First Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - RAPE -- STATUTORY RAPE
Silva v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. Jul. 14, 2006) (Massachusetts conviction of statutory rape of 14-year-old girl, under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 23 ["unlawfully has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse, and abuses a child under sixteen years of age"], was held in immigration court to be a "rape" aggravated felony for immigration purposes; since respondent did not challenge this conclusion, he waived any objection to removal on this basis).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - RAPE - STATUTORY RAPE - AGGRAVATED FELONY "RAPE" CONCEPT INCLUDES "STATUTORY RAPE"
Silva v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 26, 2006 WL 1954969 (1st Cir. Jul. 14, 2006) (Massachusetts conviction of statutory rape of 14-year-old girl, under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 23 ["unlawfully has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse, and abuses a child under sixteen years of age"], constituted "rape" aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), for deportation purposes) (dictum) ("Here, the statute of conviction, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 23, specifically terms the crime of conviction "[r]ape." Under the explicit language of the INA, all rape-including statutory rape-comes within the aggravated felony taxonomy. See 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A); see also Mattis v. Reno, 212 F.3d 31, 34-35 (1st Cir.2000) (superseded on other grounds) (holding that statutory rape . . . is an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(A)). It follows inexorably that the petitioner's state-court conviction was properly classified as a conviction for an aggravated felony.").

This analysis is plainly incorrect. It reasons that because the state labels an offense a certain way, the offense falls within the federal aggravated felony term. Many decisions, however, clearly hold that whether a crime falls within the federal definition is a matter of federal law, and the state label attached to the offense is irrelevant. See N. Tooby & J. Rollin, Aggravated Felonies 4.37 (3d Ed. 2006).

Fifth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " RAPE " REQUIREMENT OF SEXUAL INTERCOURSE " DIGITAL PENETRATION INSUFFICIENT
Perez-Gonzalez v. Holder, 667 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2012) (Montana conviction of felony sexual intercourse without consent, in violation of Mont.Code Ann. 45"5"503(1), knowingly have sexual intercourse without consent with a person of the opposite sex, not his spouse, was not categorically rape within the meaning of the aggravated felony rape definition, INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), because digital penetration is not rape; and under modified categorical analysis, neither charging document nor order accepting guilty plea, under statute which punished any nonconsensual penetration of victim, be it penile, digital or mechanical, necessarily established that alien was convicted of crime constituting rape).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - RAPE
United States v. Gomez-Gomez, 493 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. Jul. 20, 2007) (California conviction for forcible rape, in violation of California Penal Code 261 (1990), is not necessarily a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since "[a] subsection of that statute defines duress as a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to perform an act which otherwise would not have been performed, or acquiesce in an act to which one otherwise would not have submitted. Id. at 261(b) (emphasis added). It adds that [t]he total circumstances, including the age of the victim, and his or her relationship to the defendant, are factors to consider in appraising the existence of duress. Id.).

Note: The court here tries to distinguish United States v. Beliew, 492 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. Jul. 5, 2007) (Louisiana conviction for child molestation, in violation of L.S.A.-R.S. 14:81.2(A), is a crime of violence for Armed Career Criminal Act purposes, as a "forcible sex offense" since it requires as an element, "force, violence, duress, menace, psychological intimidation, threat of great bodily harm, or ... use of influence by virtue of a position of control or supervision over the juvenile"; finding that use of influence over juvenile was "constructive" use of force.), and suggests that Beliew may be contrary to established Fifth Circuit precedent.

Lower Courts of Ninth Circuit

SAFE HAVENS " AGGRAVATED FELONIES " RAPE SAFE HAVENS " CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " INNOCENT INTENT
People v. Morales, 212 Cal.App.4th 583, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 920 (2d Dist. Jan. 2, 2013) (reversing conviction of rape of an unconscious person, where under the precise language of the statute, a person who accomplishes sexual intercourse by impersonating someone other than a married victim's spouse is not guilty of the crime of rape of an unconscious person in violation of Penal Code 261(a)(4), but the record did not disclose whether the jury relied on the improper theory, or on the correct theory argued by the prosecutor, that the victim was unconscious because she was asleep, but the trial court did not err in refusing to give instructions that would have allowed the jury to consider his good faith, but mistaken, belief that the victim had consented to sexual intercourse with him).

Tenth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR - CONTRIBUTING TO THE DELINQUENCY OF A MINOR BY UNLAWFUL SEXUAL CONTACT
Vargas v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., ___ F.3d ___ 2006 WL 1689293 (10th Cir. Jun. 21, 2006) (Colorado conviction of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, in violation of CRS 18-6-701, may be violated by encouraging a child to violated any state law, from jaywalking to murder; since conviction under this statute requires proof, as an element of the offense, of a specified predicate offense, it was proper to look to the charging document to determine the predicate offense; violation of CRS 18-6-701 where the predicate offense was a violation of C.R.S. 18-3-404(1)(A), unlawful sexual contact with a minor, constitutes an aggravated felony). http://laws.lp.findlaw.com/10th/059581.html