(D)  Sentencing Context.  The definitions of “crime of violence” and “sexual abuse of a minor” are not necessarily the same in the sentencing context as in the immigration context.  While immigration cases always apply the definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), sentencing cases may involve one of three different definitions.  See § 4.40, supra.

 

In United States v. Searcy,[672] for example, the Eleventh Circuit found that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2442(b), committed by soliciting sex with a minor over the internet, was a crime of violence for sentencing purposes under the Armed Career Criminal Act.  The “crime of violence” definition applied in that context is met where there is a “serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”[673]  Rejecting the argument that there is no risk of injury in the act of soliciting a child over the internet (only in what might happen afterward), the court found that “the use of an Internet facility to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity presents the possibility of an encounter that could result in a serious risk of physical injury to the minor.”[674]  If the court had been required to find a serious risk of force in commission of the offense,[675] as required under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), the outcome arguably would have been different.

 

In a related context, the Ninth Circuit found in United States v. Lopez-Montanez[676] that a California conviction for sexual battery[677] was not a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, because the “crime of violence” definition applied in that context requires that the offense either have force as an element, or that the offense falls within an exclusive list of offenses, including “forcible sex offenses (including sexual abuse of a minor),”[678] and the offense in question did not have as an element the use of force, or otherwise require force.  The court drew a distinction between that and another case,[679] decided only four days earlier, finding that a conviction under the same statute was a crime of violence for aggravated felony purposes because 18 U.S.C. § 16 additionally includes offenses involving a substantial risk of force.

[672] United States v. Searcy, 418 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. July 28, 2005).

[673] U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.

[674] United States v. Searcy, 418 F.3d at 1197 (11th Cir. July 28, 2005).

[675] See § 5.23, supra.

[676] United States v. Lopez-Montanez, 421 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 2005).

[677] California Penal Code § 243.4(a).

[678] U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. N. 1(B)(ii) (2002).

[679] Lisbey v. Gonzalez, 420 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2005).

BIA

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE - CHILD ABUSE - FOURTH DEGREE ASSAULT - NOT CATEGORICALLY A CRIME OF CHILD ABUSE
Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, ___ (BIA May 20, 2008) (Washington conviction of fourth degree assault, in violation of Wash. Rev. Code 9A.36.041, did not categorically constitute a "crime of child abuse," under INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), because statutory elements contain no element of age of the victim, and "administrative record does not establish that the respondent was convicted of an offense that had the juvenile status of the victim as an element." (emphasis in original)).

Second Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR - ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD
James v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2008) (remanding to the BIA to decide whether New York misdemeanor conviction of endangering the welfare of a child, in violation of Penal Law 260.10 ["knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than seventeen years old or directs or authorizes such child to engage in an occupation involving a substantial risk of danger to his life or health"], is a divisible statute).

    This case leaves open, and remands to the BIA, the issue of whether a statute containing a single set of elements [or in this case two sets] that does not necessarily include aggravated felony conduct can be found to be "divisible" for purposes of applying the modified categorical analysis and making reference to the record of conviction. The law has been, of course, that a statute containing only one offense cannot be found divisible. Instead, the immigration authorities must apply the minimum conduct test when a statute contains only one set of elements that may be met by conduct that both falls within and outside of a ground of removal.

The Second Circuit stated:

"Up to this point," we observed recently in Dulal-Whiteway v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "we have explicitly found statutes divisible only where the removable and non-removable offenses they describe are listed in different subsections or comprise discrete elements of a disjunctive list of proscribed conduct"; "we have not explicitly queried whether this logic extends to a statute ... where only one type of generic conduct ... is proscribed, but an alien can commit the conduct both in ways that would render him removable ... and in ways that would not ...." 501 F.3d 116, 126-27 (2d Cir.2007) (emphasis added). The statute in Dulal-Whiteway (proscribing fraud to obtain things valuing over $1,000) is one such a statute. Id. at 126. The statute in this case is another. FN4 We further observed in Dulal-Whiteway that there are at least three ways of approaching such a statute -- none of which we have explicitly adopted or rejected. We could "find[ ] divisible only those statutes where the alternative means of committing a violation, some of which constitute removable conduct and some of which do not, are enumerated as discrete alternatives." Id. at 127 (emphasis added). Or we could "take the position that all statues of conviction may be considered divisible regardless of their structure, so long as they contain an element or elements that could be satisfied either by removable or non-removable conduct." Id. at 128. And somewhere in the middle is a third approach, developed by the Third Circuit, under which a criminal statute may be considered divisible if either (1) the statute of conviction is phrased in the disjunctive or divided into subsections such that "some variations of the crime of conviction meet the aggravated-felony requisites and others do not," or (2) the relevant removability provision "invite[s] inquiry into the facts underlying the conviction at issue." Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 161, 162 (3d Cir.2004)).FN5 "Neither Supreme Court nor Second Circuit precedent," we concluded in Dulal-Whiteway, "compels a conclusion one way or the other." 501 F.3d at 127.FN6 And no case since Dulal-Whiteway has provided greater guidance as to how we would treat a statute like New York Penal Law section 260.10. Accordingly, the IJ and BIA based their decision on an incorrect premise.

