United States v. Urias-Escobar,
281 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. Jan. 23, 2002), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct.
2377 (2002) (Texas conviction for misdemeanor assault with
bodily injury, with one year suspended sentence imposed, was
an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(43)(F) that warranted an enhanced sentence under U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2 for illegal re-entry).

Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 672
(9th Cir. Nov. 26, 2003) (Indiana conviction of battery, under
Indiana Code § 35-42-2-1, is not categorically a crime of
violence for purposes of INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i) (domestic violence),
because the offense can be committed by a mere offensive touching).

United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617 (8th
Cir. Mar. 24, 1999) (Iowa conviction of misdemeanor assault,
under Iowa Code § 708.1(1), which may be committed by "[a]ny
act which is . . . intended to result in physical contact
which will be insulting or offensive to another," by
necessity, requires physical force to complete, and is thus
sufficient physical force to constitute a crime of violence
for purposes of 18 U.S.C.

United States v. Sandoval, 390 F.3d 1077
(9th Cir. Aug. 19, 2004) (Washington Assault in the Third
Degree is not a crime of violence for sentencing purposes
since the statute may be violated through an unlawful touching
that does not involve substantial physical force or seriously
risk physical injury).

Ruiz-Morales v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1219
(9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004) (California conviction of mayhem,
under California Penal Code § 203, punishing unlawful and
malicious disfigurement or dismemberment, is an aggravated
felony crime of violence for immigration purposes).

United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063
(9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2003) (Wyoming battery conviction: domestic
relationship not a required element in order for Wyoming battery
conviction to serve as a predicate offense under the 18 U.S.C.

United States v. Pereira-Salmeron, 337 F.3d
1148 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2003) (Virginia conviction of carnal
knowledge of a child between 13 and 15 years of age, in violation
of Virginia Code § 18.2-63, constituted a "crime of violence"
under U.S.S.G.

Chavarria-Mejia v. Ashcroft, 367
F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. Apr. 29, 2004) (per curiam) (Kentucky
conviction of statutory rape, in violation of K.R.S. § 510.060,
constituted an aggravated felony crime of violence within
the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, for purposes of applying
a 16-level enhancement to a sentence for illegal re-entry).

Matter of VFD, 23 I. & N. Dec.
859 (BIA 2006) (Florida conviction for unlawful sexual activity
with a minor, in violation of Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.05(1),
is an aggravated felony sexual abuse of a minor offense under
INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C.

Matter of B, 21 I. & N. Dec. 287 (BIA
Mar. 28, 1996) (Maryland conviction for second-degree statutory
(not forcible) rape under Article 27, section 463(a)(3) of
the Annotated Code of Maryland, with a 10-year sentence, constitutes
a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and,
hence, an "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C.