Post-Conviction Relief for Immigrants

(B)  Voluntariness of a "Slow Plea."  Many of these requirements apply as well to the “slow plea” situation, in which the defendant waives the rights to jury trial, confrontation, and against self-incrimination, and stipulates that the court may decide guilt or innocence on the basis of stipulated facts, the offense report, or the preliminary hearing transcript.  The U.S. Supreme Court granted the defendant’s habeas corpus petition because his “prima facie” trial was equivalent to a guilty plea and had been obtained without his waiver of confrontation and self-incrimination.[286]

            In California, the courts have specifically held that the Boykin-Tahl requirements apply to a proceeding in which rights are waived under circumstances in which the court will find the defendant guilty of a criminal offense, i.e., where the proceedings are tantamount to a guilty plea.[287]  If the procedure used is the equivalent to a plea of guilty, the failure to obtain knowing and voluntary waivers requires reversal per se.[288]

[286] Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 1245 (1966).

[287] People v. Rogers, 56 Cal.2d 301, 14 Cal.Rptr. 660 (1961); People v. Gray, 135 Cal.App.3d 859, 185 Cal.Rptr. 772 (1982); People v. Huynh, 229 Cal.App.3d 1067, 281 Cal.Rptr. 785 (1991); see In re Steven H., 130 Cal.App.3d 449, 181 Cal.Rptr. 719 (1982); People v. Drieslein, 170 Cal.App.3d 591, 216 Cal.Rptr. 244 (1985).

[288] People v. Wright, 43 Cal.3d 487, 492, 233 Cal.Rptr. 69, 71 (1987); People v. Huynh, 229 Cal.App.3d 1067, 1078, 281 Cal.Rptr. 785, 792 (1991).