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - SEXUAL CONTACT WITH CHILD UNDER 16
Dos Santos v. Gonzalez, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 521583 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2006) (Connecticut conviction of violating Connecticut General Statute, 53-21(a)(2) [punishing "contact with the intimate parts, as defined by section 53a-65, of a child under the age of sixteen years or subjects a child under sixteen years of age to contact with the intimate parts of such person, in a sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the health or morals of such child."], is an aggravated felony crime of violence for immigration purposes as defined by 18 U.S.C. 16(b)).

Fifth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - STATUTE DEFINING "SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR" HAS SAME MEANING IN IMMIGRATION AS CRIMINAL SENTENCE CONTEXT
United States v. Najera-Najera, 519 F.3d 509, 512 n.2 (5th Cir. Mar. 7, 2008) (the term "sexual abuse of a minor" has the same meaning in the aggravated felony context as in the illegal re-entry sentencing context).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR - INDECENCY WITH A CHILD
United States v. Najera-Najera, 519 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. Mar. 7, 2008) (Texas conviction for indecency with a child, in violation of Texas Penal Code 21.11(a)(1), constitutes a "crime of violence" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - SEXUAL ASSAULT
United States v. Martinez-Vega, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir. Nov. 29, 2006) (Texas conviction for sexual assault of a child under 17, in violation of Texas Penal Code 22.011, is a "crime of violence" as "sexual abuse of a minor" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, especially where noncitizen defendant admitted before criminal judge that all facts in PSR were correct [i.e. that he sexually abused his 14 year old daughter]). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/5th/0541498cr0p.pdf

Sixth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - SEXUAL PENETRATION
United States v. Ossa-Gallegos, ___ F.3d ___ (6th Cir. Jun. 30, 2006) (Texas conviction for sexual assault, based on unlawfully, intentionally, and knowingly caus[ing] the penetration of 10-year-old a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/6th/055824p.pdf

Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " LEWD AND LASIVIOUS BATTERY
United States v. Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2013) (Florida conviction for "lewd and lascivious battery," in violation of Florida Statutes 800.04(4)(a) [[e]ngag[ing] in sexual activity with a person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age.], did not categorically constitute a crime of violence for illegal reentry sentencing purposes, since lack of consent is not an element of the crime; nor is the statute divisible, so the modified categorical analysis cannot be employed); United States v. Gomez"Mendez, 486 F.3d 599, 604 (9th Cir. 2007) (Florida conviction of lewd and lascivious battery, in violation of Fla. Stat. 800.04(4)(a) is a strict liability crime[,] criminalizing [e]ngag[ing] in sexual activity with a person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age, ibid., regardless of whether the victim, in fact, consents); see United States v. Rangel"Castaneda, 709 F.3d 373, 376 (4th Cir.2013) (Tennessee conviction of sexual penetration ... when the victim is at least thirteen (13) but less than eighteen (18) years of age and the defendant is at least ten (10) years older than the victim. did not categorically constitute a crime of violence as a forcible sex offense under the guidelines because the fact that Tennessee law renders the consent of a statutory rape victim formally irrelevant does not mean that the offense necessarily requires sexual conduct that is forcible ..."that is, involving actual compulsion.); The court reasoned: First, the absence of a consent defense to statutory rape is analytically distinct from situations in which a victim's consent ... is [deemed] not legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct is involuntary, incompetent, or coerced. U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(B)(iii). The three examples cited by the Sentencing Commission, see supra at pp. 1054"55, involve instances in which the victim does not in fact have the state of mind of willing acquiescence"either because her consent is coerced, or because her actual state of mind is such that she is not capable of willingly consenting, as in the case of incompetence or intoxication. We have acknowledged, however, that the assumption that a minor's legal incapacity implies that the proscribed sexual intercourse is non-consensual does not always hold true[.] Valencia v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir.2006). Some minors are able to engage in sexual intercourse voluntarily, despite being legally incapable of consent. Id. In other words, because statutory rape is a strict liability crime, the minor's actual state of mind does not matter, nor does the minor's actual capacity for mature deliberation. . The term statutory rape is ordinarily, contemporarily, and commonly understood to mean the unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of consent specified by state statute. Gomez"Mendez, 486 F.3d at 603. If all sex offenses where consent ... is not legally valid on the basis of age are, by definition, forcible, there would be no need to separately enumerate statutory rape. See U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(B)(iii). The same would be true of sexual abuse of a minor, whereby we define the term abuse ... in light of the age of the victim in question, United States v. Medina"Villa, 567 F.3d 507, 513 (9th Cir.2009), and have held that [s]exual conduct with younger children is per se abusive[,] Valencia"Barragan, 608 F.3d at 1107. A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant. Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted). This basic interpretive canon [,] id., applies to the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Wenner, 351 F.3d 969, 974"75 (9th Cir.2003). Yet, when asked at argument, the government could identify no circumstance in which a statutory rape would not also be a forcible sex offense under its interpretation. Nor can we. It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted). We are reluctan[t] to treat ... as surplusage, id., the Guidelines' enumeration of statutory rape and sexual abuse of a minor as separate crimes of violence. Third, deeming as forcible sex offenses all sexual acts with persons under the age of majority would ignore contemporary limitations on the concept of statutory rape. In particular, there has been a move among the states to reform statutory rape laws in cases involving partners of a similar age"for instance, foreclosing prosecutions of 16"year"olds for heavy petting with 14"year"olds, or reducing sentences of 19"year"olds for sexual intercourse with 17"year"olds. See, e.g., Charles A. Phipps, Misdirected Reform: On Regulating Consensual Sexual Activity Between Teenagers, 12 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 373, 390"91 (2003). In recognition of this growing consensus, we have held that, for federal purposes, an age difference of at least four years is an element of sexual abuse of a minor, Estrada"Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1158 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc), and of statutory rape as well, United States v. Gomez, 732 F.3d 971, 988"89 (9th Cir.2013). Reading the term forcible sex offenses"which requires no age difference"to encompass all sexual conduct with minors, would obliterate those limitations. A so-called Romeo"and"Juliet offender[,] Doe v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 503 (6th Cir.2007), could be deemed to have been convicted of a forcible sex offense by virtue of the victim's age, despite being expressly and intentionally excluded from the generic federal definitions of statutory rape and sexual abuse of a minor. (Ibid. at 1055-1056.)

