Post-Conviction Relief for Immigrants

 

A prosecutor’s failure to disclose material exculpatory information to the defense renders a guilty or no contest plea constitutionally invalid.[491]  Where the prosecution fails to disclose exculpatory evidence, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be granted where there is a reasonable probability that, but for the discovery violation, the defendant would have refused to enter the plea and insisted on going to trial.[492]  Long-standing legal rules, however, require a conviction based on perjured testimony to be set aside, even if the prosecution was unaware of it at the time.[493]

In California, disclosure of constitutionally mandated discovery under Brady and its progeny is required, even though this evidence is not included under California Penal Code § 1054.1.[494]  The California Supreme Court further refined the definition of exculpatory evidence in People v. Coddington: “Evidence is favorable and must be disclosed if it will either help the defendant or hurt the prosecution . . . .”[495]

 

            The disclosures required under Brady also include the duty to disclose all information which might potentially impeach the credibility of prosecution witnesses or evidence.[496]  The United States Supreme Court, however, held that mere impeachment information need not be disclosed by the prosecution prior to plea.[497]

 

            The duty to disclose is applicable even though there has been no request by the accused.[498]  The rule covers information “known only to the police investigators and not the prosecutor.”[499]  “The individual prosecutor is presumed to have knowledge of all information gathered in connection with the government’s investigation.”[500]

 

Prosecution suppression of exculpatory evidence is material and therefore prejudicial if there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.[501]  Evidence it “might” have changed the outcome is not enough.  Undisclosed evidence is material if its absence prevented the defendant from receiving a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence, or if it could reasonably be taken to put the case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.[502]

 

The Ninth Circuit has held the prosecution had a duty to turn over exculpatory evidence relevant to a habeas corpus proceeding.[503]  Under California law, as well, the State’s obligation to disclose continues into post-conviction actions.[504]

 

[491] Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Brown, 17 Cal.4th 873, 879-880 (1998); see also Tate v. Wood, 963 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1992); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir. 1988).  But see Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that in 1994 for a Brady violation to invalidate a plea, rather a trial, would be a “new rule” under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and so does not apply on habeas corpus).

[492] Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 324 (6th Cir. 1985); Scroggins v. State, 859 S.W.2d 704, 709 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Sturgeon, 231 N.W.2d 487 (Wis.Ct.App. 1999); see also Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1827 (1998) (prosecutor failed to disclose information in state’s files showing that prosecution’s central witness, who later confessed to murder for which petitioner was convicted, had previously been committed to mental hospital for violent rages, had long history of prior crimes and lying to the police and blaming others to cover up his own guilt); East v. Johnson, 123 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 1997) (prosecutor suppressed evidence that would have led defense to discover report raising substantial questions about sanity and credibility of crucial sentencing witness who claimed that petitioner robbed and raped her prior to murder for which petitioner was sentenced to die); Guerra v. Johnson, 90 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1996) (police coerced two originally-exculpatory eyewitnesses into corroborating prosecution theory); Riggins v. Rees, 74 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 1996) (state’s refusal to provide transcripts, rather than merely court reporter’s tapes, of previous two mistrials violated Equal Protection Clause); Devose v. Norris, 53 F.3d 201 (8th Cir. 1995) (refusal to disclose identity of confidential informant eyewitness).

[493] Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. March 13, 2002) (prosecutor's reliance on perjured testimony (whether knowing or not) requires that conviction be set aside); Hall v. Director of Corrections, 343 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. September 8, 2003) (appellate court reversal of trial court finding that scientific evidence and jailhouse snitch’s subsequent testimony supported claim that snitch had falsified jailhouse notes between him and petitioner in order to incriminate him constituted unreasonable determination of facts in light of evidence presented to trial court).

[494] Izazaga v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 356, 378 (1991).

[495] People v. Coddington, 23 Cal.4th 529 (2000).

[496] United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 450-451 (1995); People v. Santos, 30 Cal.App.4th 169, 178-179 (1994); People v. Little, 59 Cal. App.4th 426 (1997).

[497] United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (June 24, 2002) (constitution does not require government to disclose material impeachment evidence or affirmative defense information prior to entering plea agreement with defendant).

[498] United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).

[499] Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995); see, e.g, Smith v. Secretary Dept. of Corrections, 50 F.3d 801, 824  (10th Cir. 1995) (“the prosecution” extends to law enforcement personnel and other arms of the state involved in investigative aspects); United States v. Brooks, 296 U.S.App.D.C. 219, 966 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (duty to investigate based on “close working relationship” between police and United States Attorney).

[500] United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1208  (2d Cir.1995); see, e.g., In re Malone, 12 Cal.4th 935, 977, n.22, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 281, 911 P.2d 468 (1996); People v. Little, 59 Cal.App.4th 426, 433, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 907 (1997).

[501] Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995); United States v. Barton, 995 F.2d 931, 933-34 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Sassounian, 9 Cal.4th 535 (1995).

[502] Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999).

[503] Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749-750 (9th Cir. 1992).

[504] People v. Garcia, 17 Cal.App.4th 1169 (1992).