Hernandez-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 432
F.3d 763 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2005) (Illinois conviction of
indecent solicitation of a child, in violation of 720 ILCS
§ 5/11-6(a), constituted sexual abuse of a minor aggravated
felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A),
for deportation purposes even though the person solicited
was an adult police officer rather than a minor).

Gattem v. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 758 (7th
Cir. June 20, 2005) (Illinois conviction of misdemeanor solicitation
to engage in a sexual act, in violation of 720 ILCS § 5/11-14.1(a),
is an aggravated felony sexual abuse of a minor offense for
immigration purposes where the criminal complaint (and no
other document) shows that the victim was under the age of
18).

Matter of Vargas-Sarmiento, 23
I. & N. Dec. 651, 654 (BIA Feb. 5, 2004) (New York conviction
of first-degree manslaughter, abortion, in violation of Penal
Law § 125.20(3), does not constitute a crime of violence and
is therefore not an aggravated felony for immigration purposes,
under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).

United States v. Cordoza-Estrada, 385
F.3d 56 (1st Cir. Sept. 29, 2004) (New Hampshire conviction
of simple assault for punching a man in the face and breaking
his nose, with a sentence to twelve months of imprisonment
with ten months suspended, constituted an aggravated felony
crime of violence conviction, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), triggering an eight-level enhancement
of sentence under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 20
(1st Cir. Oct. 19, 2001) (Maine conviction for assault, under
17-A M.R.S.A. § 207 qualifies as a "crime of violence"
for purposes of 18 U.S.C.

Rowe v. INS, 45 F.Supp.2d 144
(D.Mass. Apr. 30, 1999) (conviction for assault and battery
of a police officer is an aggravated felony as defined by
INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes
of deportation).

Popal v. Gonzalez, 416
F.3d 249 (3d Cir. July 29, 2005) (Pennsylvania conviction
of simple assault (reckless), in violation of Pennsylvania
Penal Code § 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2701, is not an aggravated felony
crime of violence for immigration purposes, since a mens rea
of recklessness is insufficient to qualify as a crime of violence
under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).

Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft,
327 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2003) (Connecticut conviction
of third-degree assault in violation of section 53a-61(a)(1)
of the Connecticut General Statutes, which involves the intentional
infliction of physical injury upon another, is not a crime
of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) and is therefore not an
aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148
(2d Cir. Aug. 29, 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 904, 121 S.Ct.
2246 (2001) (Rhode Island misdemeanor simple assault conviction,
for which suspended sentence of one year was imposed, constituted
an aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F), warranting 16-level enhancement of illegal
re-entry sentence for violation of INA § 276(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.

Milbin v. Ashcroft, 293 F.Supp.2d 158
(D.Conn. Dec. 2, 2003) (Connecticut conviction under any subdivision
of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-61, which prohibits various ways
of causing injury to a person, did not constitute a crime
of violence within the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F), 18 U.S.C.