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " LEWD CONDUCT
United States v. Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2013) (Florida conviction for "lewd and lascivious battery," in violation of Florida Statutes 800.04(4)(a), [[e]ngag[ing] in sexual activity with a person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age.], did not categorically constitute a forcible sex offense, and thus cannot be a crime of violence as defined under the federal sentencing guidelines).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " LEWD AND LASIVIOUS BATTERY
United States v. Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2013) (Florida conviction for "lewd and lascivious battery," in violation of Florida Statutes 800.04(4)(a) [[e]ngag[ing] in sexual activity with a person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age.], did not categorically constitute a crime of violence for illegal reentry sentencing purposes, since lack of consent is not an element of the crime; nor is the statute divisible, so the modified categorical analysis cannot be employed); United States v. Gomez"Mendez, 486 F.3d 599, 604 (9th Cir. 2007) (Florida conviction of lewd and lascivious battery, in violation of Fla. Stat. 800.04(4)(a) is a strict liability crime[,] criminalizing [e]ngag[ing] in sexual activity with a person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age, ibid., regardless of whether the victim, in fact, consents); see United States v. Rangel"Castaneda, 709 F.3d 373, 376 (4th Cir.2013) (Tennessee conviction of sexual penetration ... when the victim is at least thirteen (13) but less than eighteen (18) years of age and the defendant is at least ten (10) years older than the victim. did not categorically constitute a crime of violence as a forcible sex offense under the guidelines because the fact that Tennessee law renders the consent of a statutory rape victim formally irrelevant does not mean that the offense necessarily requires sexual conduct that is forcible ..."that is, involving actual compulsion.); The court reasoned: First, the absence of a consent defense to statutory rape is analytically distinct from situations in which a victim's consent ... is [deemed] not legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct is involuntary, incompetent, or coerced. U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(B)(iii). The three examples cited by the Sentencing Commission, see supra at pp. 1054"55, involve instances in which the victim does not in fact have the state of mind of willing acquiescence"either because her consent is coerced, or because her actual state of mind is such that she is not capable of willingly consenting, as in the case of incompetence or intoxication. We have acknowledged, however, that the assumption that a minor's legal incapacity implies that the proscribed sexual intercourse is non-consensual does not always hold true[.] Valencia v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir.2006). Some minors are able to engage in sexual intercourse voluntarily, despite being legally incapable of consent. Id. In other words, because statutory rape is a strict liability crime, the minor's actual state of mind does not matter, nor does the minor's actual capacity for mature deliberation. . The term statutory rape is ordinarily, contemporarily, and commonly understood to mean the unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of consent specified by state statute. Gomez"Mendez, 486 F.3d at 603. If all sex offenses where consent ... is not legally valid on the basis of age are, by definition, forcible, there would be no need to separately enumerate statutory rape. See U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(B)(iii). The same would be true of sexual abuse of a minor, whereby we define the term abuse ... in light of the age of the victim in question, United States v. Medina"Villa, 567 F.3d 507, 513 (9th Cir.2009), and have held that [s]exual conduct with younger children is per se abusive[,] Valencia"Barragan, 608 F.3d at 1107. A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant. Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted). This basic interpretive canon [,] id., applies to the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Wenner, 351 F.3d 969, 974"75 (9th Cir.2003). Yet, when asked at argument, the government could identify no circumstance in which a statutory rape would not also be a forcible sex offense under its interpretation. Nor can we. It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted). We are reluctan[t] to treat ... as surplusage, id., the Guidelines' enumeration of statutory rape and sexual abuse of a minor as separate crimes of violence. Third, deeming as forcible sex offenses all sexual acts with persons under the age of majority would ignore contemporary limitations on the concept of statutory rape. In particular, there has been a move among the states to reform statutory rape laws in cases involving partners of a similar age"for instance, foreclosing prosecutions of 16"year"olds for heavy petting with 14"year"olds, or reducing sentences of 19"year"olds for sexual intercourse with 17"year"olds. See, e.g., Charles A. Phipps, Misdirected Reform: On Regulating Consensual Sexual Activity Between Teenagers, 12 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 373, 390"91 (2003). In recognition of this growing consensus, we have held that, for federal purposes, an age difference of at least four years is an element of sexual abuse of a minor, Estrada"Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1158 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc), and of statutory rape as well, United States v. Gomez, 732 F.3d 971, 988"89 (9th Cir.2013). Reading the term forcible sex offenses"which requires no age difference"to encompass all sexual conduct with minors, would obliterate those limitations. A so-called Romeo"and"Juliet offender[,] Doe v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 503 (6th Cir.2007), could be deemed to have been convicted of a forcible sex offense by virtue of the victim's age, despite being expressly and intentionally excluded from the generic federal definitions of statutory rape and sexual abuse of a minor. (Ibid. at 1055-1056.)

AGGRAVATED FELONY " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " LEWD ACT WITH 15-YEAR-OLD
Rodriguez-Castellon v. Holder, 733 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 2013) (California conviction for lewd and lascivious acts upon a 15-year-old girl when the actor is at least ten years older, under Penal Code 288(c)(1), is a categorical crime of violence and therefore an aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), because this offense, in the ordinary case, poses a substantial risk of the use of physical force under 18 U.S.C. 16(b)). Note: Although not a positive case, the discussion does carefully address prior Ninth Circuit case law and has some very useful analysis distinguishing 18 U.S.C. 16(b), substantial risk analysis from the minimum-conduct analysis required for other portions of the Act, including Sexual Abuse of a Minor, Child Abuse, Domestic Violence, and 18 U.S.C. 16(a). Thanks to Joseph Justin Rollin.

Eleventh Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - LEWD ACT ON MINOR
United States v. Ortiz-Delgado, __ F.3d __ (11th Cir. Jun. 6, 2006) (conviction for lewd act on a minor, in violation of California Penal Code 288 is a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/11th/0515466p.pdf