Wireko v. Reno, 211 F.3d 833 (4th
Cir. May 4, 2000) (Virginia conviction of misdemeanor sexual
battery, in violation of Va.Code 1950, § 18.2-67.4, was a
crime of violence, and therefore an aggravated felony under
INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for immigration
purposes precluding judicial review of a removal order), distinguished
by Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. Mar. 5, 2001).

United
States v. Fernandez-Cusco, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir.
Apr. 20, 2006) (Minnesota felony conviction for third degree
sexual conduct, under Minn. Stat. 8 § 609.344, is not necessarily
a "forcible sex offense," and therefore not categorically
a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).

United States v. Meraz-Enriquez,
__ F.3d __, 2006 WL 515477 (5th Cir. Mar. 3, 2006)
(Kansas conviction of attempted sexual battery, in violation
of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21- 3518, which punishes a sexual touching
of a person who is too intoxicated to be able to give consent
to the touching, is not a crime of violence for illegal re-entry
sentencing purposes because the offense does not require the
use of force).

United States v. Sarmiento-Funes,
374 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. June 21, 2004) (Missouri conviction
of sexual assault, in violation of Mo. Ann. Stat. § 566.040(1)
committed if "he has sexual intercourse with another
person knowing that he does so without that persons consent,"
did not qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2
cmt. n.1(B)(ii), for purposes of 16-level enhancement of sentence
for illegal re-entry).

United
States v. Arnold, 58 F.3d 1117, 1122 n. 4 (6th Cir. July 13,
1995) (Tennessee conviction for assault with intent to commit
sexual battery is not categorically a "crime of violence"
for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon with a firearm)
because the minimum conduct of the offense can be committed
through force or coercion).

United States v. Baza-Martinez, ___ F.3d
___, 2006 WL 2729691 (9th Cir. Sept. 26, 2006) (North Carolina
conviction of taking indecent liberties with a child, in violation
of N.C.G.S.

United States v. Teeples,
432 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. Jan. 5, 2006) (California conviction
for violation of California Penal Code § 288(a), lewd act
with child, was a crime of violence for purposes of career
offender sentencing).

Parrilla v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. July 11, 2005)
(Washington conviction of communication with a minor for immoral
purposes, in violation of Washington Revised Code § 9.68A.090,
is not categorically an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A),
8 U.S.C.

United States v. Granbois,
376 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. July 22, 2004) (federal conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(3), sexual contact with a child,
is a "crime of violence" for purposes of the Career
Offender Guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1); see United States v.
Pereira-Salmeron, 337 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. Aug.

United States v. Pallares-Galan,
359 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 2004) (California conviction
of violating Penal Code § 647.6(a), annoy or molest a child
under 18, is conviction under a "divisible statute,"
and does not constitute an aggravated felony "sexual
abuse of a minor" offense for illegal re-entry sentencing
purposes).