United States v.
Gebele, 117 F.Supp.2d 540, 544 (W.D.Va. Oct. 13, 2000) (Massachusetts
conviction of Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous
Weapon, with a sentence of five years and one day, was a "crime
of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and therefore constituted
an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of enhancing an illegal re-entry
sentence).

Garcia v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d
___, 2006 WL 2061819 (4th Cir. Jul. 26, 2006) (New York conviction
of second-degree assault, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law §
120.05 ["recklessly causes serious physical injury to
another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous
instrument"], does not constitute an aggravated felony
"crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C.

Garcia v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___,
2006 WL 2061819 (4th Cir. Jul. 26, 2006) (New York conviction
of second-degree assault, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law §
120.05 ["recklessly causes serious physical injury to
another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous
instrument"], does not constitute a "crime of violence"
under 18 U.S.C.

United States v. Fierro-Reyna,
__ F.3d __ (5th Cir. Sept.

United States v. Velasco,
___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2729670 (5th Cir. Sept. 27, 2006) (Illinois
conviction for aggravated battery, under 720 IL. COMP. STAT.

Andrade v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir. Aug. 1, 2006) (Massachusetts
conviction of battery, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws Ch.
265, § 13A, although divisible, is found in this case
to be an aggravated felony crime of violence under INA §
101(a)(43)(F), as falling under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), where
the conviction "also concerned a violation of a domestic
abuse protective order.")

Larin-Ulloa v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __, 2006
WL 2441387 (5th Cir. Aug. 24, 2006) (Kansas conviction of
aggravated battery under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3414(a)(1)(C),
defined as intentional physical contact with a deadly weapon
in a rude, insulting or angry manner defines a crime which
is categorically a "crime of violence," under 18
U.S.C. § 16(b) and thus an aggravated felony for removal
purposes).

United States v. Torres-Diaz,
438 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. Jan. 30, 2006) (Connecticut conviction
of second-degree assault under Conn. Gen.Stat.

United States v. Gonzalez-Chavez,
432 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2005) (Florida conviction
of aggravated battery under § 784.045 of the Florida Statutes
is divisible, as the statute may be violated by any assault
on a pregnant woman, including spitting, which does not involve
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force, and therefore
may not be an aggravated felony crime of violence for sentencing
purposes).

Gonzalez-Garcia v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d
234 (5th Cir. Nov. 16, 2005) (Texas conviction of assault,
in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(3) ("intentionally
or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the
person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will
regard the contact as offensive or provocative"), did
not constitute a crime of violence aggravated felony under
INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.