(B)  Accessory After the Fact.  It is unclear whether a conviction of accessory after the fact to a substantive offense, which is analogous to harboring a fugitive, will never be held to be a CMT, since it is not of the same nature as the underlying offense, or whether such a conviction will be considered a CMT only if the substantive offense is considered a CMT.  It has been held that accessory after the fact to murder is a CMT.[942]  It is clear, however, that a conviction of accessory after the fact to an offense that is not a CMT will likewise not be considered a CMT.[943]  See § 7.8, supra, concerning accessory after the fact as an aggravated felony.

[942] Matter of Sanchez-Marin, 11 I. & N. Dec. 264 (BIA 1965).

[943] But see 9 U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) § 40.21(a), N. 2.4(a)(3).  Since an attempt, or a conspiracy to commit a CMT, along with other types of offenses committed with the intent to commit a CMT, are CMTs only if the substantive offense intended is a CMT, it is difficult to understand why accessory after the fact should be treated any differently.  This is made clear in the succeeding paragraph: “Conversely, where an alien has been convicted of, or admits having committed the essential elements of, a criminal attempt, or a criminal act of aiding and abetting, accessory before or after the fact, or conspiracy, and the underlying crime is not deemed to involve moral turpitude, then INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) would not come into play.”  9 U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) § 40.21(a), N. 2.4(b).

BIA

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " ATTEMPT
Matter of VO, 25 I. & N. Dec. 426 (BIA Mar. 18, 2011) (where the substantive offense underlying a noncitizen's conviction for an attempt offense is a crime involving moral turpitude, the noncitizen is considered to have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of INA 237(a)(2)(A), even though that section makes no reference to attempt offenses).

First Circuit

MORAL TURPITUDE - ATTEMPT
United States v. Ellis, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 783262 (5th Cir. Mar. 26, 2009) (the Model Penal Code 5.01(1) "substantial step" definition of "attempt" is the majority view, having been adopted by 12 circuits plus 26 states, and arguably should be used to define the term for purposes of the Taylor v. United States analysis in the career offender sentence enhancement context of USSG 4B1.2).

Fifth Circuit

MORAL TURPITUDE - ATTEMPT
United States v. Ellis, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 783262 (5th Cir. Mar. 26, 2009) (North Carolina conviction of attempted common law robbery, "the felonious, non-consensual taking of money or personal property from the person or presence of another by means of violence or fear," see N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-1.5, 14-87.1 (setting punishments for attempt and robbery without defining them), presents a close question as to whether it qualifies as a "crime of violence" under USSG 4B1.2 for purposes of imposing a career offender sentence enhancement for a federal robbery conviction, because of the argument that North Carolina defines the term "attempted" more broadly (to require only "slight acts") than the "substantial step" required under the Model Penal Code and the majority of states, as well as 12 circuits; defendant forfeited right to bring this issue by failing to raise it before the district court); cf. United States v. Taylor, 529 F.3d 1232, 1237-38 (9th Cir.2008) (finding that Arizona's attempt statute, which used the phrase "any step," was broader than the federal definition, but that Arizona courts interpreted the statute to mean "substantial step"); United States v. Sarbia, 367 F.3d 1079, 1086 (9th Cir.2004) (Nevada's attempt statute and case law uses the "slight act" approach, but is coextensive with the federal, "substantial step" approach).

Ninth Circuit

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT
Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 2713211 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2007) (California conviction for accessory after the fact, in violation of Penal Code 32, is not a crime of moral turpitude as the minimum conduct required to violate the statute includes acts that are not necessarily "morally shocking," such a mother providing food to her son, or being accessory after the fact to an offense that is not itself an crime of moral turpitude).

SAFE HAVENS - GENERAL SAFE HAVENS - CONVICTION-BASED GROUNDS OF DEPORTATION
Immigration counsel can argue that a person convicted of aiding and abetting the commission of a deportable offense is not deportable unless the definition of aiding and abetting, under the law of the jurisdiction of conviction, is coextensive with the federal definition of aiding and abetting. For example, in California, a person can be convicted of aiding and abetting on the basis of mere encouragement, even if no actual assistance is provided. This form of aiding a theft offense has been held insufficient to constitute a theft offense aggravated felony. United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). This same argument could be used to argue that a conviction of aiding and abetting any other deportable offense - a firearms conviction, crime of moral turpitude, domestic violence conviction, or controlled substances conviction - does not fall within the ground of deportation. Criminal defense counsel, however, should assume that a conviction of aiding a deportable offense also constitutes a deportable offense and avoid such a conviction if possible.