual knowledge).

United States v. Castro, 26 F.3d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1994) (convictions for transporting and/or receiving stolen property under 18 U.S.C. § § 2312, 2313, constitute crimes of “moral turpitude” since the statutes require as essential elements knowledge that the vehicles transported or received are stolen);

Okoroha v. INS, 715 F.2d 380, 382 (8th Cir. 1982) (knowing possession of stolen mail under 18 U.S.C. § 1708);

Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964) (English conviction under divisible statute prohibiting receiving property known to have been stolen or property obtained in any way under circumstances amounting to felony or misdemeanor, was a crime involving moral turpitude, since record of conviction – clerk’s certificate – stated that defendant had been convicted of receiving property knowing it to have been stolen);

Palma v INS, 318 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1963) (transporting a stolen automobile knowing it to have been stolen, in violation of the Dyer Act), cert. den. 375 U.S. 958, 11 L.Ed. 317, 84 S.Ct. 449 (1963);

Mourikas v. Vardianos, 169 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1948) (conviction of receiving stolen goods is crime of moral turpitude, and it was proper to permit cross-examination of defendant on it for the purpose of impeaching his credibility as a witness);

Giaimo v Pederson, 193 F.Supp. 527 (D.Ohio 1960) (receiving stolen property);

Rydberg v. Reimer, 17 F.Supp. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1936);

cf. Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1929);

Matter of Salvail, 17 I. & N. Dec. 19 (BIA 1979) (Canadian conviction of knowing possession of stolen goods);

Matter of Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 212, 213 (BIA 1975) (conviction of receiving stolen property in violation of California Penal Code § 496.1 constitutes CMT since knowledge that the goods were stolen is an element of the offense);

Matter of Chen, 10 I. & N. Dec. 671 (BIA 1964);

Matter of VDB, 8 I. & N. Dec. 608 (BIA 1960) (New York);

Matter of A, 7 I. & N. Dec. 626 (BIA 1957) (conviction of receiving stolen goods, under Article 648 of the Italian Penal Code, involves moral turpitude, even though the statute does not, in express terms, require that the accused have knowledge that the goods were stolen or otherwise unlawfully acquired, since Italian legal writers and courts hold that such knowledge is implied), citing Matter of R, 6 I. & N. Dec. 772 (BIA 1955);

Matter of Z, 7 I. & N. Dec. 253 (BIA 1956) (conviction of the crime of receiving stolen goods in violation of § 6116, General Statutes of Connecticut, Revision of 1930, is a crime involving moral turpitude);

Matter of R, 6 I. & N. Dec. 772 (BIA 1955) (conviction of receiving stolen goods, in violation of New Jersey Revised Statute 2:164-1 is a crime involving moral turpitude, since knowledge is an essential element of the offense);

Matter of  L, 6 I. & N. Dec. 666, 668, n.8 (BIA 1955) (conviction of receiving stolen property is a crime involving moral turpitude if guilty knowledge is required as an essential element of the offense), citing United States ex rel. Feuer v. Day, 42 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1930); United States ex rel. Rydberg v. Reimer, 17 F.Supp. 414 (S.D. N.Y. 1936);

Matter of S, 4 I. & N. Dec. 365 (BIA 1951) (admission of receiving stolen goods in violation of § 259, German Criminal Code, which does not require knowledge or intent, but merely circumstances which should lead defendant to make inquiry, does not involve moral turpitude), citing Matter of K, 2 I. & N. Dec. 90 (BIA 1944);

Matter of G, 2 I. & N. Dec. 235 (BIA 1945) (Canadian conviction held CMT where evidence showed that the defendant intended to deprive the rightful owner permanently of the goods);

Matter of K, 2 I. & N. Dec. 90 (BIA 1944) (German conviction of possessing stolen property will not be found to involve moral turpitude where the evidence of record indicates property was acquired without guilty knowledge and without wrongful intent, since offense in Germany differs from the United States in that conviction may result from negligent receipt of property by person acting in good faith).

 

Although traditionally held to be a CMT, the offense of receiving or possessing stolen property may no longer qualify.  Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2), a conviction of receiving stolen property has been held not to be per se one of dishonesty or involving a false statement, for impeachment purposes, because it can be committed without misrepresentation or deceit.[114]  This leads to an argument this offense does not constitute a CMT. 

 

Disposing of stolen property has been held to involve moral turpitude.

 

Solis-Muela v. INS, 13 F.3d 372 (10th Cir. 1993).

 

Transportation of stolen property. 

 

United States v. Castro, 26 F.3d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1994) (convictions for transporting and/or receiving stolen property with knowledge that such property is stolen constitute crimes of moral turpitude);

Palma v. INS, 318 F.2d 645, 649 (6th Cir. 1963) (dictum that conviction for violation of the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2312, constitutes a CMT);

Matter of Acosta, 14 I. & N. Dec. 338 (BIA 1973);

Matter of Fernandez, 14 I. & N. Dec. 24 (BIA 1972) (forged and fraudulent securities).

[113] 9 U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) § 40.21(a) N.2.3-1(b)(11) (“Receiving stolen goods (with guilty knowledge)”); De Leon-Reynoso v. Ashcroft, 294 F.3d 1143 (3d Cir. June 11, 2002) (subjective belief property was stolen).

[114] United States v. Foster, 227 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2000).