Post-Conviction Relief for Immigrants

 

(A)  Coercion from Codefendants.  A common example is where two defendants are charged, and are offered different plea bargains in a “package deal” that both must accept or neither may enjoy the benefits of the plea agreement.  There, the possibility arises that the defendant receiving the sweetheart deal will put a gun to the head of the codefendant and force him or her to take the deal, even though the codefendant may be innocent of the charge to which s/he is entering a plea.  This form of coercion may occur in the streets as well.  It is not uncommon for the husband to be told by the police, implicitly or explicitly, that he better take the rap or his wife will be arrested as well, and the children forced into foster care.

 

            Under both state and federal law, the trial court has an obligation to determine whether the plea bargain is a package deal, and, if so, to inquire thoroughly into the possibility of coercion.  If the court did not do so, it fails to establish that the plea was not involuntary.[403]

 

            The Supreme Court has reserved judgment on the “constitutional implications of a prosecutor’s offer during plea bargaining of adverse or lenient treatment for some person other than the accused.”[404]  The court noted that third party threats and promises “might pose a great danger of inducing a false guilty plea by skewing the assessment of the risks a defendant must consider.”[405]

 

            A number of courts have held that a trial court must make a more careful examination of the voluntariness of a plea when it is induced by threats or promises against a third party.[406]

            In United States v. Martinez-Molina,[407] the court held the trial court’s inquiry into the voluntariness of the guilty plea was inadequate, and reversed the convictions.  Three appellants claimed their attorneys coerced them into accepting the package deal plea agreements.

 

It is beyond dispute that a guilty plea is involuntary and therefore invalid if it is obtained “by actual or threatened physical harm or by coercion overbearing the will of the defendant.”  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970) (parallel citations omitted).  The Supreme Court has also explained that “a prosecutor’s offer during plea bargaining of adverse or lenient treatment for some person other than the accused might pose a greater danger of inducing a false guilty plea by skewing the risks a defendant must consider.”  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 n.8 (1978) (dictum) (parallel citations omitted).  This concern applies to package plea agreements because, “[q]uite possibly, one defendant will be happier with the package deal than his codefendant(s); looking out for his own best interests, the lucky one may try to force his codefendant(s) into going along with the deal.”  United States v. Caro, 997 F.2d 657, 659-660 (9th Cir. 1993).  Package plea deals therefore impose special obligations: the prosecutor must alert the district court to the fact that codefendants are entering a package deal.  Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(2); United States v. Daniels, 821 F.2d 76, 78-79 (1st Cir. 1987); see also Caro, 997 F.2d at 659-660, and the district court must carefully ascertain the voluntariness of each defendant’s plea.  See United States v. Buckley, 847 F.2d 991, 1000 n.6 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1015 (1989) (parallel citations omitted); Daniels, 821 F.2d at 79-80; see also Caro, 997 F.2d at 660.[408]

 

            Thus, federal law requires a trial court, when taking a guilty plea, to conduct a special inquiry in co-defendant cases to ensure that the defendant is not entering an involuntary plea as a result of pressure or promises brought to bear on a codefendant because of a package deal.

 

            Moreover, the California Supreme Court has likewise held that a “package deal” plea bargain is not automatically coercive per se, but the trial court must take special pains to verify that such a plea was given voluntarily under the totality of the circumstances before accepting it.[409]  “[W]hen a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a ‘package-deal’ arrangement, the trial court has a duty to conduct further inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea; although such a bargain is not per se coercive, it may be so under a totality of the circumstances.”[410]

 

            The court explained:

 

“Package-deal” plea bargains, however, may approach the line of unreasonableness.  Extraneous factors not related to the case or the prosecutor’s business may be brought into play.  For example, a defendant may fear that his wife will be prosecuted and convicted if he does not plead guilty; or, a defendant may fear, as alleged in this case, that his codefendant will attack him if he does not plead guilty.  Because such considerations do not bear any direct relation to whether the defendant himself is guilty, special scrutiny must be employed to ensure a voluntary plea.  “[P]lea bargaining of adverse or lenient treatment for some person other than the accused . . . might pose a greater danger of inducing a false guilty plea . . . .”  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra, 434 U.S. at p. 364, fn. 8, 98 S.Ct. at p. 668, fn. 8; italics in original.[411]

