United States
v. Treto-Martinez, 421 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. Sept. 7, 2005)
(Kansas conviction of aggravated battery against a law enforcement
officer, in violation of K.S.A.

United States v. Perez-Vargas, 414 F.3d
1282 (10th Cir. July 15, 2005) (Colorado conviction for third-degree
assault, "knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury
to another person or with criminal negligence he causes bodily
injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon,"
in violation of C.R.S.

United States v. Holguin-Enriquez, 120
F.Supp.2d 969 (D.Kan. Oct. 12, 2000) (Washington conviction
for criminal assault, with one-year suspended sentence, constituted
an aggravated felony as crime of violence under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) for purpose of imposing 16-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) to defendants
base offense level for illegal re-entry).

Matter of Martin, 23 I. & N. Dec.
491 (BIA Sept. 26, 2002) (Connecticut conviction of third-degree
assault, in violation of section 53a-61(a)(1) of the Connecticut
General Statutes, which involves the intentional infliction
of physical injury upon another, is a crime of violence under
18 U.S.C. § 16(a), for deportation purposes).

Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d
533, 540-541 (3d Cir. Jan. 3, 2006) (Pennsylvania misdemeanor
conviction of recklessly endangering another person, in violation
of 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 2705, with a sentence of one year
or more, did not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 16(a), and was not a felony conviction, and therefore did
not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.

United States v. Calderon-Pena,
339 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. July 17, 2003) (Texas conviction of
child endangerment, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.041(c),
would not on its face constitute a crime of violence under
INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes
of illegal re-entry sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Hernandez-Castellanos,
287 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. Apr. 25, 2002) (Arizona conviction
of felony endangerment in violation of A.R.S. § 13-1201 was
not categorically an aggravated felony under a crime of violence
theory under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)
for illegal re-entry enhancement purposes under U.S.S.G.

Dickson v.
Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 2003) (New York conviction
of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, in violation
of N.Y. Penal Law § 135.10, with indeterminate sentence of
one to three years, held not to be an aggravated felony crime
of violence within the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

United States v. Stapleton,
440 F.3d 700 (5th Cir. Feb. 16, 2006) (Louisiana conviction
for false imprisonment while armed with a dangerous weapon,
in violation of La. Rev. Stat. Ann § 14:46.1(A) is a violent
felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e), because it necessarily presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another).

United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez,
431 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2005) (California conviction
of felony false imprisonment, in violation of Penal Code §
236, 237 constitutes a divisible statute, encompassing some
offenses that constitute crimes of violence within the meaning
of U.S.S.G.