Post-Conviction Relief for Immigrants
§ 6.41 G. Breach of Plea Bargain
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If the government breaches the plea agreement, it violates the defendant’s right to due process and renders the plea involuntary. See § 7.97, infra.[366] The issue of breach of plea bargain is reviewed de novo.[367]
Due process requires the government to honor its agreements:
[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.[368]
“Plea bargains are ‘contractual in nature and must be measured by contract law standards.’”[369] As a result, when the agreement could be said to be ambiguous, it must be construed against the drafter — the government.[370] The government is to be held to the literal terms of the agreement, and must bear responsibility for any lack of clarity.[371] Construing ambiguities in favor of the defendant makes sense in light of the parties’ respective bargaining power and expertise.[372]
A negotiated guilty plea is a “bargained-for quid pro quo,” so that either party will be in breach if it fails to live up to its obligations under the agreement.[373] “When a guilty plea is entered in exchange for specified benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum punishment, both parties, including the state, must abide by the terms of the agreement.”[374] Where a defendant has breached a plea agreement, courts have found the government to be free from its obligations.[375] The government may move to vacate a plea agreement upon the defendant’s breach.[376]
The prosecution’s failure to comply with the essence of the plea bargain renders the defendant’s plea involuntary, and undermines the constitutional validity of the conviction.[377] Under these circumstances, the conviction should be reversed, and the defendant should be allowed to enter a new plea. The harmless error rule does not apply to the law of contractual plea agreements. Where the government is in breach, there are several available remedies, including allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea or ordering “specific performance” by the government.[378]
When the prosecution offers a defendant a plea bargain, and the defendant timely accepts, the prosecution may not withdraw its offer absent exceptional circumstances.[379] When the defendant has detrimentally relied on the contract, specific performance may be the only just remedy.[380]
If the court, however, refuses to honor the plea bargain, it is obligated to offer the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea.[381]
[366] United States v. Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. November 27, 2002) (government breached plea agreement by recommending against “safety valve” departure without independent finding by Probation Department that safety valve was not applicable).
[367] United States v. Myers, 32 F.3d 411, 413 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversal for prosecution breach of plea agreement by failure to recommend a low-end sentence).
[368] Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
[369] United States v. Packwood, 848 F.2d 1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Sutton, 794 F.2d 1415, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)).
[370] United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1338 (9th Cir. 1993).
[371] United States v. Anderson, 970 F.2d 602, 607 (1992), amended, 990 F.2d 1163 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Read, 778 F.2d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986); United States v. Herrera, 928 F.2d at 772; United States v. Giorgi, 840 F.2d 1022, 1026 (1st Cir. 1988)).
[372] United States v. De La Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1338 (9th Cir. 1993).
[373] United States v. Partida-Parra, 859 F.2d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 1988).
[374] “When a guilty plea is entered in exchange for specified benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum punishment, both parties, including the state, must abide by the terms of the agreement.” People v. Walker, 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1024 (1991).
[375] See, e.g., id. (citing United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 887-89 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Reardon, 787 F.2d 512, 516 (10th Cir. 1986)).
[376] People v. Vargas, 91 Cal.App.4th 506 (2001).
[377] See United States v. Corsentino, 685 F.2d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 1982); cf. United States v. Read, 778 F.2d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984).
[378] United States v. Partida-Parra, 859 F.2d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Herrera, 640 F.2d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 1981)); see generally Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e) (governing plea withdrawals); United States v. Anderson, supra, 970 F.2d at 608; People v. Mancheno, 32 Cal.3d 855 (1982).
[379] People v. Williams, 45 Cal.3d 1268 (1988).
[380] Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. August 4, 2003) (defendant entered into plea agreement upon prosecutor’s false promise on the record that with good behavior in prison, defendant would be released in half the time; the responsibility for the false promise lies with the prosecutor who made the offer and the judge who could have clarified that prosecutor had no power to make such a commitment; specific performance was the only remedy, since the petitioner had served 17 years, and “paid in a coin that the state cannot refund.”).
[381] Ellis v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist of Washington, 294 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. June 21, 2002), opinion vacated by, 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. December 5, 2002) (if trial court, after accepting plea to lower charge, subsequently disapproves plea agreement, judge must give the defendant opportunity to withdraw plea; court is not ‘stuck’ with charge in plea agreement).