 

            The court indicated that the same factors that might create a coerced confession may be used to determine whether a guilty plea has been coerced, including a promise of leniency to a third party.[412]  The court explained the factors to be considered: 

 

First, the court must determine whether the inducement for the plea is proper. . . .  Second, the factual basis for the guilty plea must be considered.  If the guilty plea is not supported by the evidence, it is less likely that the plea was the product of the accused’s free will.  The same would be true if the “bargained-for” sentence were disproportionate to the accused’s culpability.  Third, the nature and degree of coerciveness should be carefully examined.  Psychological pressures sufficient to indicate an involuntary plea might be present if the third party promised leniency is a close friend or family member whom the defendant feels compelled to help. . . .  If the defendant bears no special relationship to the third party promised leniency, he may nevertheless feel compelled to plead guilty due to physical threat.  For example, if the third party had made a specific threat against defendant if he refused to plead guilty, the plea is likely to be involuntary.  On the other hand, if the defendant merely thought, as in the case at bar, that his codefendant would attack him if he did not plead guilty, sufficient coercive factors may not be at play.  Fourth, a plea is not coerced if the promise of leniency to a third party was an insignificant consideration by a defendant in his choice to plead guilty. . . .  Our list is by no means exhaustive.  Other factors which may be relevant can and should be taken into account at the inquiry.  For example, the age of the defendant . . . , whether defendant or the prosecutor had initiated the plea negotiations . . . , and whether charges have already been pressed against a third party . . . might be important considerations.[413]

 

            The record, however, does sufficiently demonstrate that petitioner pled guilty as part of a “package deal” plea bargain and that the trial court failed to inquire into the possibly coercive character of that bargain. Under our decision in In re Ronald E., supra, 19 Cal.3d 315, 320-321, 325-326, 137 Cal.Rptr. 781 [parallel citation omitted], however, a plea cannot be set aside on petition for habeas corpus unless the petitioner demonstrates prejudice.  Thus petitioner here must allege and prove that his plea of guilty was involuntary under the standards set down in this opinion and should not have been accepted by the trial court.[414]

 

            The court stated: “In seeking to set aside a plea as involuntary under the standards discussed in this opinion, both a petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus and an appellant must point to facts to show not only the lack of an inquiry but also the involuntary character of the plea.”[415]

 

[403] In re Ibarra, 34 Cal.3d 277, 193 Cal.Rptr. 538 (1983) (package deal coercive unless affirmative showing of voluntariness on the record at the plea); see United States v. Caro, 997 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1993).

[404] Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 n.8 (1978) [emphasis supplied].

[405] Ibid.

[406] United States v. Castello, 724 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1984) (“the trial court did conduct a particularly searching inquiry at the Rule 11 hearing”); United States v. Usher, 703 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 1983); Harman v. Mohn, 683 F.2d 834, 838 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Nuckols, 606 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1979) (threat to prosecute defendant’s wife); United States v. Tursi, 576 F.2d 396, 398 (1st Cir. 1978); Johnson v. Wilson, 371 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1967) (threat to prosecute pregnant wife and turn daughter over to juvenile authorities).

[407] United States v. Martinez-Molina, 64 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 1995).

[408] United States v. Martinez-Molina, 64 F.3d 719, 733 (9th Cir. 1995).

[409] In re Ibarra, 34 Cal.3d 277, 193 Cal.Rptr. 538 (1983).

[410] Id. at p. 540.

[411] In re Ibarra, 34 Cal.3d 277, 193 Cal.Rptr. 538, 544 (1983).

[412] Id. at p. 544, n.4, citing People v. Haydel, 12 Cal.3d 190, 201, n.5, 115 Cal.Rptr. 394 (1974) [parallel citation omitted]; see also People v. Matlock, 51 Cal.2d 682, 336 P.2d 505 (1959).

[413] In re Ibarra, 34 Cal.3d 277, 193 Cal.Rptr. 538, 545 (1983) [citations omitted].

[414] In re Ibarra, 34 Cal.3d 277, 193 Cal.Rptr. 538, 546 (1983) [footnote omitted].

[415] In re Ibarra, 34 Cal.3d 277, 193 Cal.Rptr. 538, 546 n.6 (1983).