Safe Havens



 
 

§ 7.89 28. Obstruction of Justice

 
Skip to § 7.

For more text, click "Next Page>"

See “Accessory After the Fact,” § 7.30, supra, and “Misprision of Felony,” § 7.85, supra.  A conviction of contempt of court, under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), was one “relating to obstruction of justice,” and thus an “aggravated felony” for immigration purposes).[697]


[697] Alwan v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. Oct. 18, 2004).

Updates

 

BIA

AGGRAVATED FELONY - OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE - HINDERING ONE'S OWN ARREST
Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 808 (BIA 1999) ("[I]t is substantially unlikely that the offense of simply obstructing or hindering one's own arrest will be viewed as an obstruction of justice aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act for removal purposes.").
SAFE HAVEN - AGGRAVATED FELONY - OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE -- ELUDING AN OFFICER OFFENSE DOES NOT MEET BIA DEFINITION OF OBSTRUCTING
California Penal Code 2800.2, eluding an officer, should not be considered an obstruction of justice offense within the meaning of INA 101(a)(43)(S), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(S). See Matter of Espinoza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 894 (BIA 1999) ("We do not believe that every offense that, by its nature, would tend to "obstruct justice" is an offense that should properly be classified as "obstruction of justice." The United States Code delineates a circumscribed set of offenses that constitute "obstruction of justice," and although misprision of a felony bears some resemblance to these offenses, it lacks the critical element of an affirmative and intentional attempt, motivated by a specific intent, to interfere with the process of justice.").

Ninth Circuit

PRACTICE ADVISORY " CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " MISPRISON OF A FELONY PRACTICE ADVISORY " AGGRAVATED FELONY " OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE " MISPRISION OF A FELONY
Federal conviction of misprision of a felony, under 18 U.S.C. 4, does not constitute an aggravated felony, or a crime of moral turpitude, at least within the Ninth Circuit. This offense is not considered a drug-trafficking aggravated felony, even if the principals felony was a drug-trafficking offense and the client were to receive a sentence of one year or more. See Matter of Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I & N Dec. 889 (BIA 1999), distinguishing, but not overruling Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 955 (BIA 1997), while holding that misprision conviction does not constitute obstruction of justice aggravated felony). Compare Matter of Batista-Hernandez, supra (holding that noncitizen convicted of accessory to drug crime is deportable under obstruction of justice aggravated felony ground). The BIA considers this offense to be a crime of moral turpitude, which can trigger deportation or inadmissibility. Matter of Robles, 24 I & N Dec. 22 (BIA 2006). The Ninth Circuit reversed, saying the BIA interpretation was so unreasonable that it was not a permissible interpretation of the moral turpitude deportation statute. Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2012). That is the law, at least in the Ninth Circuit, at least right now. This rule, however, applies only within the Ninth Circuit. The BIA Robles rule prevails in all other circuits in the country. For example, the Eleventh Circuit has held misprision was categorically a CMT. Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. Apr. 22, 2002). There is therefore a circuit split, giving rise to the possibility that the Supreme Court might take up the issue in the future. In the meantime, the client risks being placed in removal proceedings for this conviction if found in the U.S. outside the Ninth Circuit. To avoid this possibility, the client should therefore enter and leave the United States through Ports of Entry within the Ninth Circuit.
AGGRAVATED FELONY " OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE " RENDERING CRIMINAL ASSISTANCE
Hoang v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 1885989 (9th Cir. May 17, 2011) (Washington conviction of misdemeanor rendering criminal assistance in the second degree, to a person who committed a felony, by providing such person transportation, in violation of Wash. Rev. Code 9A.76.080, did not categorically constitute an aggravated felony crime related to obstruction of justice under INA 101(a)(43)(S), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(S), because a person could be convicted of violating this statute if to one whom s/he provided transportation s/he knows has committed a crime, before any investigation or judicial proceeding has begun; generic federal obstruction of justice requires that defendant commit an act involving either active interference with proceedings of a tribunal or investigation, or action or threat of action against those who would cooperate with the process of justice.); quoting Matter of Espinoza"Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889, 893 (BIA 1999) (en banc).
AGGRAVATED FELONY - OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2008), withdrawing previous opinion, 532 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. July 10, 2008) (aggravated felony obstruction of justice involves: (a) active interference with proceedings of a tribunal or investigation, or action or threat of action against those who would cooperate in the process of justice; and (b) the specific intent to interfere with the process of justice; no meaning distinction exists between failing to appear for court proceedings and hindering a third party from appearing; "Although misprision of felony or fleeing arrest may obstruct justice in a general sense, neither act interferes with judicial process and thus both offenses are different in kind than generic obstruction-of-justice offenses."), following Matter of Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889, 893 (BIA 1999).

Other

SAFE HAVENS " MISPRISON OF A FELONY
Active concealment, whether physical or verbal, is required for the elements [of misprision of a felony] to be established. See Christopher Mark Curenton, The Past, Present, and Future of 18 U.S.C. 4: An Exploration of the Federal Misprision of Felony Statute, 55 ALA. L. REV. 183, 185"86 (2003) (explaining the dichotomy between physical and verbal concealment, and noting the heightened standard for verbal concealment to include cases such as knowingly providing the police with completely false information); see also Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 558 n.5 (1980) (requiring some affirmative act of concealment); United States v. Worcester, 190 F. Supp. 548, 565"66 (D. Mass. 1960) (summarizing federal court holdings as requiring active concealment rather than mere failure to disclose for the establishment of the crime of misprision of felony).

 

TRANSLATE