There is an extensive literature on federal post-conviction vehicles.[1]  The present discussion will offer a brief overview, emphasizing those aspects particularly useful to those seeking to vacate a conviction for immigration purposes.

[1] A comprehensive Bibliography concerning Post-Conviction Relief may be found at http://www.CriminalAndImmigrationLaw.com.

Ninth Circuit

POST CON RELIEF " FEDERAL " MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
United States v. Mazarella, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2015) (motion for new trial granted where: (1) the government withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland; (2) defendant's right to be free of unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment were violated; and (3) the district court erred in its denial of defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing and for discovery).

POST CON RELIEF " PROCEDURE " RIGHT TO COUNSEL " NO RIGHT TO COUNSEL ON PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. Sept. 27, 2010) (there is no federal constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in connection with state collateral relief proceedings, even where those proceedings constituted the first tier of review for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim), petition for certiorari granted, Martinez v. Ryan, 131 S.Ct. 2960 (Jun. 6, 2011)).

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - FEDERAL - MOTION TO CORRECT CLERICAL ERROR
United States v. Bergmann, 836 F.2d 1220, 1221 (9th Cir. 1988) (a motion under F.R.Crim. P. 36 to correct a clerical error in the record is the proper motion by which to amend a written order or minutes to conform to the oral version).

POST CON RELIEF - FEDERAL - MOTION TO CORRECT RECORD - RULE 36
United States v. Dickie, 752 F.2d 1398, 1400 (9th Cir. 1985) (under Rule 36, the district court will make a factual finding of whether the clerk of the court committed error in describing the sentence imposed by the court); United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200, 1201 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984) (court of appeal reviews denial of a Rule 36 motion for clear error, the standard that governs review of all "historical facts" found by the trial court; questions of law are reviewed de novo).

Other

SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND ET AL., STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS
45 tbl.1 (2010) (stating that there were more than 21 million criminal cases filed in state trial courts in 2008), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/ 2008_files/EWSC_2008_Online_Version.pdf

POST CON RELIEF " VEHICLES " 1983 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Practice Advisory. It may be possible to obtain relief from collateral consequences of an unconstitutional conviction, for which custody has expired, by means of a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Cf. Skinner v. Switzer, ___ U.S. ___, 2011 WL 767703 (Mar. 7, 2011) (convicted state prisoner may seek DNA testing of crime-scene evidence in 1983 action, since Rooker-Feldman doctrine that loser in state court cannot use 1983 action to obtain federal review of constitutionality of state conviction did not bar claim). The Court stated: District Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. ----, ----, 129 S.Ct. 2308, 174 L.Ed.2d 38 left unresolved the question whether a convicted state prisoner seeking DNA testing of crime-scene evidence may assert that claim in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 or may assert the claim in federal court only in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. In Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005), we comprehensively surveyed this Court's decisions on the respective provinces of 1983 civil rights actions and 2254 federal habeas petitions. Habeas is the exclusive remedy, we reaffirmed, for the prisoner who seeks immediate or speedier release from confinement. Id., at 82, 125 S.Ct. 1242. Where the prisoner's claim would not necessarily spell speedier release, however, suit may be brought under 1983. Ibid. Adhering to our opinion in Dotson, we hold that a postconviction claim for DNA testing is properly pursued in a 1983 action. Success in the suit gains for the prisoner only access to the DNA evidence, which may prove exculpatory, inculpatory, or inconclusive. In no event will a judgment that simply orders DNA tests necessarily impl[y] the unlawfulness of the State's custody. Id., at 81, 125 S.Ct. 1242. Skinner v. Switzer, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 2011 WL 767703 (Mar. 7, 2011). There are some old U.S. Supreme Court cases, like Burgess v. Texas, that basically say it violates the constitution to impose any penalty on account of an unconstitutional conviction. Now, Padilla says criminal deportation is a "penalty". Maybe that means it's unconstitutional to impose deportation on account of an unconstitutional conviction. It might be possible to bring a 1983 action for a declaratory judgment that the prior state conviction that violates Padilla was imposed in violation of the Constitution. If successful, counsel could take that declaratory judgment holding the state prior conviction was unconstitutional into immigration court and argue that respondent is not trying to challenge the constitutionality of the state conviction in immigration court. Respondent has already done that in federal court in the 1983 action and prevailed, so the immigration court must give full faith and credit to the district court judgment finding the state prior conviction unconstitutional. Counsel can argue that the Burgess line of cases holds the federal courts cannot impose any penalty on account of an unconstitutional conviction. The federal habeas mootness cases hold this question of the constitutionality of a prior conviction is not moot so long as any collateral consequence, such as deportation, continues to flow from it, or potential impeachment as a witness on account of the conviction, or deprivation of the right to vote, etc., so the expiration of custody does not render these issues moot. This would be a difficult avenue to pursue, since the Supreme Court has generally precluded federal courts from entertaining post-conviction attacks against state convictions. See, e.g., Premo v. Moore. But there may be something there.