The aggravated felony category of “crimes of violence” is defined by statute in general terms, and a great deal of litigation has developed concerning whether specific offenses are or are not crimes of violence under the statutory definition.  The definition contains two prongs: (1) offenses whose elements require use or threat of force, which can even be misdemeanors, or (2) felony offenses whose elements carry a substantial risk that force may be used in the commission of the offense.  See § 7.42, infra.  A conviction under either prong is an aggravated felony only if a sentence of one year or more is imposed.

 

            It is important to examine the checklist of general aggravated felony safe havens to determine whether each offense or conviction being examined falls within one or more of the safe havens listed there.  See § 7.29, supra.

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - THIS AGGRAVATED FELONY DEFINITION IS GENERIC, NOT CIRCUMSTANCE-SPECIFIC, AND SO IS SUBJECT TO THE STRICT CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS
Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 2300 (Jun. 15, 2009), citing James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 212, 127 S.Ct. 1586 (2007)(while the Court did not directly address whether a "crime of violence" aggravated felony is a generic definition, or a circumstance-specitif definition, it concluded it had already applied the traditional categorical analysis to very similar language in the Armed Career Criminal Act which defines the "violent" felonies it covers to include "burglary, arson, or extortion" and "crime[s]" that have "as an element" the use or threatened use of force. 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). This language refers directly to generic crimes. The statute, however, contains other, more ambiguous language, covering "crime[s]" that "involv[e] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." Ibid. (emphasis added). While this language poses greater interpretive difficulty, the Court held that it too refers to crimes as generically defined).

Fifth Circuit

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Rodriguez v. Holder, 705 F.3d 207, (5th Cir. Jan. 16, 2013) (Section 16 has both criminal and noncriminal applications, and thus, the rule of lenity applies. We therefore are constrained to interpret any ambiguity in the statute in [Rodriguez's] favor.) (footnotes omitted); quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n. 8, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - FORCIBLE SEXUAL CONTACT
United States v. Rosas-Pulido , 526 F.3d 829 (5th Cir. May 2, 2008) (Minnesota conviction for unlawful sexual contact, in violation of M.S.A. 609.345(1)(c), punishing use of "force or coercion to accomplish" sexual contact is not a "forcible" sex offense for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes as the minimum conduct punishable under the statute includes a 14 year old giving a nipple twister to a classmate, an offense that does not involve forcible compulsion), citing In Re DLK, 381 N.W.2d 435, 436 (Minn. 1986) (nipple twister case).

Seventh Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS LIMITED TO ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE OF CONVICTION
LaGuerre v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1037 (7th Cir. May 20, 2008) (per curiam) (rejecting DHS argument court should go beyond elements of offense of conviction to determine whether state conviction constituted aggravated felony crime of violence under INA 101(a)(43)(f), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)).

Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ESCAPE FROM HALFWAY HOUSE NOT CRIME OF VIOLENCE FOR FEDERAL ARMED CAREER OFFENDER ENHANCEMENT PURPOSES
United States v. Piccolo, 441 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 2006) (Escape conviction under 18 U.S.C. 751(a), which includes failure to return to a non-secured halfway house, is not necessarily a crime of violence for federal armed career offender sentencing purposes). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0410577p.pdf

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - FALSE IMPRISONMENT - DIVISIBLE STATUTE
United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 431 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2005) (California conviction for false imprisonment, in violation of Penal Code 236, does not necessarily qualify as a crime of violence aggravated felony for purposes of applying a 16-level sentence enhancement for illegal reentry).

Lower Courts of Ninth Circuit

CAL CRIM DEF " SAFE HAVENS " MALICIOUS WITNESS DISSUASION " CRIME OF VIOLENCE " CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " REALISTIC PROBABILITY OF PROSECUTION
People v. Wahidi, 222 Cal.App.4th 802, 807, 166 Cal.Rptr.3d 416 (2d Dist. Dec. 30, 2013) (defendants request that victim and defendant settle their dispute by Islamic mediation, rather than a criminal case, was held to be both knowing and malicious, within the meaning of the malicious witness dissuasion statute, Penal Code 136.1(a)(2), even though the defendant did not demand the victim drop the charges or threaten any violence: There is no substantial evidence that Wahidi intended to vex, annoy, harm, or injure Khan when Wahidi approached Khan in the mosque. But the evidence does show that Wahidi intended to thwart or interfere in any manner with the orderly administration of justice by convincing Khan not to testify at the preliminary hearing the next day. Under the definition of malice in section 136, Wahidi maliciously attempted to dissuade Khan from testifying.") (emphasis added). Note. Under this decision, California law now defines Penal Code 136.1(a)(2) as including conduct such as a civilized request to resolve an issue according to religious belief and conscience that in no sense of the word involves an element of violence (18 U.S.C. 16(a) or by its nature creates a substantial risk of violence (18 U.S.C. 16(b)). This offense therefore does not constitute an aggravated felony crime of violence. In addition, the conduct here is not depraved, and does not involve an intent to vex, annoy, harm, or injure another. It should therefore not be considered a crime of moral turpitude. It includes conduct motivated solely by religious belief and conscience. This sufficiently establishes a realistic probability of prosecution under this statute for non-removable conduct to prevent a conviction for violating this statute from constituting an aggravated felony crime of violence or crime involving moral turpitude. Thanks to Daniel G. DeGriselles.

Tenth Circuit

ASSAULT - FEDERAL COMMON LAW DEFINITION
United States v. Hathaway, 318 F.3d 1001, 1007 (10th Cir. 2003) (at common law simple assault was defined as "either a willful attempt to inflict injury upon the person of another, or by a threat to inflict injury upon the person of another which, when coupled with an apparent present ability, causes a reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm.").

Other

RESOURCES " DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & CRIME OF VIOLENCE
NIP-NLG and Immigrant Defense Project have written an advisory on the Supreme Courts recent decision in U.S v. Castleman. The advisory explains why this decision should have no negative impact on immigration law and how it may even support arguments to narrow the domestic violence and aggravated felony removal grounds. The advisory is located at: http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/publications.htm