Post-Conviction Relief for Immigrants

 

A claim of estoppel can be made under Santobello v. New York,[382] and its progeny, where there is no valid contract claim.[383]  Restatement of the Law of Contracts § 90 establishes the doctrine of promissory estoppel:

 

A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.

 

The elements of promissory estoppel are a promise, which the promisor should reasonably foresee would cause the promisee to rely upon, and upon which the promisee actually relies to his detriment.

 

In re Kenneth H[384] applied the doctrine of detrimental reliance to the plea bargain situation and ordered the state’s broken promise enforced due to the accused’s detrimental reliance thereon, based on his submission to a polygraph examination.  The state promised to move to dismiss the juvenile delinquency proceeding if the minor agreed to take a polygraph examination and passed it.[385]  After the minor had paid for a private polygraph test and had passed, the prosecutor refused to move for dismissal, explaining that he had received various calls from the community objecting to dismissal of the case.[386] 

 

Although the plea agreement was not enforceable because it had not yet been approved by the court, a theory of detrimental reliance mandated its enforcement:

 

The fact that the court is not bound by a plea agreement entered into by the prosecutor and the accused, and the fact that a plea agreement made by the parties before it is submitted for court approval is akin to an executory contract which does not bind the accused, do not undermine the principle that the prosecutor should be bound by the agreement if the accused has relied detrimentally upon it. The integrity of the office of the prosecutor is implicated because a “‘pledge of public faith’” occurs when the prosecution enters into an agreement with an accused. [Citation omitted.] . . . The ‘failure of the [prosecutor] to fulfill [his] promise . . . affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ [Citation omitted.][387]

 

The defendant suffered sufficient detriment because he had waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent by submitting to a polygraph examination.  The court explained:

 

Here, the minor relied upon the agreement by waiving his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and by paying $350 to take the polygraph examination.  The People believe this is insufficient to warrant enforcement of the agreement.  They argue: ‘Although by submitting to a polygraph examination [the minor] may have given up his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, his statements were not used for any purpose in adjudication or disposition. The only other detriment [the minor] suffered was financial — the $350 fee paid for the test . . . . [A]ttempting to recoup this kind of loss is better addressed in a civil action under principles of contract law.  It does not involve a denial of due process or abridgment of liberty and cannot warrant dismissal of a juvenile petition charging criminal behavior.’  We are unpersuaded.  ‘A defendant relies upon a [prosecutor’s] plea offer by taking some substantial step or accepting serious risk of an adverse result following acceptance of the plea offer. [Citation.]  Detrimental reliance may be demonstrated where the defendant performed some part of the bargain.  [Citation.] . . . .’ [Citations omitted.]  By paying for, and submitting to, the polygraph examination, the minor took a substantial step toward fulfilling his obligation under the agreement, and accepted a serious risk that he might suffer an adverse result, i.e., fail the examination, which he would not have been required to take but for the agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecution should be bound by its agreement.[388] 

 

The court therefore reversed the adjudication of delinquency on this basis.

[382] Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).

[383] See, e.g., In re Kenneth H., 80 Cal.App.4th 143 (2000).

[384] In re Kenneth H., 80 Cal.App.4th 143, 148-149 (2000).

[385] Id. at 145.

[386] Id. at 145-146.

[387] Id. at 148-49 (emphasis supplied).

[388] Ibid. (emphasis supplied).