United States v. Garcia, 400
F.3d 816 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2005) (federal conviction of aiding
and abetting is not a separate offense from the substantive
offenses of alien smuggling and transportation of aliens,
but rather a different theory of liability for the same offense).

Castro-Espinosa v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1130 (9th
Cir. July 17, 2001) (federal conviction of harboring illegal
aliens in violation of INA 274(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii)
is an "aggravated felony," under INA § 101(a)(43)(N),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N), for removal purposes).

United States v. Galindo-Gallegos, 244 F.3d
728 (9th Cir. Mar. 27, 2001), amended, 255 F.3d 1154 (9th
Cir. July 12, 2001) (federal conviction of transporting illegal
aliens who were already in United States, in violation of
INA § 274(a)(1)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), constituted
an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(N), 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(43)(N), for purposes of enhancing sentence for illegal
re-entry).

United States v. Martinez-Candejas, 347 F.3d
853 (10th Cir. Oct. 21, 2003) (federal conviction of alien
smuggling includes transportation and harboring for purposes
of 16-level enhancement of illegal re-entry sentence under
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(vii) (2002) based on prior aggravated
felony conviction).

United States v. Salas-Mendoza, 237 F.3d 1246
(10th Cir. Jan. 22, 2001) (federal conviction of transporting
aliens, in violation of INA § 274(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A),
was an "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(N),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N), for purposes of sentence enhancement
under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) of illegal re-entry sentence).

Matter of Alvarado-Alvino, 22 I. & N. Dec. 718
(BIA May 24, 1999) (federal conviction of illegal entry, in
violation of INA § 275(a), 8 U.S.C. 1325, is not an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(N), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(N),
which specifically refers to those offenses relating to alien
smuggling described in INA § 274(a)(1)(A) and (2), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(1)(A) and (2)).

Matter of Malta, 23 I. & N. Dec. 656
(BIA Mar. 11, 2004) (California conviction of stalking based
on harassing conduct in violation of Penal Code § 646.9(b),
which proscribes stalking when there is a temporary restraining
order, injunction, or any other court order in effect prohibiting
the stalking behavior, is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 16(b), and is therefore an aggravated felony under INA
101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

Bovkun v. Ashcroft, 283 F.3d 166
(3d Cir. Mar. 8, 2002) (Pennsylvania misdemeanor conviction
of making terroristic threats, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons.Stat.
§ 2706 (1998), qualified as a "crime of violence"
under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for
immigration purposes, since the maximum of the indeterminate
11- to 23-month sentence imposed was one year or more).

United States v. Acuna-Cuadros,
385 F.3d 875 (5th Cir. Sept. 21, 2004) (per curiam) (Texas
conviction for retaliation, in violation of Tex. Penal Code
§ 36.06 (1995), penalizing one who "knowingly harms or
threatens to harm another by an unlawful act," did not
qualify as "crime of violence" supporting 16-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Martinez-Paramo,
380 F.3d 799 (5th Cir. Aug. 4, 2004) (Pennsylvania conviction
for terroristic threats, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 2706(a) (2003), was not established to be a crime of violence,
under U.S.S.G.