In addition to being a knowing relinquishment, the waiver of the right to trial by jury must be a voluntary decision.  The California Supreme Court has declared invalid a waiver of the right to a jury trial, where the trial court informed the defendant that he would receive “some benefit” if he waived his right to a jury trial, although the court did not specify what that benefit would be.[313]  The court found that the promise of some unspecified benefit presented a “substantial danger of unintentional coercion,” thus rendering the waiver involuntary.[314]  The court explained:

 

In effect, the trial court offered to reward defendant for refraining from the exercise of a constitutional right.  (See Lewallen, supra, 23 Cal.3d 274, 278-281; People v. Colds, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d 860, 863-864; accord, People v. Alexander (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 602, 605.)  The circumstance that the trial court did not specify the nature of the benefit by making a promise of a particular mitigation in sentence, or other reward, does not negate the coercive effect of the court’s assurances.  The inducement offered by the trial court to defendant, to persuade him to waive his fundamental right to a jury trial, violated defendant’s right to due process of law.[315]

 

The failure to obtain a voluntary waiver under these circumstances amounts to structural error requiring automatic reversal without a showing of prejudice.[316]

 

[313] People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297 (2001).

[314] Id., citing People v. Orin, 13 Cal.3d 937, 943 (1975).

[315] Ibid.

[316] Ibid.

Ninth Circuit

POST CON RELIEF " GROUNDS " JURY TRIAL WAIVER
United States v. Shorty, 741 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. Dec. 20, 2013) (district court failed to take the necessary precautions to ensure defendants jury-trial waiver was made knowingly and intelligently, after learning that defendant had low I.Q. and was learning disabled, when district court failed to conduct in-depth colloquy concerning jury-trial waiver).

POST CON RELIEF " GROUNDS " JURY WAIVER
Crosby v. Schwartz, 678 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. May 4, 2012) (affirming denial of habeas corpus, where state court holdings were neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, in that the defendants jury trial waiver was express and intelligent; there is no clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law that holds that the Constitution guarantees a right to a jury trial after a valid waiver of that right).