Omar v. INS, 298 F.3d 710 (8th
Cir. Aug. 5, 2002) (Minnesota conviction of criminal vehicular
homicide, in violation of M.S.A. § 609.21, subd. 1(4), was
a crime of violence, and therefore was an aggravated felony
under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for
removal purposes).

United States v. Moore, 38 F.3d 977 (8th
Cir. Oct. 24, 1994) (federal conviction of manslaughter is
a crime of violence within meaning of federal sentencing statute
different from 18 U.S.C. § 16 and the aggravated felony definition
contained in INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).

Lara-Cazares v. Gonzales,
408 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. May 23, 2005) (California conviction
of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, in violation
of Penal Code § 191.5(a), which can be committed by gross
negligence, does not qualify as a crime of violence within
the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16, and so does not constitute
a crime of violence aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C.

United States v. Bonilla-Montenegro,
331 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. June 9, 2003) (California conviction
of voluntary manslaughter, in violation of Penal Code § 192(a),
held to be a "crime of violence" aggravated felony,
under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for
purposes of enhancing illegal re-entry sentence under U.S.S.G.

Park v. INS, 252 F.3d 1018
(9th Cir. June 5, 2001) (California conviction for violation
of California Penal Code § 192(b), involuntary manslaughter,
constitutes an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)).

Matter of Vargas-Sarmiento, 23 I. &
N. Dec. 651 (BIA Feb. 5, 2004) (New York conviction of first-degree
manslaughter, in violation of Penal Law § 125.20(1) and (2),
constitutes a crime of violence and therefore an aggravated
felony for immigration purposes, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C.

Matter of Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec. 373
(AG May 2, 2002) (New York conviction of second-degree manslaughter,
under N.Y. Penal Law § 125.15(1), may constitute a "crime
of violence" and therefore an aggravated felony under
INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).

United States
v. Pimental-Flores, 339 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2003)
(Washington conviction of third degree assault in violation
of court order, under Rev. Code of Washington § 26.50.110(4),
may fail to trigger a 16-level illegal re-entry sentence enhancement,
as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 (2001), because
the statute proscribes merely negligent assault).

United States
v. Gonzalez-Tamariz, 310 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2002)
(Nevada conviction of battery causing substantial bodily harm,
in violation of Nev.Rev.St. § 200.481, constituted aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

United States
v. Ceron-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. July 26, 2000) (Arizona
conviction for attempted aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon or deadly instrument, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-1001 and 13-1204(A)(2) and (B), constitutes an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F),
for purposes of illegal re-entry sentence enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)).