The nature of the intent element sufficient to constitute a crime of violence under § 16(b) is very similar, according to the Supreme Court, to that required under 16(a).  Both are discussed at § 5.22, supra.

AGGRAVATED FELONY - THEFT OFFENSE - AUTO THEFT - AIDING AND ABETTING
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, ___ U.S. ___, 2007 WL 98723 (Jan. 17, 2007) (California conviction of unlawful taking of a vehicle, in violation of Vehicle Code 10851(a), constituted theft offense aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), since the crime of "aiding and abetting" a theft offense is included within the substantive offense).

BIA

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " INTENT
Matter of Singh, 25 I. & N. Dec. 670 (BIA 2012) (an offense that may be committed recklessly may still be considered an aggravated felony crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b)).

Second Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - 18 U.S.C. 16(b) -- MASSACHUSETTS CONVICTION OF ASSAULT ON OFFICER UNDER WANTON OR RECKLESS THEORY CONSTITUTED CRIME OF VIOLENCE UNDER 16(b) SINCE IT HAS A SUBSTANTIAL RISK THE DEFENDANT WILL USE FORCE TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE
Blake v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2007 WL 914865 (2d Cir. March 28, 2007) (Massachusetts statute defining offense of assault on police officer and other categories of public official, Massachusetts General Laws chapter 265, section 13D, under the wanton or reckless theory of assault, constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), since it offers a substantial risk the defendant will use force to commit the offense; the court found that Massachusetts law required physical or bodily injury to convict).

Third Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " 18 U.S.C. 16(b) " RECKLESS MENS REA DOES NOT NECESSARILY BAR CRIME OF VIOLENCE UNDER 18 U.S.C. 16(b)
Aguilar v. Attorney General of the U.S., ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 5925141 (3d Cir. Nov. 29, 2011) (Pennsylvania conviction of sexual assault, under 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. 3124.1, constituted a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), and was therefore an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), even though the offense has a minimum mens rea of recklessness; because sexual assault raises a substantial risk that the perpetrator will intentionally use force in furtherance of the offense, we agree with the BIA that it constitutes a crime of violence under 16(b).).

Fourth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT - 18 USC 16(b)
Garcia v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2061819 (4th Cir. Jul. 26, 2006) (BIA interpretation of the "substantial risk" requirement in 18 U.S.C. 16(b), looking to whether "by its nature, the offense involves that in the course of committing it the offender will intrinsically employ power, violence, or pressure against a person or thing" is foreclosed by Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10 (2004) (footnote omitted) (italics in original), which held in order for there to be a crime of violence sufficient to trigger deportation, "[t]he reckless disregard [requirement] in 16 [must], relate not to the general conduct or to the possibility that harm will result from a persons conduct, but to the risk that the use of physical force against another might be required in committing a crime.").

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSALUT - 18 USC 16(b)
Garcia v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2061819 (4th Cir. Jul. 26, 2006) (New York conviction of second-degree assault, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 120.05 ["recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument"], does not constitute a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), and thus is not an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), since recklessness, like negligence, is not enough to support a determination that a crime is a "crime of violence"), following Bejarano-Urrutia v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 444, 447 (4th Cir. 2005) (such a violation did not qualify as a "crime of violence" because "[a]lthough the crime of violating Va. Code Ann. 18.2-36 intrinsically involves a substantial risk that the defendants actions will cause physical harm, it does not intrinsically involve a substantial risk that force will be applied as a means to an end.").

Fifth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - BURGLARY
United States v. Constante, 544 F.3d 584 (5th Cir. Oct. 6, 2008) (Texas conviction for burglary, in violation of Texas Penal Code 30.02(a)(3) [enters a building or habitation and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft, or an assault] did not constitute a crime of violence for ACCA purposes where statute of conviction does not require specific intent).

Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ASSAULT IN THIRD DEGREE
United States v. Rendon-Duarte, 482 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. March 21, 2007) (Alaska conviction of Assault in the Third Degree, in violation of Alaska Statute 11.41.220(a)(1) ("recklessly (A) places another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument."), constituted a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2)(2005) ("any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . (2) ... involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another."), for purposes of enhancing sentence for a federal conviction for being a felon in possession of firearms, in violation of in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) & 924(a)(2): "Whether the conduct was reckless or not has no bearing on the applicability of subsection (2) of the Guidelines.").

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER
United States v. Camacho-Lopez, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. May 30, 2006) (California conviction for vehicular manslaughter, in violation of California Penal Code 191.5(a) is not an aggravated felony crime of violence, in light of Leocal, for immigration purposes; Immigration Judge therefore improperly advised noncitizen that he was not eligible for relief; conviction for illegal re-entry following removal therefore cannot be sustained.)