Accessory after the fact is a non-substantive offense, and is not included in the list of non-substantive offenses that can trigger removal for an aggravated felony.  See discussion at § 3.49, supra.

AGGRAVATED FELONY -- ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT - SUPREME COURT REMANDS QUESTION TO NINTH CIRCUIT FOR CONSIDERATION
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, ___ U.S. ___, 2007 WL 98723 (Jan. 17, 2007) (question whether California conviction of violating Vehicle Code 10851(a) holds liable accessories after the fact, who need not be shown to have committed a theft, is remanded to the Ninth Circuit for consideration in the first instance).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - THEFT OFFENSE - WHETHER THEFT INCLUDES JOYRIDING REMANDED BY SUPREME COURT TO NINTH CIRCUIT FOR CONSIDERATION IN FIRST INSTANCE
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, ___ U.S. ___, 2007 WL 98723 (Jan. 17, 2007) (remanding to Ninth Circuit claim that Cal. Vehicle Code 10851(1) applies to joyriding, which falls outside the generic "theft" definition, is not considered because it does not fall within the terms of the question presented, the lower court did not consider them, and this Court declines to reach them in the first instance).

BIA

AGGRAVATED FELONY " OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE " ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT
Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I&N Dec. 838 (BIA 2012) (California conviction of accessory after the fact, in violation of Penal Code 32, is an aggravated felony "obstruction of justice" offense if a sentence of one year or more is imposed on any single count). http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol25/3758.pdf.

AGGRAVATED FELONY " OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE " ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT
Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I&N Dec. 838, 842 (BIA 2012) (California conviction of accessory after the fact, in violation of Penal Code 32, with a sentence of 16 months imprisonment, is a conviction for an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(S), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(S) because it include[s] the element of an affirmative and intentional attempt, motivated by a specific intent, to interfere with the process of justice), quoting Matter of Espinoza, 22 I&N Dec. 889, 894 (BIA 1999); disagreeing with Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2011) (BIA requires actual interference with an ongoing criminal proceeding or investigation). Note: The BIA interpreted the obstruction of justice provision more broadly than the Ninth Circuits more restrictive approach, pursuant to Brand X, the Supreme Court decision that allows an agency to issue a reasonable interpretation of a statute within its expertise even after a court has found an earlier agency interpretation unreasonable. Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I&N Dec. 838, 840 (BIA 2012), discussing Natl Cable & Telecomms. Assn v. BrandX Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). The question remains whether the Ninth Circuit will conclude that the aggravated felony definition, also used extensively in federal criminal cases, falls exclusively within the purview of the BIA to interpret immigration laws. The Ninth Circuit could also determine the statute is not ambiguous, after employing normal statutory interpretation standards, or that the BIAs interpretation is unreasonable, to justify deference.

ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT - CONCEALMENT OF STOLEN PROPERTY
Matter of Fernando Salas-Lopez, 2007 WL 1724884 (BIA May 22, 2007) (unpublished) (California conviction for violation of Penal Code 496d(a), receipt of stolen vehicle, is not categorically an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(G) because "[c]oncealment of stolen property may well not be the same as aiding and abetting the receiving of stolen property. Even if done with knowledge that the property is stolen, the concealment of the stolen property could be more like acting as an accessory after the fact to the theft or to the receipt of stolen property.").

Fifth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE " ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT
United States v. Gamboa-Garcia, ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. Sept. 22, 2010) (Idaho convictions for violation of Idaho Code 18-205, for being accessory after the fact to murder, was an aggravated felony obstruction of justice offense to constitute an obstruction of justice aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(S), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(S). for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes). Note: The court here did not address the issue of whether an obstruction of justice offense must interfere with a court proceeding to constitute an obstruction of justice aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(S), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(S). CD:19.80, 19.15;AF:5.2, 5.63, A.31, A.2, B.31, B.62

Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT
Verdugo-Gonzalez v. Holder, 581 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2009) (California conviction for receiving stolen property, under Penal Code 496(a), categorically qualified as a theft offense aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), rejecting argument that the statutory use of the term "aids" includes accessory after the fact, which would not constitute an aggravated felony; the court reasoned that the statute does not mention accessory, only aiding, and no case was identified applying the statute to accessories after the fact).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - AIDING AND ABETTING ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON
Ortiz-Magana v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. Sept. 09, 2008) (California conviction of aiding and abetting assault with a deadly weapon, under Penal Code 245(a)(1), constitutes a crime of violence aggravated felony for removal purposes).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT
United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 2007) (9-6 en banc) (accessory after the fact does not constitute an aggravated felony, since attempt and conspiracy are listed under INA 101(a)(43)(U), but accessory after the fact is not).

Other

CAL POST CON " SAFE HAVEN " ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT " ELEMENTS
People v. Moomey, 194 Cal.App.4th 850, 856, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 749, 753 (4th Dist. April 26, 2011) (The crime of accessory consists of the following elements: (1) someone other than the accused, that is, a principal, must have committed a specific, completed felony; (2) the accused must have harbored, concealed, or aided the principal; (3) with knowledge that the principal committed the felony or has been charged or convicted of the felony; and (4) with the intent that the principal avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment.); quoting People v. Plengsangtip (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 825, 836, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 165.